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LIBRARY OF THE 
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Q 940.9197 
M78uU 
1920 








Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2021 with funding trom 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 


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| SHOWING AMERICA'S PARTICIPATION 
| Selected from the Otttcral Hiles of the War Department 


With Unofficial Introductory Photographs 





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WILLIAM EMOORE Late Captain, US.A.and JAMES C. RUSSELL Late Captain USA. 


Pictorial Bureau 
Washington, TD GC: 


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WAR DEPARTMENT 


WASeE NGTON 


September £9, 1919. 


Dear Captain Moore: 
Any enterprise which attempts fairly 

and faithfully to spread hefore the country 
the facts regarding the participation of 
America in the World War is entitled to all 
the encouragement and arvroval it can receive 
from any source. The photographs of the 
Signal Corps are available for purchase at 
cost, of course, to any one who wishes to 
secure them, but I am glad to know that you 
are binding up a representative collection 

of them to illustrate the magnitude and 
effectiveness of the American military effort. 


Cordially yours, 


—_—_——— 


PE eae la eT 


Newton D. Baker 
Secretary of War. 








CAPTAIN MOORE served 15 months in France, where he was attached 
to General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces as 
officer in charge of tke Pictorial History of the A. E. F. In this capacity 
he directed the work, for the General Staff, of the Signal Corps Photographic 
Section. 

Captain Russell was detailed by the General Staff of the Army as censor 
of all official photographs and motion pictures at the Army War College, 
Washington, D. C. 











Dedicated to The American Fighting Man 


“I pay the supreme tribute to our officers and men of the line. Their ct ee ee yn N 
deeds are immortal, and they have earned the eternal gratitude of our \ Ree ere 
country.”—John J. Pershing, General, Commander-in-Chief, American. ie ae 
Expeditionary Forces. Zz 


WE GO TO WAR 


When the United States entered the World War in the spring of 1917 
the nation was unprepared in a military sense. The building of the huge 
war machine that later comprised four and a half million men had to be 
undertaken after the official entry of this country into hostilities April 6. 


The threat of war which had been hanging over the country since the 
sinking of the Lusitania in May, 1915, became practically a certainty 
Jan. 31, 1917, when the German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, 
handed a note from his government to Secretary Lansing announcing 
the inauguration by any of unrestricted submarine warfare on 
February |. The undersea policy of the German government was begun 
on the date announced. Three days later President Wilson handed his 
passports to Ambassador von Bernstorff and directed the withdrawal 
of the American Ambassador, James W. Gerard, from Germany. These 
steps were announced by President Wilson in a speech before the Senate 
on the same day, Feb. 3. In this speech Mr. Wilson suggested to all 
neutral countries that they follow the example of America. 


Feeling was intensified in the United States Feb. 28 when the Associated 
Press made public the details of a German plot to bring Mexico and Japan 
into an alliance against this country. The information was contained 
in a letter from Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, German Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, to the German minister to Mexico. On March | Dr. Zimmer- 
mann admitted the authenticity of the letter. War was now so certain 
that on March 9 President Wilson issued a call for a special session of 
_ Congress to meet April 16. Twelve days later the call for the special 
session was changed to April 2. 


Before Congress met the President called out part of the National 
Guard in eastern states and sent them to camp. This was March 25. 


Congress met on the appointed day and was addressed by President 
Wilson. He asked that a state of war be declared to exist with Germany. 
The joint resolution was passed and was signed by the President April 6. 
Meanwhile several American vessels had been s by German sub- 
marines with loss of lives. All the naval forces of the United States 


were mobilized by presidential proclamation on the day war was declared. 


While our preliminary war steps were being taken, several missions 
arrived from Allied countries to assist with their advice. The first of 
these were the British and French. In. the latter was Marshal Joffre, 
the hero of the first battle of the Marne. He immediately became a 
popular idol and was given triumphal receptions when he toured the 
country. Italian, Belgian, Japanese and other missions followed. 


April 28 was a red letter day in the war calendar. On that day the 
Senate and House passed the army draft bill which provided for the call- 
ing up of approximately ten million men between the ages of 21 and 31 
for service with the colors. The French and British were asking for 
the immediate despatch of troops to France and in compliance with this 
demand the War Department announced that nine regiments of engi- 
neers would be raised immediately and sent abroad. On May [8 the 
President ordered the Ist Division of the regular army to France. Mean- 
while Major General John J. Pershing had been chosen commander-in- 
chief of our still to be organized expeditionary forces and sent to France 
with a small staff of officers. At the time of his selection Gen. Pershing, 
only recently promoted from the grade of brigadier general, was com- 


manding a division of regulars that had been operating in Mexico to 
effect the capture of Villa. 


June 5 had been fixed as the day for all men eligible under the draft 
to register. In order to provide officers for these prospective citizen 
soldiers camps were opened Sear the country for the instruction 
of officers. These camps were modeled on the volunteer instruction 
camps at Plattsburg that had been inaugurated three years earlier by 
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood. The finest young men in the nation rushed 
to offer their services and the regular army officers in charge of selection 
found it difficult to keep the numbers down to what properly could be 
handled. These officer candidates were given three months’ intensive 
instruction and were graduated in August in time to take care of the 
first quotas of the draft that reported for duty in the sixteen draft camps 
in September. Other training camps for officers were established later. 


Those units of the National Guard which had not been ordered to 
duty in March were called out by the President July 9. The regular 
army and the navy already were busily recruiting their ranks. Thus, 
within two months, the machinery had been constructed for the manu- 
facture of that great military force which by Nov. I1, 1918, had helped 


to topple over the German military autocracy. 


By July the nation was feverishly at work building up the army and 
navy. But there were other equally important measures to be taken 
in the fields of finance and production. To assist in this work eminent 
men in all walks of life were called into government service to serve upon 
boards and commissions, and in departments. The women of the nation 
also were mobilized for war service. These answered the call in as great 
numbers and with as much patriotic devotion as the men. 





Gm. PLEWw 





Harris & Ewin 


War! 


T is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful country 
| into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of al! 
wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But 
the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight 
for the things which we have always carried nearest our 
hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit 
to authority to have a voice in their own governments, 
for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal! 
dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shal! 
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world 


itself at last free 


To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our for- 
tunes, everything that we are and everything that we 
have, with the pride of those who know that the day has 
come when America is privileged to spend her blood and 
her might for the principles that gave her birth and 
happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God 
helping her, she can do no other. — President Wilson to 
Congress, April 2, 1917. 


THE WAR PRESIDENT 





Harris & Ewing 


The White House, where President Wilson and the Cabinet, with other ofhcial advisers formed their war plans. 





The War Cabinet: President Wilson. Back row, left to right: William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury; Thomas W. Gregory, Attorney General; 
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture; William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor. 

Front row, left to right: Robert Lansing, Secretary of State; Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War; Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster General; Franklin 
K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior; William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce. Caeie 





Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War Josephus Daniels. Secretary of the Navy 


Underwood & Underwood G. V. Buck 





At 8:30 o'clock in the evening of April 2, 1917, President Wilson a 


ing that a state of war be declared to exist between the United States and the imperial German Government. The war resolution was passed by the Senate 
April 4, by the House April 6. It was signed by the President é 


and became effective the same day. ee ae 


ppeared in person before Congress, sitting in joint session, and read his message recommend- 











The Cotmander-in-Chief of the American “Shirt Sleeve’’ soldiering had prepared General Pershing for the task that faced him in France. 
“Over there” the nature of his duties demanded that he ride in limousines and special trains, but 
he worked harder than when he rode horseback in Mexico. Underwood & Underwood 


Expeditionary Forces came out of the West. 





General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff during the last year of the war. 
Before becoming executive head of the army he was chief of artillery of the A. E. F. 


Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, Maj. Lawrence Martin and the Washington newspaper correspondents. This conference took place daily during 


the Summer and Fall of 1918. Through these reporters the Chief of Staff daily told American families what their boys were doing in France. Harris & Ewin 


Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff; Edward B. Stettinius, Second 
Assistant Secretary of War, and Frederick Paul Keppel, Fourth 
Assistant Secretary of War, in consultation. 


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The State, War and Navy Building at Washington. It became tco 
small to house the personnel of the three departments early in the 


war. New buildings of immense size were hastily built to hold the 
overflow. 


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Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals and staff. 
Goethals built the Panama Canal. During 
Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. 


In peace days Gen. 
the late war he was 


Harris & Ewing 
















The War Trade Board. Its du- 
ties were to regulate exports and 
imports, and trading with the 
enemy or allies of the enemy. 
Standing, left to right: C. M. 
Woolley, E. F. Gray, Alonzo E. 
Taylor, Frank C. Munson. 
Seated, left to right: Beaver 
White, Vance McCormick, 
Thomas L. Chadbourne, Jr., 
Albert Strauss. 





Benedict Crowell, First Assistant Secretary of War. Mr. Crowell 
was a major in the Army when called upon to doff his uniform and 
help run the War Department as a civilian. 


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In this group of distinguished inventors, scientists and business men are Thomas A. Edison, Chairman: 


First general meeting of Naval Advisory Board in Secretary Daniels’ office. 


W. R. Whitney, L. H. Blackland. Frank J. Sprague, B. G. Lamme, R. S. Woodward, Arthur G. Webster, A. M. Hunt, Alfred Craven, Spencer Miller, William Le Roy Emmett, Matthew B 
Sellers, Hudson Maxim, Peter Cooper Hewitt, Thomas Robins. Howard Coffin, Andrew L. Riker. Henry A. Wise Wood, Elmer A. Sperry, William M. Saunders, Benjamin B. Thayer 
J. W. Richards and Lawrence Addicks Harris & Ewing 


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National Council of Defense and Advisory Commission. Seated, left to right: David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture; Josephus Daniels, Secretary 
of the Navy; Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War; Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior; William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor. Standing, left 
to right: Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Secretary; Julius Rosenwald, Bernard N. Baruch, Danie! Willard, Dr. F. H. Martin, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Howard E. 


Coffin, and W. S. Gifford, Director. Mack Ewing 





Underwood & Underwood 


President Wilson and a group of his aides on the White House veranda. This group met every Wednesday to coordinate national war activities. Seated, 
left to right: Benedict Crowell, First Assistant Secretary of War; WilliamG. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury and Railroad Administration; President Wilson, 
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; Bernard N. Baruch, War Industries Board. Standing, left to right: Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator; Edward 
N. Hurley, Chairman of the Shipping Board; Vance McCormick, Chairman of the War Trade Board, and Harry A. Garfield, Fuel Administrator. 


Personnel of the War Plans Division of the General Staff in the Winter of 1917-18. Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown, Director of the Division, stands in the 
center of the first row, number 4 from the left. 





War College Building, on the Potomac River, near Washington, D. C. This building, during the war, housed the War Plans Division of the General 
Staff. It is now a General Staff School, attended by officer students who commanded divisions and brigades in the Great War. 


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Navy War Council in Secretary Daniels’ office. Secretary Daniels seated. Standing, left to right: Major Gen. George Barnett, commandant of the Marine Corps; Capt. W. C. Watts, Judge Advocat 

noua Ga ottlin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Rear Admiral Samuel McGowan, Paymaster General; Rear Admiral Robert S. Griffin, Chief Engice ane William 
S. Benson‘ Chief of Naval Operations; Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of Bureau of Ordnance; Comd. Herbert G. Sparrow, Aide to the Secretary; Rear Admiral Charles W. Parks, Chief of the 
Bureau of Yards and Docks; Rear Admiral Leigh C. Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation: Rear Admiral William C. Braisted, Surgeon General. 


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British War Mission. Arthur Balfour, ex-premier of England, seated in middle, wearing a silk hat. The group comprises leading military, naval 
and commercial experts of the British Empire, sent over as soon as America declared war to aid us with their advice, based on three years’ war experience. 


Underwood & Underwood 


Italian War Mission. This group of celebrities helped arouse the French War Mission. Marshal Joffre, hero of the first Battle of the 

Italians in America to put forth the splendid effort that distinguished Marne, stands in the center of the group, wearing a military cape 

them during the war. Harrin & Bwine overcoat. That figure and uniform later became familiar and 
popular during the Marshal’s tour of the United States. 





RECRUIT 


BRITISHERS jury nual 


Patriotic men of all ages and conditions in life besieged recruiting offices in the first weeks of the war, demanding to be enrolled as soldiers or sailors. 
These crowds often stood in line for days before they could reach the overworked recruiting officers. 

Scene in a National Guard Armory in New York City when the first call came for volunteers to fill up the ranks of militia regiments. Note 
the splendid types of young men who are offering themselves for military service. 


Int. Film Service 





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When the local militia marched away to their mobilization camps, scenes like this were repeated in hundreds of towns. No doubt your own town had a 
similar farewell parade in which discipline for the moment was forgotten. This outfit belonged to the Seventh Regiment, Illinois National Guard, Chicago. 


Sending their men to war with a kiss and a smile was one of the biggest jobs women had in the war days. Sometimes tears forced them- 
selves through the smiles and sobs had to be choked back as in this case. Int. Film Service 








New York’s famous Central Park was turned into a drill field when the war tocsin sounded. It was filled from dawn until sunset with “rookies” learning 
“squads east.’ This particular outfit of volunteers was made up of recruits of the 12th Regt. Inf., N. Y. National Guard. 

When Johnny marched away on the first leg of his trip to the battlefield his best girl went along as far as the train. ‘All aboard” was 
the signal for a barrage of kisses and the long embrace that sometimes was the last one. Underwood & Underwood 


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Seca Sat 
Maj. General Leonard Wood was the originator of the “‘Plattsburg Idea” which furnished our young army with its splendid reserve officers. The General is 
seen here addressing a group of officer candidates at Ft. McPherson, Ga. Central Now Eheto terviee 





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First Officers’ Training Camp at Plattsburg. “Rookies” in an open air school. The regular army officer standing in the center is lecturing to the class. 


Making army officers in three months was a “hurry up” job. It was necessary to utilize every minute. When the young candidates for commission were 
tired from drilling they sat down and listened to a lecture Unuerwood & Underwood 


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Student officers at Ft. Myer Training Camp learning bayonet work. Maj. Theodore Reosevelt leading a company of officer candidates to 
Each bundle of switches represented a German, so when the embryo mess at first Plattsburg training camp. Maj. Roosevelt fought in 
officer missed the mark he was theoretically dead. France with the First Division, was wounded, decorated, and came 


home a lieutenant colonel. Punk Thompson 


On an old battlefield of Black Hawk, the Indian chieftain, his name- 


There was no royal road to a commission for the patriotic young men 
sakes of the 86th (Black Hawk) Division Jearned marksmanship. 


who volunteered in the officers’ training camps. The man without 
a hat is Louis Swift, son of a millionaire packer. This rifle range could accommodate two brigades at one time. 
tot. Film Serviee 


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The “‘slacker hunt” Learning to handle the big guns at Ft. Mon- Secretary Baker handing his commission to a Making a landing at 
in New York City. roe. The men graduated here later handled successful candidate at the Ft. Myer Training the Army Balloon 
This boy, however, the big guns that helped blast our way to Camp. President and Mrs. Wilson were on- School, Ft. Sill, Ok- 
had his registration victory. lookers. + Central News Photo Service lahoma. 


card. 








The scroll of Fate. As the numbers 
were drawn in Washington, lists were 
posted in all the draft districts of 
the country. Crowds like the one 
in this New York City scene searched. 
the lists day and night. 


Typical scene in a district draft board office. Drafted men answer- 
ing the questionnaires. Int. Filta Service 


America’s biggest lottery. Secretary Baker drawing the first draft 
number. This number was 258, which meant that each man in the 
4,577 selective draft districts of the United States holding that 
number was the first man called to the colors in his district. 


Underwood & Underwood 


The group in this picture typify the democracy of the American 
Army. The man in knickerbockers is Kingdon Gould. tnt. vitm service 


Blostein Studio 













Waiting for the train that would 
carry the first contingent of Na- 
tional Army mentocamp. Cities 
and villages made a patriotic holi- 
day of these occasions throughout 
the United States. This scene 
was caught by the camera in 
Devil’s Lake, North Dakota. It 
was duplicated in every town in 
the Union. 


Saying goodbye to mother. This was the hardest part of going to 
war. Most American mothers, like the one in this picture, played 
the game as bravely as their sons. 





Paul Thompson 


Field artillery section in action. Training of young men to become artillery officers. In a war where “rolling barrages” were a feature it was necessary that 
both officers and men should be able to shoot cannon with almost the same accuracy as rifles. 





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Chicago draft men boarding train for Camp Grant. As in all such scenes the prospective soldiers are more cheerful than the relatives they are leaving 
behind. Study the serious expressions on the faces in the platform crowd. 

“Please smile’’ is always the photographer’s command. Evidently the camera man asked the same thing here. Everybody is smiling but 
there is no mirth behind the attempt. tnt. Film Serviee 


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n the men of the National Army marched away to war they were made to feel that the nation was behind them. These Chicago draft 
Michigan Avenue amidst a tornado of cheering. 





men swept down 
Iat. Film Service 


The willing spirit in which America accepted the draft always is testified to by these “goodby” New York City reviewing its army of draft 
scenes. The men in the cars are Brooklyn draft men bound for Yaphank. Brooklyu Kaske 


men before they left for Camp. 


Underwood & Underwood 








Three generations called to the colors. Right to Left: Father, Child, Wife, Sister, Mother. Snapped by a newspaper camera man in the Kansas City Union 
station. This single photograph tells better than a whole page of newspaper print the tragedy war brought to millions of American families. 


The camps were not finished when the first draft quotas arrived. 
The job called for speed. Drills began at once amidst the confusion 
of building operations. Camp Upton, Yaphank, N. Y. tt. Film Service 


Soldiers and citizens too. Because of lack of uniforms draft men 
in many camps learned to drill in the “‘civies’” they wore from home. 
These men were from Cincinnati. 








Getting acquainted with a mess kit—a complicated business. Draft 


“rookies” from New York City at their first mess in camp. 
Underwood & Underwood 


All dressed up in Uncle Sam’s uniform. Draft men at a Texas camp 
just after drawing full uniform equipment. 


“Hiking” long distances hardened the new soldiers for the tasks Gen. Pershing, in all his communications from France, emphasized 


ahead. It was hard work but, like true soldiers, these men at Camp training in shooting. Here is a target practice view showing how 
Grant seem to have got some fun out of it. marksmen were made. vaseiaheteeresoer 





Bayonet practice under a July sun in Texas. These soldiers are “Going over the top” in practice in a Maryland camp. In actual 
simulating actual war conditions by fighting with gas masks and practice in France it was done more casually. Int. Film Service 
“tin hats.” 





The human voice could not carry far enough to reach all these men so 
uge megaphone. 


the athletic instructor used a h 


Ten thousand infantrymen at Camp Hancock going through calisthenics in cadence. 











“Policing” camp after a heavy 
snowfall looks as if it might be a 
relief from monotony, but in Camp 
Grant, Rockford, IIl., it became a 


deadly grind during the hard winter 
of 1917-18. 





Husky Westerners jumping into the “‘enemy’s’” trench with fixed Shooting at targets 500 yards away. Our shooting astounded the 
bayonets. Camp Lewis, Washington. French and dismayed the Germans. 





Review of Artillery Brigade, 28th Division, Camp Hancock, Ga. The camera’s lens could take in only a few hundred of the 4,500 men assembled on the parade 
ground. 


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Human Service Flag comprising 2,000 sailors at the U. S. Naval Training Station, San Francisco. 


THE YANKS ARE COMING 
















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This Map Illustrates Troop Sailings from American Ports to Great Britain and France 


During our 19 months of war more than 2,000,000 American soldiers were 
carried to France. Half a million of these went over in the first 13 
months and a million and a half in the last 6 months. 


The highest troop-carrying records are those of July, 1918, when 306,000 


The cargo fleet was almost exclusively American. It reached the size 


of 2,600,000 deadweight tons and carried to Europe about 7,500,000 tons 


of cargo. 


soldiers were carried to Europe and May, 1919, when 330,000 were 
brought home to America. 


Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York. Half 
of them landed in Great Britain and the other half landed in France. 
Among every 100 Americans who went over 49 went in British ships, 45 
in American ships, 3 in Italian, 2 in French, and | in Russian shipping 
under English control. 


Our cargo ships averaged one complete trip every 70 days and our troop 
ships one complete trip every 35 days. 


The greatest troop-carrier among all the ships has been the Leviathan, 


which landed 12,000 men, or the equivalent of a German division, in 
France every month. 


The fastest transports have been the Great Northern and the Northern 
Pacific, which have made complete turnarounds, taken on new troops, 
and started back again in 19 days. 


LEONARD P. AYRES, Colonel, G. S., 
Chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff. 


These troops are marching to the ferry-boats at Alpine Landing, N. J., that will carry them down the Hudson River to the transport at Hoboken. Hundreds 
of thousands of American soldiers passed this way from their “rest” camps. Why “rest” camps? Ask Washington. 








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“Lets Go!” Yanks on the first leg of their journey to France. The ferryboat is transporting eager fighting men to the docks at Hoboken where convoys 
await them. (In circle) The “safe arrival” Card. When soldiers had disposed of their equipment aboard the transport they addressed to their next 


of kin printed postcards announcing their safe arrival. These were collected at the port of embarkation and mailed when the cables told of the ship’s 
advent at the point of debarkation. ; 


Major General David C. Shanks who handled General March was sending more than 10,000 troops a day to General Pershing when this picture 
the great troop movements from Hoboken. was made at Hoboken in July, 1918. These soldiers are boarding the “Leviathan” at Hoboken. 
During the war |,656,000 men were expedited 

from that port. 








The “Leviathan”, formerly the German passenger liner “‘Vaterland”, leaving Hoboken for France. During the Spring and Summer of 1918 the “‘Leviathan’ 
averaged 27 days for the round trip. She carried on each eastern voyage 12,000 soldiers, or the equivalent of a German division, and a crew of 2,000. 


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Major General Grote Hutchinson during the war despatched to France from Newport News 288,000 men. Of the embarkation ports the Virginia city was 
second in Importance. 


Troops waiting to board ship at Newport News. 





Fighting men in full pack go aboard. “Goodby, Dixie. Hello! France.” 





The Great Adventure. 





As the troopship travels the lane where the U-boat lurks these “buddies” 
hold council. 


Whippets of the Sea. Submarine chasers on the alert. 





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The Yanks are Coming. In this fleet are seen the troop ships “‘George Washington” and ‘“‘America” steaming majestically toward France. Photographed 


May 18, 1918. 





i 





The destroyer Henderson throwing out smoke screen to protect convoy. “Ever”, says Lieutenant Colonel Palmer,” the destroyer weaving its watchful 
course of ‘guardianship in all weathers will remain the symbol of devout gratitude to all men who have crossed the Atlantic in this war. 





Scanning the sea from the pilot house of a destroyer. Owing to The wake of a periscope. The sign of death upon the waters for which 


the unceasing vigilance of the Navy not one East-bound American all “lookouts” on transports searched the sea twenty-four hours a day. 
transport was torpedoed or damaged by the enemy. 








Sharply on the lookout for periscopes great “blimps” escorted our ; ; 
troop fleets as they approached the shores of France. “Blimp” is Signalling from a destroyer. 
slang for dirigible balloon. 


Western Newspaper Union 









Paid in full. A U-boat blown up by 
a depth bomb. 





ON et (i 






on Of, 


ELE Hse = 


A deckload of “‘ash cans.” A full supply of depth bombs, each The destructive range of a depth charge is 200 feet from the point 
containing 300 pounds of high explosives, ready to be dumped on of detonation. 
undersea pirates. 


TEBE That w : 
pe Sh 


Cardinal Richelieu first recognized the importance of Brest as a seaport but it remained for the American army to give it fullest development. It was here that 


79|,000 Yankee soldiers first set foot on French soil. 


















From prairies pioneered by Mar- 
quette and Joliet came gallant men 
of Illinois to fight side by side 
with compatriots of the intrepid 
“voyageurs.” Thirty-third divis- 
ion, Brest. 








“The sea was all right. Let the navy have it, but give them the 
Early arrivals. land. They were soldiers.” Lieut. Col. Palmer in “America In 
France.” 


a 





CE Po psc) eS 2 i dane 
“So this is France!’ Americans getting their first view of the soil they had come 3,000 miles to fight on. The “Leviathan,” carrying 12,000 troops, 4,000 sailors, 


200 Red Cross nurses and 700 casual officers was coming to anchor in the busy harbor of Brest when this picture was taken. An hour before the huge 
transport had been attacked by a nest of German U-boats and had successfully fought them off with stern guns and the assistance of destroyers. 


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The vanguard of the two million in 
France. Soldiers of the First Divi- 
sion arriving June 26, 1917. This 
was the first combat outfit to land. 
Some aviators and medical units 
had preceded them. 





eg 


PL er ot ee ne 
(NPS PA 





Giving France the “once over’ from the decks of the first transport. French civilians gathered to welcome the first arrivals. 
to arrive in France, June 26, 1917. “Les Yankees sont arrives! Vivent les Yankees.” 
(“The Yankees have come! Long live the Yankees.’’) 





ia 0000 Be » ey 
Debarkation of the 42nd (Rainbow) Division at St. Nazaire. This famous division, made up of National Guard outfits from twenty-seven states and the 


District of Columbia, landed its headquarters at St. Nazaire Nov. 1, 1917. Other contingents landed at St. Nazaire, Brest and Liverpool, Eng., from Nov |. 
to Dec. 7. 






we “Liye F RS 





Early arrivals 
marching 
through the 
streets of ‘an- 
cient Brest. 
For two years 
this French 
port echoed to 
the tread of 
marching 
Yankees, go- 
ing towards 
the front and 
later flowing 
home. 






From the 
transports ar- 
riving troops 
marched to 
nearby rest 
camps for a 
few days be- 
fore boarding 
“Chevaux 8” 
for training 
areas. 




















OS 





More of the Rainbow Division at St. Nazaire—the 117th Engineers. Street scene in St. Nazaire during the early days when France was - 
The two leading figures are Col. William Kelly, commanding, and strange and wonderful to the Americans and they were admired 
Lieut. Col. Harold Hetrick. curiosities to the French. 


Off to the training field. Their first ride in the now famous “Hommes 40,Chevaux 8” (40 men or 8 horses). In these “side door palace cars’ our doughboys 
traveled wherever they went, except at the front. There they “hiked” or rode in trucks. The “Hommes 40, Chevaux 8” furnished many of the famous jokes 


of the A. E. F. 








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‘ i. aes Tee 4 paling “8 A> | E 
eo ¢ SS 4S $e Mv el oF DR 2% ‘ | oe ina ‘el Ls ; —— 
|. The first armed force of a foreign power to march in England's Capital since the time of the Conqueror. Thirteenth Engineers crossing Westminster Bridge. 


In inset) Major General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces and his staff landing at Liverpool June 8, 1917. 
He and the British general who welcomed him inspect the guard of honor. The following day General Pershing was welcomed in London by King George. 


~ 








Gen. Pershing and Gen. Pelletier, French army, reviewing honor 
steamer being welcomed by French civil and military dignitaries at guard of French marines on dock at Boulogne. 
Boulogne, June 13, 1917. 


| Pershing arrives in France. The general and his staff on a Channel 
Q 








Gen. Pershing meeting the French officials sent to welcome him and 
his staff at Boulogne. 


A notable group at the Boulogne railway station. In the front row. 
left to right, are: Colonel, the Count de Chambrun, descendant o- 
La Fayette, General Pelletier, Gen. Pershing and Maj. (later Major 
General) James G. Harbord, his chief of staff, 


A guard of honor of French infantry, in 


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Pershing meets the Poilu. 





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Paris welcomed Pershing with wild enthusiasm. Although unknown to them he typified the 
people of France from the devastator. The simple republican soldier was received with 
conquering marshals or crowned heads. 


power of the great sister republic that was coming to save the 
all the popular honors that heretofore had been reserved for 











Color 


of a battalion of 16th Inf., 


Ist Division 
Paris. 


part in 
n when 


gh the streets of 


1917, 


, at Austerlitz Station, 


This battalion took 


a remarkable demonstratio 
aris, July 4 


it marched throu 


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American and French officers in the Reuilly Barracks yard, Paris. 


g through streets of 


.. marchin 


Paris from railway station to Reuilly Barracks. 


Battalion of the [6th Inf., Ist Div 


arracks to do honor to the memory of 


y march from Reuilly b 


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“Latayette, we are here!’’ Historic scene at the tomb of the Marquis de Lafayette when General Pershing uttered the apothegm attributed to him by 


press correspondents. Army officers later declared that these words were spoken by Lt. Col. Charles E. Stanton, Q. M. C., of General Pershing’s staff. 


Underwood & Underwood 


French crowds cheer men of the 16th Infantry as they leave Picpus cemetery after doing honor to the memory of Lafayette. 





In the shadow of Napoleon’s tomb on Independence Day, 1917, General Pershing, Marshal Joffre, President Poincaire and other American and French 
notables inspect an American battalion about to leave for the training area near the front. 


= 3 ss oe eee 


While a French band plays the “Star Spangled Banner,” General No sooner are the ceremonies of greeting over than General Pershing 
Pershing is presented with a stand of colors. Hotel des Invalides, gets down to business. Here he is acquiring first hand information 
July 4, 1917. at a French aviation center. 








Busy days for the “C-in-C.””_ In the modest corner room at 31 Rue Constantine, Paris, Major General John J. Pershing laid the foundation of the American 
Expeditionary Forces. With that iron jaw could he fail to win? 


TRAINING AND TRENCH FIGHTING 


“All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive. This purpose will be emphasized 


in every phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought.’ 


““We did not enter this war for anything but a decision,” said a dis- 
tinguished officer of the General Staff during the course of a lecture at 
General Headquarters in France in which he described the training of 
American combat troops. 


There never was a question in the mind of G. H. Q., he said, that the 
German lines could be broken by American troops. 


“With the idea of the offensive as the only possible role to fit the Amer- 
ican characteristics and mission in the war,” he added, “‘also went the 
idea of an aggressive, self-reliant infantry’ as the basis of all organization. 
Only with troops imbued with the offensive spirit can decisive results 
be obtained.” 


The fundamental doctrine insisted upon by General Pershing is found 
in his statement of the general principles governing the training of units 
of the American Expeditionary Forces: 


“The methods to be employed must remain or become distinctly our 
own. 


“The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in 
their essence. This war has developed special features which involve 
special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our 
Drill Regulations, Small-Arms Firing Manual, Field Service Regulations 
and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers 
and constitute the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, 
except as modified in detail by instructions from these headquarters. 


“The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the In- 
fantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marks- 
man both on the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit 
must be developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, 
invincible in battle.” 


The early period of training and trench warfare is thus described by 


Brigadier General Fox Conner, Chief G-3, G. H. Q.: 


“When the great German offensive of March, 1918, began America 
had four divisions in the line. One of these (the Ist) held its own sec- 
tor north of Toul while the 26th in the Chemin-des-Dames, the 42nd in 
the Luneville, and the 2d in the Verdun-St. Mihiel sectors were bri- 
gaded with the French for a first tour of duty in the trenches. Prior 


? 


—General John J. Pershing. 


to the opening of the German offensive the guiding principles which 
had been adopted for the employment of arriving divisions were in out- 
line as follows: 


“Arriving uivisions would be sent to a training area (the artillery to 
one of the special camps) for a period of from one to two months. During 
this period the division was to be equipped, receive special training and 
become acclimated in the atmosphere of war. Upon the completion of 
this preliminary period the division was to be brigaded in quiet sectors 
with units of our Allies for a month or six weeks’ duty in the trenches. 
After this period of actual service the division was to be reassembled 
in a training area and receive a month’s instruction in which attention 
would be especially devoted to maneuvering as a division. Upon the 
completion of this last month’s instruction the division would take its 
place on the battle front. The German offensive, however, made neces- 
sary the abandonment of the policy above outlined, During the period 
to mclude July 15, 1918, it was essential to throw American troops into 
the fight at the earliest possible moment in order that the war might not 
be lost, and after July 15 it was only by the maximum use of American 
troops that winning the war in 1918 became possible. The Ist Division 
was therefore the only division which followed strictly the program 
originally intended. - 


“In September of 1917 it had been decided that the logical employ- 
ment of the first American army to be formed was to be found in the 
reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. In preparation for this operation 
it had been arranged that as our divisions as such were ready to enter 
the line they should be placed on the St. Mihiel front, thus gradually 
creating a purely American sector. The German series of offensives 
and the necessity of breaking up those offensives at all costs—with 
corrollaries such as the desire, arising from necessity, of our allies to 
raise the morale of their soldiers through the appearance of our soldiers 
at different parts of the front, and willingness of the British to increase 
our troop shipping provided our troops were sent to the British front for 
preliminary training—served, however, to uvset our plans with regard 
to St. Mihiel for many weary months. In fact, by the end of June, 1918, 
our troops were literally spread from Switzerland to the English Channel 
and only the constant and firm determination of the Commander-in- 
Chief eventually to assemble our forces prevented that task from being 
abandoned as hopeless.” 


ee 
~e 
/ 


sais 


“An Aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels 


himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.’ 
Pershing. 


Gen. John J. 


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Sa = Fy 
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Famous Blue Devils showed our Ist 
Division how to hurl grenades. 
Strained arms soon taught us that 
SS overhand bowling throw was the 

est. 


“The Tin Lizzie” is what the doughboys dubbed the Chauchat 


automatic rifle whose uses are being explained by an Alpine Chasseur. 















7 > 
_* oe a 
* wien st 
x Gee os oy 





Five wound stripes on the right sleeve of the French veteran on the 
left give a hint of the experience that qualifies him to teach our soldiers 
the use of the rifle grenade. 


American baseball pitchers might find serious rivals in these F rench 
grenade tossers. 


imate 


young our doughboys were on int 


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marine is learning to fire his pistol according to regulations. 


With the old as well as the 


and cordial terms. 


Say, Kids, is this right?’ The husky sergeant and his young 
The gossips. 


preceptresses. 








The British 
became so pro- 
ficient in the 
use of the 
machine gun 
that they 
couldlay down 
barrages as ac- 
curately as ar- 
tillerymen. 
His Majesty's 
officers in- 
structing our 
meninthe 
handling of the 
Vickers gun. 











Advancing on “enemy” positions. 


Sgt. Harris, 15th Bn., B. E. F., formerly 
Ist Regt., New Mexico National Guard, 
teaching a detail of Yanks. 


Cann iw: 
Debenham, of 
the British 
Army in- 
structs our 
oficers and 
non-coms on 
the machine 
gun range. 






C. A. Blacklock (left) and Brig. 
Gen. A. G. Hubback, B. E. F., watching 


the training of Americans. 


Scotch and English offtcers super- 


vising training on the target range. 





French soldier fitting mask on Yank so that gas cannot leak through, “The Infantry Soldier will be trained to a high degree of skill as a 


marksman, both on the rifle range and in field firmg.” Gen. John J. 
Pershing. 


% SARS Bes, EOF 4, NS 
Bbary 2 Sp Ln hoi RAMS 
si ~~ Rae HM > eialeegle OH ts ‘ ie Ties 
Fi nae Oe OND ae SEN, lta: ae & 
di ad os, hes j ae : we Ped t ee 
ia if oe Wel awe: api : wt C. Tee, \ et 
The chivalrous Yank, when not fighting alongside the men of France, often helped the women in their arduous toil. 


b 1 


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i 





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EES KM BNO iy, t i 2 + + ¥ : “if 
LLC (SSS : Le See a AS * 2 2.4 , i NS 


French soldiers sm E Ax fe Naw Se OF a Men of the 42d 
acting as in- oe £m te att ag > Mere Nes 0 odanstin, | ae J Div., in gas 
structors 2S ; 3 ry, ie = Fe 5 BY Ay, naa | ao masks, hur! 
to marines on << , | aS lassie, | ary Mo er, E.Mey Som ) ‘ bombs. 

the rifle range. SA: ' 

















A d f whippets at, the Gondre- “Hawkeyes” of the 168th Inf. (former lowa “Leathernecks” of the 95th Company, 
eilcor ote es National Guards), marching through Rolampont, Marines, at Sommedieue, watch Poilus 


February 4, 1918. march to front, April 29, 1918. 


* 


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he Sh HU DAM COE 
en eee 


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BARS ie OO VS He mg 

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: yeh ee ROA EMR gy : 
‘Sy ae tes, FE a RACH te, 
dis a tas te 





Lads used to bath rooms and steam heat looked back on billets like these as luxuries after 
front line experience: 


(Upper left hand corner). Entrance to G. H. Q. For more than a year American head- (Upper right hand corner). Barracks B, G.H. Q. On the second floor, over the middle 
quarters was a place of mystery to a hundred million Americans. General headquarters doorway was the office of the ““C-in-C”” (Commander-in-Chief). In the A. E. F. everything 


of the A. E. F. was establisher’ at Chaumont, Haute Marne, in September 1917. possible was reduced to initials for brevity’s sake. 





ois fl 


88S E TA) PS 


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OP we cna z Bod 
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7 OE See a EO teas ieee sere: s i: «oes SA 
7 ag TO ern Bi 


An air view of “G. H. Q.”, Chaumont. The buildings surrounding the rectangle housed the eeneral staff of the A. E. F. 
and the hundreds of officers attached thereto. 


The brain center of the A. E. F. 








Officers of the Ist Diy. (18th Inf.) 
at mess during march to take up 
their positions in the sector north 





“There was nothing downhearted about their mood, as you saw by Men of the |8th Infantry in the trenches. They are now five-day 
their faces,’’ writes Lt. Col. Palmer in his book, speaking of the veterans. 

men of the Ist Div. when they went into the trenches for the first 

time, January 19, 1918. 





Taking a look at Jerry. Officers and men of the 18th Infantry, Ist Div., in the front line January 20, 1918. 





Sentinel of the Ist Div. on the alert. 


Men of the 18th Inf. in an observation post. 


“Buckeyes” of the 166th Inf., 42d 
Div., rest on the hike to Rolampont. 





In the Toul Sector where the Ist Division took over the first trenches Soldiers of the 101st Inf., 26th Div., in the trenches. 
to be held by Americans. 





Supply train of the 42d Div. on the way to Rolampont. 


& 


The last long mile on the way to 
Rolampont. : 





ate - 5 
; 


General Pershing insisted on rigorous march discipline. This Yank 
is temporarily exhausted but he'll be up and away in a few minutes. . 


TAG 
a) 


—- 





» , - 


The gun that fired the Geet shot for America. It was aimed in the general direction of Berlin October 23, 1917, by a gunner of Battery C, 6th F. A., Ist Div., 
commanded by Captain Idus R. McLendon. It is now at the United States Military Academy, West Point. 


ee : 
-s 


“Here lie the first soldiers of the United States to fall on the soil of France for liberty and justice.” This is the inscription on the graves of Corp. James D. 
Gresham and Privates Thomas F. Enright and Merle D. Hay who were killed on the night of November 3, 1917, when a German patrol raided a part of the 
trenches occupied by the Americans. Bathelemont, France. 





A gas alarm. Soldiers of the First Division in a dugout on the Y. M. C. A. worker serving hot chocolate to Yanks and Poilus in 


front line. front line. 





A medical officer at work behind 
the lines during our early occu- 
pation of the trenches. 





First aid. Bertrichamps, April 26, 1918. A dressing station at the front near Bertrichamps, April 26, 1918. 





Sgt. John Letzing, 104th Inf., 26th Div., proudly exhibits his prisoner, 
Robert Froehlich. Froehlich was the first German soldier captured 


by the 26th Div. February 17, 1918. 








“How!” Yanks and Poilus in the front line drink a toast to the Beloved of all Yanks. Miss Gladys McIntyre of the Salvation 
Allies. April 16, 1918. : Army, serving doughnuts to the men of the 26th Div. Ansauvillers, 
April 9, 1918. 


After a three days’ march im the 
snow the 42d _ Div. arrives in its 
training area around Rolampont. 





SN SSS SS 
SZ Del LS 


LL SSS 


AR 1 





In “side-door Pullmans” Yanks of the 10{st Inf., 26th Div., leave 


Cannoneers of the 6th Artillery on way to front in Toul Sector, 
; for the Soissons front, February, 1918. 


January 18, 1918. 





== 


FAN LSS —— 














Men of the 
167th Inf.(4th 
Ala.) eat mess 
in front line. 












LL RV. 





gS 
Soldiers of the 
42d Div. in 


forward posi- 
tion near Ba- 
donviller, 


March 16, 
1918. 


Doughbo d machi nners of 165th Funeral of Private Dyer J. Bird, 166th Inf. (4th Lt. Col. George Florence, Major R. G. 
Inf. (69th Inf. N.Y.N G), about to Inf. O. N. G.), at Domjevin, March 3, 1918. Allen and members of staff of 166th Inf. 
move up to front line. Croismare, March Private Bird was killed in a listening post by leaving dugout for inspection of lines at 


2, 1918. German patrol. Blemerey. 








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Trench mortar torpedo burst 


March 17, 1918. 
Patrol under Lieut. Cu 
viller, March 18, 1918 


of 168th Inf. 


preparatory toaraid. March 
s land through 


” 
’ 


, 1918. Frenchmen 


Hawkeyes 
March 17 
advance into no man 


ae 





In sector near Badonviller occupied by 
American and French officers cut wire 
Going over the top at Badonviller, 
and lowans of the 168th Inf. 


17, 1918. 
breach in wire. 








In the 42d Div. trenches, Luneville Sector, the Secretary of War 
chums with a doughboy from Alabama. March 19, 1918. 


Secretary Baker seeks first-hand information. He is peering over a 
parapet in the Luneville Sector. March 19, 1918. 





With a French officer Mr. Baker reconnoiters the ground. Luneville Sector, March, 1918. The Mr. Baker and Maj. Gen. Charles T: Menoher 
Secretary looks as “hard-boiled” as one of ‘‘Reilly’s Bucks.” _ pac cae ruined church at Badonviller, 
arch 19, : 





Major Noble B. Judah and Lieutenant F. R. Wulsin, Intelligence 
Officers of the 42d Div., quizzing prisoners at Baccarat. 


There were no more intrepid soldiers 
than the men of the Field Signal 
Battalions. Lt. E. H. Cooper 
snapped these men of the 26th Div. 
as they were going forward to install 
phones in observation stations in 


Soissons sector March 12, 1918. 


Salvation Army lassies, God bless them! Misses Gladys and Irene 
McIntyre, Myrtle Turkington and Stella Young of the Salvation 
Army make pies for soldiers of the 26th Div. Ansauvillers, April 9, 


1919. 





r 
> 





< . fA SS . ie ae ome Be | 
: : ‘4, a ae Ble TO aS 


Fit to Fight. Secretary Baker, General Pershing, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett and Col. John L. Hines, C. O., review 16th Inf., Ist Div., at Gondrecourt, March 
20, 1918. Eight days later General Pershing sent this cable: “First Division is considered fit for any service and will probably be taken at an early date if 
battle continues.” (Inset). Secretary Baker and Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher of the 42d Div. in the front line, Luneville Sector, March 19, 1918. 


wpe PTE 
re) ae 





A 42d Div. outpost in the Woods of Paroy near Badonviller, March 5, 1918. A few minutes after this picture was taken the position was blownup by 


enemy shell fire. 


Smiles from a pretty Red Cross girl. 
They made as much for morale as the 
delicious doughnuts and chocolate. 








Right up,front on the edge of No Man’s Land the precious letters “Dere Mable.” A gunner in the doorway of a bombproof shelter 
from home were delivered. Post of command, Moscou, April 17, 1918. writes to his sweetheart in the far off U. S. A. 


Secretary Baker made his first visit 
to the A. E. F., March 19, 1918. Front 
row: General Pershing, Mr. Baker, 

tend William G. Sharp, U. S. Ambassador to 
France; Maj. Gen. W. M. Black, C. E. 
Back row: Capt. de Marenches, French 
Army; Col. Carl Boyd, Lt. Col. M. L. 
Brett, Col. Fox Conner, Commander 
R. D. White, U.S. N.; Ralph A. Hayes. 
Secretary to Mr: Baker. 








Meanwhile at Fremenil in the Toul Sector the 149th F. A. is engaging “The Blue Print Era.” On an observation car Secretary Baker and 
the enemy. A German shell bursts over the position occupied by General Pershing inspect the vast depot project at St. Nazaire. Brig. 
Battery C. Gen. W. W. Atterbury, in civil life an officer of a great railway system, 

explains the plans. 





Lieut. C. R. Holmes and Sgt. J. A. Murphy for bravery in raid near through Sexey Aux Forges, April 6, 1918. 


o 
oO 
“For Valor.” Maj. Theodore Roosevelt, Ist Bn., 26th Inf., cites On the way to stop the German drive the Ist Bn., 26th Inf., marches 
Bois l’Eveque, April 5, 1918. 
og 
Q 





Avi Iky animal to board a train at Toul. A gallant airman. Maj. Raoul Lufberry (wearing six decorations) 
Sic id alabama et eee EE chatting with Maj. J. W. F. M. Huffer of 94th Aero Squadron, Toul, 
April 18, 1918. 


Before the battle. Chaplain Rollins, 101st Inf., administers communion in the Pantheon Cave near the Chemin des Dames, Feb 20, 1918. 














A direct hit on the church at Rambucourt. A German battery fired However, there was plenty of retaliation. This is a “heavy’’ just 
five shells at the edifice before this one partially destroyed it. April fired by “Hoosiers” of the 150th F. A. near St. Pole. 
20, 1918. 


A barrage at dawn. The 150th F. A. at Reherrey 4:15 A. M., May 3, 1918. 





The earth trembles as Battery D, 150th F. A., thunders on the line at Reherrey. The smoke from the heavies may be seen arising from the camouflage 
at the roadside. 









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Snipers in cam- 
ouflage. _Intelli- 
gence personnel of 
the 168th Inf. at 
Badonviller in 
elaborate equip- 
ment first devised 
by British for 
scouting’ in No 


Man’s Land. 






Men of Co. H.,; 
165th Inf., throw- 
ing hand grenades 
at Heinie near 


Brouville, April 16, 
1918. 

















BN ASSES 


LLL SSS 











“Where you been, Sarge, up front?” genially asked an M. P. of a Bunk fatigue up front. Men of the 167th Inf. (formerly 4th Ala.) 
first sergeant returning with a column like this. “Yes,” was the dry resting in the line near Neuviller, May 10, 1918. 
answer. “Where you been? Right here?”. Fifth Marines passing 
through Sommedieue on the way from the trenches. 


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32d Div., crossing the frontier at Sentheim, Alsace, May 29, 1918. 


125th Inf. 


First American troops to set foot on German territory. Company A, 


Men of Batteries A and B, 103d 
F. A., 26th Div., in billets at Rangeval 
after the battle of Seicheprey. On the 
ground gunners are playing with a lion 





Col. E. L. Logan, 101!st Inf., 26th Div., in his dugout at Beaumont, Men of Battery D, 103d F. A., loading 155 m. m. gun near Mandres, 
May 6, 1918. May 12, 1918. 


Seicheprey. On April 20, 1918, Seicheprey was the scene of the first serious encounter between the Americans and the enemy. A German “traveling circus” 

composed of 1200 storm troops captured the place from elements of the 26th Division, but the Americans counter-attacked and recovered the lost ground. 

“Seicheprey,” says Lt. Col. Palmer, “should be mentioned as a primary exhibition of courage on the part of junior officers and men in face of a concentrated 
and well planned effort.” Photo by U. 8. Air Service 





Here you are, 
you congressmen, 
who say General 
Pershing never 
went up front. This 
is a picture of the 
“C-in-C”’ in shrap- 
nel helmet about 
to walk to Serevil- 
lers in the Mont- 
didier sector with 
Col. Carl Boyd 
and Lt. Shirey of 
the Ist Div., May 
20, 1918. Serevil- 
lers was an active 
sector. 























Men of the 
18th M. G. Bn, 
Ist Div., at Petit 
Froissy, May 16, 
1918. 






Member of the Medical Corps, U. S. A., helping an aged refugee to After being in the line 20-days soldiers of the 18th Inf. eat their first 
board a flat car at Montmirail, May 31, 1918. meal since leaving the Petit Froissy, May §5, [918. 


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ena 


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“Nos Sauveurs.” As deliverers the little French children greeted the early arrivals. The advancing column is the 10I!st Ammunition Train. Soulosse 


April 10, 1918. 


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The first American division to enter an active battle sector in Europe. Historic scene at Chaumont-en-Vexin, April 16, 1918, when, on the eve of their 
departure for the front opposite Montdidier, General Pershing addressed the officers of the Ist Div., reminding them of the “essential, immemorial principles 
of the offensive spirit in war.” Six weeks later at Cantigny the First gloriously vindicated those principles. 





THE BATTLE OF CANTIGNY 


Our First Offensive 


On April 25, 1918, the First Division took over the active Cantigny 
sector near Montdidier. Strategically Cantigny was not important but it 
marked a salient in one of the most advanced parts of the German lines. 
It was desirable to straighten the line here, especially in view of an allied 
offensive movement which was contemplated. This offensive had to 
be given up owing to the development of the third German drive on 
May 27. The plans for the capture of Cantigny, however, were carried 
out, partly for the local advantage, but chiefly for the moral effect, on 
both friend and enemy, of showing American troops in an independent 
offensive action. 


In the commencement of their thrust the Germans were especially 
active in the neighborhood of Cantigny. They made three raids, one 
penetrating our line and resulting in the capture of one prisoner. As 
this might cause the disclosure of our plans, a patrol pursued the raiders 
and recaptured the prisoner after sharp fighting. 


Reinforced by French Artillery, the 28th Inf. at 6:45 A. M., May 28, 
attacked on a front of 2,250 yards. The men who went over the top 
carried 220 rounds of rifle ammunition, two hand grenades and one rifle 
grenade, two canteens filled with water, one shelter half, four sand bags 
and one shovel or one pick. They wore their blouses and left their 


blankets behind. 


The 18th Infantry was in support. 


The 28th Infantry advanced with the precision of the drill ground. 
It reached. Cantigny on schedule. American losses to this point were 
less than one hundred. A number of prisoners had been taken. The 
town was mopped up and the 28th regiment continued its progress. 


Aroused by the unexpected success of the movement the Germans 
redoubled the activity of their artillery. For three days our men were 
subjected to a heavy bombardment of eight inch shells together with 
shrapnel and gas. With Cantigny at their backs they had dug in. 


“We suffered serious casualties now,” says Lieutenant Colonel Frederick 
Palmer, “but we did not go back and we took revenge for our casualties 
in grim use of rifle and machine gun which, with the aid of prompt bar- 
rages, repulsed all counter attacks until the Germans were convinced 
of the futility of further efforts.” 


“The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely 
violent,” says General Pershing in his final report,’’ and apparently he 
was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the 
American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers 
were concentrated on our new position and counter attack succeeded 
counter attack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting 
at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion 
to the numbers involved.” 


Elsewhere General Pershing has said of the battle of Cantigny: ‘‘Al- 
though local, the brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demon- 
strated our fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and also 
that the enemy’s troops were not altogether invincible.” 


The French were anxious to exploit this American success for its 
effect on the morale of the French nation. The French press spread the 
propaganda—perhaps beyond the Americans’ deserts, but the reaction 
was electrical. Our soldiers everywhere were hailed as the “‘Saviours of 
France.” Men, women and even the children saluted them wherever 
they met them in the streets. 















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Interpretation of hes air view ee ae = of Cantigny presented on the opposite page. The interpretation, a mise not call attention to the shell 
holes filled with advancing American troops which are interesting and pictorially unusual features of this photograph. 


Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


Air view of the battle of Cantingy. “‘On the morning of May 28 this division (the Ist) attacked the commanding German position on its front, taking 
with splendid dash the town of Cantigny and all other objectives which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious counter-attacks and galling 
artillery fire.” General John J. Pershing’s report to Secretary of War, November 20, 1918. 


Photo by U. 8. Air Service 





= * 


Beis hee 
6 eat ee ere Wee 





During the battle, of Cantigny a German shell burst near this escort wagon. The animals were kill 


May 28,-1918 


ed but the teamsters were unharmed. Cantigny, 





The cost. Bodies awaiting burial, constant fire preventing removal. Cantigny, May 28, 1918. 


Scene in the 
wrecked village of 
Cantigny after it 
had been seized 
by the Americans. 
Photographed 
May 30, 1918. 


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Enemy wound- 
ed received the 
same attention as 
our own. Twenty- 
eighth Inf. dress- 
ing station. Can- 
tigny, May 28, 
1918. 





Major Robert R. McCormick of 5th F. A. 


German prisoners taken at Cantigny being searched German soldier killed at Cantigny, M 
Near Cantigny, May 28, 1918. P gn g searche n soldier killed at Cantigny, May 28, 


for information 1918, 





It was all in the day's work, so Private Barnes, a machine gunner of Men of the 28th Inf., Ist Div., in the Montdidier Sector. _ 
the Ist Div., though suffering from severe head wounds received at 


Cantigny, is taking the situation quite philosophically. 





Mercy to a fallen foe. A wounded 
German being lifted onto a stretcher at 
a 28th Inf. dressing station. Cantigny, 

May 28, 1918. 


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Yank and Poilus from a breach in a wall watch effect of enemy shell Prisoners captured at Cantigny marching through Le Mesnil-St. 
fire. 


Firmin. May 28, 1918. 





After a “drive” fleets of ambulances arrived in Paris with their toll of wounded. American Military Hospital Number One, Paris. 


(Inset.) “It is to laugh.” 





For being the first unit to advance at Cantigny, General Petain.of the French Army awarded the Croix de Guerre to the 28th Inf. On Jan. 11, 1919, when 
the Ist Div. was in the Army of Occupation, Maj. Gen. E. F. McGlachlin affixed the decoration to the regimental colors, 


CHATEAU THIERRY 
Saving Paris. The Second Battle of the Marne 


‘Notes on the German offensives of May 27 and July 15 and the allied counter-attack of July 18, 1918, prepared by 
Brigadier-General Fox Conner, Chief G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F. G-3 was Operations Division of the General Staff.] 


On May 27 the German Aisne-Marne offensive was launched. The 
German success during the first days of this offensive was more 
marked than anything that German arms had 
yet secured. Paris had already been sub- 
jected to long range bombardment and vio- 
lent air raids, and the state of morale of that 
capital may be judged by the fact that it is 
estimated that more than one million peo- 
ple left Paris during the months of May and 
June. On June |, just at the moment when 
the future seemed darkest, the 2d American 
Division, which had been brought around 
from Verdun-St. Mihiel, was thrown across 
the ~Chateau Thierry Paris road—and_ the 
Germans advanced no farther toward Paris. 
At the same time elements of the 3d Divisi- 
on, whichhad never before been in the line, were 
placed along the Marne together with various 
bodies of French troops—and wherever the soldiers of the 3d Division 
appeared there too the German advance broke on the rocks. 





Brig. Gen. Fox Conner 


The work of the 2d Division, and of the elements of the 3d, gave 
impetus to the rise, already begun as a result of the work of the Ist 
Division, of the American soldier in the esteem of enemy and Allies, and 
by June 30 all concerned fully realized that the arrival of American 
soldiers might soon turn the tide to the definite favor of the Allies. 


But America and England, who released her shipping for the transport 
of our troops until her food stocks had reached the vanishing point, had 
not waited for the events of June to demonstrate the value of the American 
soldier. So effectively had our shipping program been increased that on 
June 30, 1918, some 900,000 Americans were in France, and all prepara- 
tions had been made to maintain indefinitely the increased rate of arrival. 


Having now no illusions on the value of American troops and with the 
general knowledge which his High Command must have had concerning 
American arrivals, the German decided to try in one final effort to obtain 
a decision in his favor before the American soldier should render such a 
decision hopeless of attainment. The final German attack was accord- 
ingly launched in the Champagne on July 15. On that date the dispo- 
sition of the American divisions in France was as follows: 


The 32d, 35th, 5th and 77th Divisions were in line between the Swiss 
border and Luneville. The 82d was in line north of Toul. The four 
regiments of the 93d Division were with the French in line between the 
Argonne and the Meuse. The 42d was in reserve to meet the expected 
German attack in Champagne. The 3d and 26th were in line in the 
region of Chateau Thierry and the 28th had elements with the American 
and French units in the same region. The 2d and 4th were in reserve 
near Meaux and the Ist near Beauvais ready for use in the planned 
counter-attack. The 27th and 30th were in line with the British near 
Ypres. The 33d, 78th and 80th were completing their training with the 
British, tue 91st had just arrived at Le Havre and the 79th was arriving 
at Brest. The 29th, 90th, 83d, 92d, 37th and 89th were in our training 
areas around Chaumont and every nerve was being exerted to complete 
their training and equipment. 


Fortunately for the Allies the German attack and its location were 
foreseen and more fortunately still the considerable number of American 
soldiers who had now arrived were either in the line, in reserve ready for 
the counter-attack which had been planned during the first few days of 
July, or, in the case of newly arrived divisions, ready and anxious to get 
into the fight with or without their complete equipment. 

* * * * ok 
In the first days of July, 1918, it became apparent that the Germans 


would be unable to launch more than one other great attack, and towards 
the 10th of the month it was believed certain that if the enemy attacked 


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Map of the Chateau-Thierry “pocket” explaining the American part in the opening phases of the great Allied counter offensive beginning July 18, 1918. 
This map is copied from the official map issued by the General Staff at American G.H.Q. in France. Gen. Fox Conner’s accompanying “Notes on Operations” 


should be read before studying the map. 


—— ee ee 


Pee 


the blow would fall in Champagne. Thanks to the arrival of American 
troops, the Allied reserves were now sufhciently numerous to justify a 
counter-attack, and if, as every High Command was confident, the 
Champagne front could hold with the troops already allotted to it, the 
Allied Command retained complete freedom in the selection of the front 
upon which the counter-attack should fall. The selection by the Germans 
of Champagne and the eastern face of the Marne salient, as the fronts on 
which they were to make their last effort was fortunate for the Allies; 
for this decision of the enemy allowed an Allied counter-attack which, 
while affording immediate relief to the enemy’s thrust, would also obtain 
other advantages for the Allied cause. Paris is still France, and the 
approach of the German lines along the Marne toward Paris had caused 
apprehension throughout France; it was essential that the threat on 
Paris be relieved at the earliest possible moment. Aside from reasons of 
morale, purely material reasons also demanded the reduction of the Marne 
salient as the first task of the Allies when the offensive should pass to 
their hands. Paris contained a multitude of essential war industries, 
and so long as the Germans maintained their lines these industries were 
seriously hampered by the constant long range bombardments and air 
raids. The great east and west railroad through Chateau-Thierry must 
also be regained by the Allies as a first necessity in the troop movements 
required in any general offensive. 


But while with each day there came increased certainty that the 
Allied counter-attack could be properly launched to the north of Chateau- 
Thierry, and while the French armies on that front began to plan accord- 
ingly, the Allied resources were not sufhciently great to permit a final 
decision until after the actual launching of the hostile attack; it thus 


‘happened: that only on the 16th could many of the actual preparations 


be commenced. 


The general plan for the Allied counter-attack of July 18th involved 
attacking the entire west face of the Marne salient. This main attack 
was at first to pivot on Chateau-Thierry; later the Allies in the region of 
Chateau-Thierry were to take up the attack. The Allies were also to 
attack that part of the German salient south of the Marne and to the 
southwest of Rheims. The plan then really involved attacking the 
entire Marne salient, the principal blow falling at first on the west face, 
with the critical point, at which eventual success or failure would be 
determined, southwest of Soissons. The three divisions selected to break 
the most sensitive part of the German line were the 2nd American, the 
Ist Moroccan (French) and the Ist American. If these three divisions 
could seize and hold the heights south of Soissons the German position in 


the salient proper became untenable and its ultimate reduction was 
assured. 


At 4:35 a. m., July 18th, after some of the American infantry had 
double-timed into line and when some of their guns had barely gotten 
into position, the Ist and 2nd American Divisions and the Ist Moroccan 
Division jumped off. Notwithstanding their desperate resistance the 
Germans were driven back and the results upon which ultimate success 
depended were secured. The 2nd Division advanced 8 kilometers in the 


‘first 26 hours, took about 3,000 prisoners, 2 batteries of 150 mm. guns, 


66 light guns and 15,000 rounds of 77 mm. ammunition, besides much 
other property. This Division suffered some 4,000 casualties and, as it 
had made exhausting marches to reach the battlefield, and having recently 
been withdrawn from its desperate fighting at Chateau-Thierry, the 
Division was relieved after the second day. 


The Ist Division suffered 7,000 casualties, of whom it is believed that 
not one was a prisoner. Sixty per cent of its infantry officers were killed 
or wounded, in the 16th and 18th Infantry all field officers were casualties 
except the colonels, and in the 26th Infantry all field officers, including 
the colonels, were casualties. Notwithstanding its losses the Ist Division, 
by constant attacks throughout four days and nights, had broken through 
the entrenchments in the German pivot to a depth of || kilometers, had 
captured 68 field guns and quantities of other material, in addition to 
3,500. prisoners taken from the seven separate German divisions which 
had been thrown against the Ist United States Division in the enemy's 
desperate effort to hold ground which was essential to his retaining the 
Marne salient. 


Never again could friend or enemy question the fighting qualities of 
the American soldier! 


But while the work of the Ist and 2nd Divisions attracted most 
attention because of the special importance of their attack, they were 
not the only American divisions to participate in the July 18th offensive. 
A little to the south of the 2nd Division the 4th Division was in line 
with the French, and the 4th Division joined in the attack and continued 
to advance until July 22nd when it was assembled’and as a division 
relieved the 42nd Division on August 2nd. The 26th Division was just 
northwest of Chateau-Thierry and together with the 167th French 
Division formed the Ist American Corps, which was the first American 
corps to exercise tactical command. This corps acted as a pivot in the 
beginning and later had to advance under peculiarly difficult conditions. 
For the 26th Division maneuver was much complicated in order that the 


front of the division might conform to the general plan; not only was it 
necessary for the division to pivot during attack, but at one time the 
right half of the division had to attack simultaneously in two directions. 
Notwithstanding the difficult nature of its task, and the fact that it lost 
5,300 officers and soldiers, the 26th remained in the attack until July 
25th; some of its elements having been continuously fighting for eight 
days and nights. The division had advanced more than 17 kilometers 
against determined enemy resistance, had taken the villages of Torcy, 
Belleau, Givry, Epieds, and Trugny, and had captured large quantities 
of enemy materiel. On July 25-26 the 26th Division was relieved by 
the 42nd Division, which, after having taken some part in the successful 
resistance to the German attack of July 15th in Champagne, had been 
brought round to the Chateau-Thierry region. 


Just east of Chateau-Thierry and south of the Marne the 3rd Division 
had broken up all efforts made against it on July 15th. Now on July 
20th the 3rd Division received orders to join in the counter-attack. By 
skillful work of the command and staff the division had gotten well 
across the Marne by the 22nd and without having encountered serious 
resistance. From the 22nd to 25th the division was engaged in bitter 
fighting in the wooded slopes leading up to the village of le Charmel, 
which was taken on the evening of July 25th. Constantly fighting its 
way forward the division took Roncheres, and finally on July 30th was 
relieved by the 32nd Division after having suffered a total loss, in the 
defense of the Marne and in crushing the German resistance, of about 
7,900. (It will be remembered that the 32nd Division had been in line 
near Belfort on July 15th. In the meantime this division had been 
relieved by the 29th Division and brought to Chateau-Thierry.) 


The 28th Division also had elements with French and American 
divisions during the attack and won great credit. 


As has been mentioned, the 42nd Division relieved the 26th on July 
25th. On the next day the 42nd Division attacked, and by the 28th it 


had crossed the Ourcq and taken Sergy. Here the enemy offered desper- 
ate resistance, launching counter-attack after counter-attack, the village 
of Sergy changing hands four times. But the 42nd definitely occupied 
Sergy on the morning of July 29th and continued to press forward until 
August 2nd when the enemy withdrew. The 4th Division now relieved 
the 42nd, and on August 6th the operation of the reduction of the Marne 
salient terminated and the battlefront stabilized on the line of the Vesle 
(our 4th and 32nd Divisions being in line). The 42nd had lost some 
5,500 officers and men. 


The 2nd and 3rd Divisions had played a conspicuous part in arresting 
the May 27th offensive, and now eight American divisions (the Ist, 2nd, 
3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd and 42nd) had been indispensable in the 
reduction of the Marne salient. We had lost over 30,000, but the results 
were commensurate—not only was the Marne salient reduced, but the 
initiative had been gained by the Allies and was never to be lost—the 
value of the American soldier, which had first been demonstrated by the 
Ist and 2nd Divisions, had been verified by the conduct of six other 
divisions. 


From the beginning the Commander-in-Chief had never varied from 
his determination to bring the American forces together. The German 
offensive, however, had interrupted the execution of this plan, forcing 
us to utilize all our efforts to the end that the war might not be lost. 
Now, however, the initiative had passed into the Allied hands and there 
appeared to be no good reason for longer delay. On the contrary, the 
Chateau-Thierry operations had involved such difficulties in the way of 
supply and the evacuation of sick and wounded (in all of which we were 
largely dependent upon the action of French staffs) that it was apparent 
that our troops must be assembled. A few divisions might be properly 
cared for when dispersed under foreign command, but our forces had 
rela to the point where it became imperative to begin assembling 
them. 


The Commander-in-Chief naturally turned to St. Mihiel. 


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hierry—f to be associated with the glory of American arms. The Germans occupied the northern part of the city from June 3 to July 19 
ee a fered Paris, were prevented from crossing the Marne by the 7th M. G. Bn. of the 3d Div., which had rushed to t 


he bridgehead in motor 
trucks from Montmirail, 28 kilometers away. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 









Major General James G. Harbord in the helmet Maj.-Gen. Omar Bundy and staff of the 2d Div.-at Chaumont-en-Vexin, May 28, 1918. Front 


of a French brigadier-general which he wore when row: - Colonel Preston Brown, Gen. Bundy, Col. Charles H. Bridges. Rear row: Capt. Prichard, 
he commanded the Marine brigade of the 2d Div. Lt. Col. George A. Herbst and Capt. Kerr. : 


Belleau Wood. “‘Belleau Wood was a jungle, its every rocky formation formin 
fire. There was only one way to wipe out these nests—by the bayonet. And by t 
shouting their battle cry of ‘E-e-e-e Y-a-a-h-h-h zip!’, charged straight into the 


g a machine gun nest, almost impossible to reach by artillery or grenade 


his method they were wiped out, for United States Marines, bare-chested, 
urderous fire from these guns and won.” 


Heroes of the fighting around Belleau Wood enroute to rest camp. All that remained of 2d Bn., 6th Marines, 


Ma)j.-T. C. Holcomb commanding. 















Infantry about to embus for the Chateau Thierry sector. Capt. Robert F. Hyatt (with megaphone) Battery F, 15th F. A., 2d- 


Div., receiving reports from observation post via field telephone. 
Coupru, Chateau Thierry Sector. June 5, 1918. 






Gassed. Gas 
cases were 
marked witha 
cross on the 
forehead. 
Soldier of 2d 
Div. being 
carried into 
hospital near 
Montreuil, 


June 7, 1918. 





























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Interior of 
tent hospital 
at Auteuil, fa- 
mous race 
track in the 
Bois du Bou- 


logne, Paris. 









Wounded soldier of 2d Div. arriving at Lightly wounded arriving at field hospital. Mon- Interior of a hospital train. 
15th Field Hospital near Montreuil. treuil, June 7, 1918. 
June 7, 1918. 


Bombardment of Bouresches Wood by the Germans. Bouresches, after the most desperate fighting, was captured at 9:45 p. m., June 6, 1918, by Lieut. 


James F. Robertson, U.S. M. C., and twenty men of his platoon. Later two re-inforcing platoons joined them. 


3 , This remarkable photograph was taken by 
the U_ S. air service. 


Photo by U. S. Air Service 





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German prisoners captured on the night of June 30 by 9th and 23d Inf. being escorted through La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 1, 1918, by French soldiers 
2. Premier Clemenceau goes to American front June 30, 1918, to congratulate Maj. Gen. Omar Bundy of the 2d Div. 3. Prisoners captured by 





“ 


the 2nd Div. being 4ed through streets of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 4. Col. W.C. Neville, 5th Regt. of Marines. 5. Maj. E. J. Steichen, Chief, Pho- 


tographic Section Air Service. 6. Salmson observation plane going over German line’ under escort. 7: Brig. Gen. Charles A. Doyen, U.S. M. C 





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38th Inf. 3d 
Div. on way 
from Mont- 
mirail to stem 
drive on Paris. 


June 1, 1918. 


7, 1918. 











Bridgehead at Chateau Thierry where the Germans 
were stopped by Yankee machine gunners. 


Men of 9th M. G. Bn, 3d Div. set up gun 
in railroad shop. Chateau Thierry, June 


Troops of 
Company G, 
7th Inf. 3d 
Div. resting 
on roadside. 


St. Martin, 


France. 





Gunners of 7th M. G. Bn, 3d Div. at 
Chateau Thierry. June 7, 1918. 


General John J. Pershing and General (later Marshal) Ferdinand 


Foch at the former’s quarters, Val des Ecoliers near Chaumont, Pershing at Val des Ecoliers. June 17, 1918. 
June 17, 1918. 


The Lion and the Tiger. Premier Georges Clemenceau and General 





A momentous occasion, General! John J. Pershing greets General Ferdinand Foch, Generalissimo of the allied forces at Va! des Ecoliers, 


23, 1917. It was at this time that General Pershing ‘‘very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated 
use as a striking force against the Marne salient.” 


Chaumont, June 
under American command, if possible, for 








Stemming the tide at Chateau Thierry. Men of Company A, 7th M. G. Bn, 3d Div. at the bridgehead, Chateau Thierry, guarding against the passag« 
of the Marne by the Germans. The gallant conduct of these soldiers and their comrades of the 3d Div. earned for the organization the name of *“The Marne 
Division.” 




















Independence Day at Chau- 
mont, 1918. General Pershing 
is presented with a bouquet by 
French children. The citizens 
of Chaumont, headquarters of 
the American Expeditionary 
Forces, entered heartily into the 
celebration of .the fete day of 


their newly arrived Yankee 
Allies. 











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Troops of 125th Inf. 32d Div. passing through Massevaux, Alsace, G ] Pershing kept fit by daily horseback ri 
after review on Bastile Day, July 14, 1918. a ae Valdes bestia Te ge ae ea 





ps marched past the statue of 


when a column of American combat troo 


The men had just come from the line and their rugged appearance and martia! bearing stirred all Paris. 


Thrilling scene in the newly named “Avenue du President Wilson,” July 4, 1918, 


George Washington. 


Panorama of Chateau Thierry after its bombardment by the Ger- 
mans. Photographed July 27. 1918. 


Barricade erected by Germans in street at Chateau Thierry. 





Bridge over the Marne at Chateau Thierry blown up by the Germans 
when they abandoned the town. 


German machine gun barricade in Chateau Thierry. 


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* 
a5 


The town of Vaux a few minutes before the 9th and 23rd Inf. 2d Div. entered, July 1, 1918. Dead Germans may be seen lying in the street. With the 
aid of information supplied by a stonemason who had escaped from the place, American gunners were able to search out and destroy every cellar and tunnel that 
might be used by the Germans for shelter. The American artillery fire was so accurate that not a single structure in the village escaped being struck by shells. 


= Photo by U. S. Air Service 








Members of the medical corps removing wounded from Vaux. 


Graves of American soldiers who died in hand-to-hand fighting near Vaux. 


Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman and staft of the 3d (Marne) Division. During the operations previous to the counter offensive of July 18, the 3d Div. 
held the bank of the Marne east of Chateau Thierry ‘‘where a large force of German infantry sought to force a passage under support of powerful artillery 


concentration and under cover of smoke screens.’’ The result is laconically described by Gen. Dickman: “By noon of July 16 there were no Germans in the 
foreground of the 3d Div. sector except the dead.” 








2% 


General Dickman at Niedermendig decorating the colors of the 38th Inf. for valor on the Marne. _(Inset.) Brig. Gen. U. G. McAlexander who commanded the 38th Inf. when the 3d Div. 
held the bank of the Marne. This regiment, says Gen. Pershing, ‘wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front while 


on either flank the Germans, who had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded 
in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.” 





Back to the U. S. A. Many non- 


assist in the training 
of draft men in the various cantonments. 


commissioned officers who had proven themselves in battle were sent back to the United States to 





_ 


Gunners of the 7th F. A. which supported the attack of the Ist Division infantry in the Marne salient beginning July 18, 1918. 





On July 16, 1918, the Ist Div., having been withdrawn from Cantigny, July 8, reported to relieve one brigade of the Moroccan division near Coeuvres-et- 
Valsery. On the night of July 17 it went into the line and on July 18 it attacked. Throughout four days of constant fighting it advanced 1] kilometers, cap- 
turing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights above Soissons. It took 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from the 7 German divisions employed against it. The photo- 
graph shows re.erves of the Ist Div. waiting to go in at Coeuvres-et-Valsery. 








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German prisoners, officers and men, captured by the Ist and 2nd Divisions in the assault beginning July 18, 1918. The 2d Div. advanced from the Bois 
de Retz, proceeding 8 kilometers in 26 hours and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field\guns. General 
Pershing rhe “‘Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our Ist and 2d Divisions the tide of war was definitely turned 
in favor of the Allies.” 





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Desperate fighting marked the sweep of the Ist Div. over the field of Soissons. This is a sunken road choked with Germans killed by the 16th Inf. during 
the dash to Missy-au-Bois. 





Refugees fleeing from the scene of hostilities along the Marne. This scene was repeated hundreds of times during the Germans’ last drive toward Paris. 
The arriving American troops were spurred to their work by the sight of the 


se refugees whom they passed on all the roads that led to the front. (Inset). A 
view of the Marne Valley from Chateau Thierry. 





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This photograph taken at 4:30A.M., July 18, 1918 
103d Inf., 26th Div., may be seen advancing at the ed 
reached its objective, Torcy, in 35 minutes. 


,1s the first ever made of American troops ‘‘jumping off.” A file of soldiers, who are members of the 
ge of the wood. The entire field is swept by enemy shell fire and machine gun bursts. The 103d Inf. 





Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Edwards of the 26th Div. and his chief -of fe fg aie ‘ 

staff, Lt. Col. Duncan K. Major at Lucy-leBocage. July 20, 1918. Menof the: “Yankee advancing on Torey. 
The 26th Div. and a French division acted as the pivot of the move- 

ment toward Soissons. 






Under a gruelling fire men of 102d 
M: G. Bn, 26th Div. push on toward 
Torcy. 





“After the 26th Div. had taken Torc 
units in their enthusiasm forgot they we 
this hill was not in their sector.” 


y and a hamlet beyond Torcy at the foot of the commanding Hill 193 in good fashion,’ 
re a part of a pivot and started up the ascent. They were pushing valiantly along w 


* says Lt. Col. Palmer, “‘some 
hen they were recalled because 






Signal platoon, 
102d Inf., lay- 
ing wire un- 
der fire. 





















Telephone German pris- 
communicCa- oners cap- 
tion had to be tured at Tor- 
maintained cy waiting at 
with the ad- the roadside 
vance and to for someone to 
make this pos- lead them to 
sible Signal the rear. They 

never tried to 





Corps men 
had to face 
the enemy fire 
along with the 
infantry. 






escape. 




















Maj. Gen. Edwards standing near a gun Ruined church at Lucy-le-Bocage. Terrific bom- Col. John H. Parker, 102nd Inf., 26th 
captured by 102d Inf. bardment left the crucifix unharmed. Div., who twice went into battle on horse- 


back, thereby winning the D.S.C. and French 


Croix de Guerre. 
































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it fought its way through the 


says General Pershing, “* 


lieved by the 4th Div. on Aug. 3.” 


., entering La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 23, 1918. Two days afterward the 42d Div. 


From this time until Aug. 2, 


“ee 


(4th Ohio Inf.) 42d Div 


, 


relieved a French division. 


urcq, advancing toward the Vesle until re 


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, and, extendin 


Hardened veterans of Com 


relieved the 26th 
Foret de Fere and across the O 





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Moving up to drive the Germans out of the Marne salient. One Hundred and Fiftieth F. A. (Ist regt. Indiana F. A.) passing through Chateau Thierry, 
July 25,4918, the day the 42d Div. relieved the 26th Div 















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Bishop Luther B. Wilson, ex- 
treme left, conducting services 
at the grave of Lieut. Quentin 
Roosevelt, killed July 14, 1918. 
Chamery, Aug. 9, 1918. The 
grave of this young aviator be- 
came a place of pilgrimage for 
thousands of doughboys passing 
that way during the fighting in 
the Marne salient. 













Chaplain Francis P. Duffy officiating at the grave of Lieut. Roosevelt, Grave of Lieut. Roosevelt as found by Americans. The stones that 
Aug. 9, 1918. marked the grave, the posts and wire, were placed there by the 
Germans. 





A patrol of the 166th Inf. in Villers-sur-Fere at close quarters with the enemy. July 30, 1918. 


hs RN 
RAY: 


“3°. RS 


In the wake of the advance to Fere-en-Tardenois. Dead of the 167th 


Prussian guardsmen bayonetted in trench near F ere-en-l ardenois as 


(Ala.) Inf. 42d Div. advanced. 


er 





Heroes who fell during the advance of the 167th Infantry toward Fere-en-Tardencis, 


ers of the 167th Inf. during the hottest fighting at Seringes. 


Kneeling shelter was used by soldi 





German dead at Mezy. Fallen heroes of 38th Inf. at Mezy. 
It was bayonet and grenade, man to man, or rather one American to two or three Germans” at Mezy just before the Third Division crossed the Marne 


on July 21, 1918. 


vise 





Near Fresnes, in the thrust to the Vesle. Brig.-Gen. Douglas Mac- 
Arthur (middle figure) of the 84th Brigade, 42d Division, at his 


temporary headquarters. 





Cellar in Chateau Thierry residence filled with pack f ishings i i 
packages of French Household furnishings in Chateau Thi i 
clothing addressed by German soldiers to relatives at home. by the enemy ae their peaiarrite testo pare 





Training for its remarkable achievements in the reduction of the Marne salient was received by the 32d Div. in a front line sector near Belfort. The 
division held this sector until July 2! when it was ordered to the Ourcg where it relieved the 3d Div. in the Aisne-Marne offensive on July 30. In this offensive 
the 32d broke the German line of resistance on the Ourcq and drove the enemy back to the heights north of the Vesle, making a total advance of 19 kilometers. 
These are machine gunners of the 126th Inf., 32d Div., at Dieffmatten, Alsace, June 26. 


Preparing for later triumphs 
on the Ourcg.- Sgt. Charles 
Quick, Corpl. Mark Young 
and Pvt. Albert Lull, of the 
126th Inf., manning a 37 mm 
gun in the front lie at Dieffmat- 

ten, Alsace, June 25. This 

“pound wonder,” as it was called, 

had a maximum range of | 14 miles 

and could be fired at the rate of 
28 rounds a minute. 


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Men of Co. K, 127th Inf., 32d Div., in trenches at Benhalz, Alsace, 3 Pvt. Leo R. Hahn, sniper, Intelligence Section, 127th’ Inf., 32a Div. 
July 1. in trenches at Benholz, Alsace, July |. 


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In the drive to the Vesle the 4th Div. was assigned on July 28 to the Ist American Corps. The division was concentrated in the Bois de Beauvardelles 


in support of the 42d Div. These are men of the 39th Inf., 4th Div. 











The biter bitten. Having captured a German machine gun nest When the 28th Div. was operating in the Marne salient near Dravegny 
on a house top at St. Gilles, American gunners adapt it to their own uses. a French observation balloon was hit and fell in flames. 


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Fismes-Here the American troops (32d Div.) were held up by the Vesle River and the heights beyond, from which German artillery and machine guns 
poured forth a heavy fire. The 32d was relieved by the 28th at Fisme. On Aug. 7 the Americans made an attack across the river and after stiff fighting suc- 
ceeded in entering Fismette. Photo t 


y U.S. Air Servier 





The Vesle river where the rout of the Germans from the Marne was Ruins of the City Hall of Fisme. 
completed. 





A street barricade behind which the Germans fought in Fisme. Vestiges of desperate fighting in Fismette. 


¢ 





., resting in a shell hole. 


Battle weary soldiers of the 12Ist M. G. Bn., 32d Div 





French tanks (“Chars d’Assaut’’) moving to the support of French troops operating on the left of the 32d Div., Aug. 29, 1918. 


Officers of the famous 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron. L. to R: Lieut. 
(later Capt.) E. V. Rickenbacker, Lieut. Douglas Campbell, and Capt. 
Kenneth Marr. 





Issoudon, France, an American flying field, where many American aces received training. 





plane. Tismes sector, Aug. 16, 1918. at Busay, France. 


o a 
| Ambulance of 109th Co. after having been attacked by German Destruction by a German bomb of American hospital ward No. 2, | 
o ij 





Happy, though wounded. A stretcher case. 





The burial party. 


LtoR: Corpl. B. F. Harbour, Sgt. John Leeskuil, Pvt. C. Reynolds Putting wounded on train. 
and Corpl. H.S. Gallagher, 168th Inf., 42d Div., who captured a machine 


gun nest in the advance to the Vesle. 





Chefs on U. S. hospital train. Operation for shrapnel. 





; Surgeons and nurses at Base Hospital No. 23, Vittel, France. Wounded men moved progressively from dressing station to field hospital, thence to evacua- 
tion hospital and finally to base hospital. f 





Chateau Thierry as it looked when the Yanks marched on to St. Mihiel. 


| 


ST. MIHIEL 


The American First Army in Action 


[Notes on operations in the reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient, prepared by Brigadier General Fox Conner, Chief 


G-3, G. H. Q.| 


The offensive of March 21, 1918, and the succeeding German offen- 
sives, with the consequent necessity for employing American troops 
wherever they might be of the most immediate use, had postponed the 
formation of an American army from day to day. Thus while on May 
19th the Commander-in-Chief had reached an agreement with General 
Petain looking to the early organization of an American sector in the 
Woevre, the German May 27th offensive delayed the execution of this 
project and involved our most experienced troops in saving Paris and in 
reducing the Marne salient. * * * * * 


On July 24th a most important conference between the American, 


British and French Commanders-in-Chief and Marshal Foch * * * * 


-was held at Bombon. 


Briefly the conference agreed that all the Allied forces should pass 
to an offensive attitude. 


Definite operations were agreed upon as follows: 
(a) Continuation of the reduction of the Marne salient; to secure 
as a minimum result the release of the Paris-Chalons railroad. 


(b) Reduction of the Amiens salient, thus securing the release of 


the Paris-Amiens railroad. 
(c) Reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. 


(d) Release of the mining regions in the north (region of Bethune) 
and driving the enemy away from the ports of Dunkerque and Calais. 


The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was confided to the American 
army, but no approximate date for this effort was fixed, 


On the other hand, it. was agreed on July 24th to begin immediately 
movements which would finally result in the formation in the Chateau- 
Thierry region of an American army of two army corps of three divisions 
each. 


By August 3rd the operations in the Chateau-Thierry region had not 
only completely succeeded in their original purpose but the line showed 
tendencies of stabilizing. A study made at American G. H. Q. at this 
time showed the advisability of changing the plan of forming the First 
American Army in the region of Chateau-Thierry and instead, of com- 
mencing the plans for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. On August 
6th the line on the Vesle did become stabilized and on August 9th the 
Commander-in-Chief conferred with Marshal Foch at Sarcus and with 
General Petain at Provins. In brief the decision reached was to leave 
an American corps of three divisions on the Vesle and to begin the move- 
ment of troops which were to undertake the reduction of the St. Mihiel 
salient. 

* * * * The St. Mihiel salient was occupied by German troops in 
the early days of the war. * * * * The French did not immediately 
make a determined effort to reduce the salient although there was hard 
fighting at Apremont in October, 1914. In February and April of 1915, 
however, there were serious attempts to force the enemy from his threat- 
ening position. * * * * But the final result of these operations was local 
success only, and the Germans retained the salient practically intact. 


The primary strength of the St. Mihiel salient lay in the character 
of the ground on its western face, which ran along the eastern heights 
of the Meuse north of St. Mihiel and constituted an exceedingly strong 
position. Security from attack on the southern face was found in the 
dificult ground comprising Loupmont Ridge and Montsec, which are 
off-shoots from the main heights of the Meuse, and the wooded and hilly 
ground which lies between Montsec and the Moselle river at Pont-a- 
Mousson. But in spite of these natural defenses the salient had the weak- 
ness of all salients in that it might be attacked on both flanks and pinched 
out. Consequently the Germans had during the years of its occupa- 
tion by them strengthened the salient by a great mass and variety of 
artificial works, the main feature of which was an elaborate system of 


wiring. 


The offensive value of the salient to the Germans lay chiefly in the 
fact that it interrupted French communications from west to east on 
the main railroad Paris—Nancy while constantly threatening the entire 
region between Nancy and Bar-!e-Duc as well as that between Bar-le- 
Duc and Verdun. The principal defensive value of the salient from the 
German point of view was that it covered the strategic center of Metz 
and the Briey iron basin. It must be reduced before any general offensive 
against these two vital points or even further east could be contemplated. 


The French Command naturally had studied the question of the re- 
duction of the salient, but the one attempt made in 1915 had failed and 
the general situation had forbidden another French attempt. Various 
considerations dictated the occupation of this part of the line by the 
American army when it should arrive in force. Consequently the re- 
duction of the St. Mihiel salient was, as has been indicated, studied by 
the American Command as the first large-scale operation by an American 
army. * * * * However, the Allied success in August caused the Allied 
High Command to decide on a combined offensive late in September in 
which the American army should attack west of the Meuse. Several 
conferences (August 30th, September 2nd) were held between the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Marshal Foch and General Petain which resulted in 
limiting the St. Mihiel operation with the line Regnieville-en-Haye— 
Thiaucourt—Vigneulles as the objective. 


The definite decision taken on August 9th to unite at least a part 
of our forces found our divisions dispersed from Switzerland to the English 
Channel. It can not be too often repeated that, unfortunate as this 
dispersion was, it had been rendered necessary by the duty which had 
fallen upon the American Command of saving an Allied defeat. * * * * 
In addition to divisions large numbers of troops such as army artillery, 
aviation, tank corps and services of all kinds, had to be found and con- 
centrated for the operation. The total of troops, of all classes, to engage 
in the operation amounted to approximately 600,000. The necessity 
for concentrating these troops in so secret a manner as to secure at least 
a tactical surprise added to the difficulties and required long night marches. 
Still another difficulty lay in the fact that, due to necessities arising from 
the successes obtained by the enemy in March and April, America had 
sent over infantry in advance of auxiliary arms, leaving us woefully short 
in artillery, etc. (This action had been largely due to representations 
made by our Allies.) Consequently arrangements with the French 
Command were necessary to secure the army and corps artillery, aviation 
and other services required by so important an operation. The French 
High Command responded generously to our requests and we were able 
to enter the fight with a dominating force of artillery and aviation. 


The 2nd French Colonial Corps (39th, 26th and 2nd Dismounted 
Cavalry Divisions) was in sector on either side of the town of St. Mihiel. 
Although the part to be played in the general plan by this corps was in a 
certain sense secondary yet it was essential and its command was accord- 
ingly to be given to the Commander-in-Chief, who, with the First Amer- 
ican Army Staff, was to assume immediate command of the attack. * * * 
* On August 30th General Pershing with Ist Army Headquarters at 
Ligny-en-Barrois, took over command of the sector extending from Port- 
sur-Seille east of Pont-a-Mousson to a point southeast of Verdun. 


The general plan of attack to carry out the operation, as limited 
by the conferences August 30th to September 2nd, was as follows: 


(a) An attack from the south through the wooded country southeast 
of Vigneulles. 


(b) A follow-up attack on the left flank of the southern attack. 


(c) An attack from the west over the eastern heights of the Meuse 
between-Les Eparges and Seuzey toward Hannonville and Hattonville. 


(d) An exploitation and follow-up attack on the right flank of the 
western attack. 


(e) Eventual exploitation. 


The southern attack was to be made by the Ist and 4th Corps from 
right to left. The follow-up attack on its left flank was to be made by 
the 2nd French Colonial Corps two hours after the southern attack had 
started. This French Corps also was to make the attack given in (d) 
above, advancing two hours after the attack given in (c) above. The 
5th Corps was designated for the western attack. 


On the night of September 11-12 the Ist Army was ready to attack. 
Its battle order was as follows: 


Ist Corps—Port-sur-Seille to Limey 


82nd, 90th, 5th, 2nd Divisions in line (82nd Division merely to 
follow up.the attack east of the Moselle.) 


78th Division in reserve. 


4th Corps—Limey to Richecourt 
89th, 42nd and Ist Divisions in line 
3rd Division in reserve. 


2nd French Colonial Corps—Richecourt to Mouilly 


39th Division, 26th Division and 2nd Dismounted Cavalry Divi- 
sion (all French) . 


No division in reserve as this corps made only follow-up attacks. 


5th Corps—Mouilly to Watronville 
26th Division, 15th French Colonial Division and part of 4th 
Division in line 
Part of 4th Division in reserve 


(The attack to be made by the 26th and [5th Divisions). 


The enemy’s strength amounted to eight divisions and one separate 
brigade. 


Documents captured in June, 1918, had shown that the enemy had a 
plan for evacuating the salient in case this became necessary. Prisoners 
and deserters as well as abnormal activity noted by observers now gave 
evidence that the enemy had begun to move his artillery and material 
out of the salient in anticipation of an attack. 


The operation was initiated at 1:00 a. m. September 12th by a heavy 
artillery fire of destruction. Through reinforcements of French artillery 
the Ist Army had at its disposal 2971 guns for the artillery preparation. 
- Much of this artillery was of heavy calibre and the destruction and 
disorganization which it caused within the salient was very great. 

* * * * Due to the fact that the enemy was withdrawing his 
artillery as well as to the overpowering superiority of American guns 
the enemy artillery reaction, especially toward the center of the salient, 
was light. 


At 5:00 a. m. the six American divisions in the front line on the south- 
ern face of the salient and west of the Moselle advance The advance 
was preceded by a rolling barrage and assisted by French tanks manned 
partly by Americans and partly by French. Tanks and Engineer de- 
tachments equipped with wire cutters and Bangalore torpedoes went 
forward to cut the wire. To American infantry the wire did not prove 
as great an obstacle as our previous information had led us to expect. In 
many places the wire was old and badly kept up, some gaps had been 
cut by artillery fire, other gaps were made by the tanks; above all, the 
enemy, demoralized by the volume of artillery fire and the suddenness 
of the attack, did not, except in certain sectors, make a stubborn defense. 
In an irresistible dash the American soldier went over, under and through 
the wire which had held up the Allied advance for four years. All the 
initial objectives were taken on schedule time. The attack was now so 


evidently successful that the schedule of attack was advanced and the 
salient was pinched out by a junction of the 4th and 5th Corps in the 
vicinity of Vigneulles and Hattonville, effected early in the morning of 
September 13th. 


In spite of heavy rains, which had made the ground soggy and difh- 
cult, many of the tanks accompanied the infantry through the trench 
systems, and did valuable work in wiping out machine-gun nests. 


To insure the success gained against the enemy reaction, it was es- 
sential to push the artillery up, and passage of the Rupt-de-Mad and 
smaller streams:had to be assured. In addition, ammunition, food and 
other supplies had to go forward. The supply of the advance over a 
country poor in roads, and in which the existing roads were cut by trench 
systems, torn by shell fire, and heavy from late rains, was met only by 
making of communications and circulation tactical considerations of 
the first importance. The engineer organizations had a most difficult 
problem in assuring the passage of artillery and trains. 


Command of the air was assured by 1,481 airplanes, perhaps the 
most important air concentration the Western front ever saw. 


The advance was halted on the army objective; the defense of this 
objective was organized and strong reconnaissance forces pushed ahead. 


The great result of the operation was development of the Ist Army 
as an effective weapon for more vital fighting. The moral gain was also 
great. * * * * This operation had proved to the Allied Command that 
in the present state of the German defense American troops could success- 
fully attack defenses on which four years of labor had been spent. 


In a material way the gain was also important. The Paris-Avricourt 
railroad was free. More than 200 square miles of territory had been 
restored to France. The captures included 13,251 prisoners, 466 guns, 
752 machine guns, many trench mortars and small arms, ordnance ma- 
terial, engineer material, quantities of ammunition, clothing and equip- 
ment, telegraph material, railroad material, and rolling stock. 


The casualties for the Ist Army were about 11,000. Considering 
the rumbers engaged and the results obtained the losses were remark- 
ably light. * * * * Reserve divisions were started in motion toward 
the Meuse-Argonne front as soon as the success of the St. Mihiel operation 
was assured and before it had completely terminated. Front-line divisions 
were subsequently withdrawn for the same purpose, and the St. Mihiel 
front was reluctantly permitted to stabilize. 









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Mont Sec—“We ought to have that mountain,” said General Pershing one day in March, 1918, as he gazed at Mont Sec towering 380 meters above the 
Woevre plain. From this stronghold and the Fort du Camp des Romains the Germans dominated the St. Mihiel salient for four years. 
Sept. 12, 1918, General Pershing’s Ist Army captured the sector in 27 hours. During the battle the Ist Div., instead of making a direct attack on the hill, 
smothered it with a smoke barrage and passed around it. The photograph shows Brig.-Gen. F. E. Bamford, 2d Brig., Ist Div., reconnoitering the ground. 


Beginning 





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Air view of the Fort du Camp des Romains, when it was occupied Panorama of a portion of the St. Mihiel salient taken when it was still 
by the Germans. On the crest of a hill 326 meters high this stronghold in possession of the Germans. In the foreground are the ruins of Xivray. 
dominated the valley of the Meuse both North and South. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


Photo by U. 3: Air Service 


aA Rhy. os 


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The battle of Saint Mihiel: “At dawn on Sept. | ; “¥ 
ay pt. 12, after four hours of violent artillery preparation and accompanied re 
Ist and 4th corps advanced. The infantry of the 5th Corps commenced its advance at 8 A. M. The operation on ey Sree we Be oars 
cision. en. 


John J. Pershing. 


A machine gun company pass- 
ing through Richecourt, near 
Mont Sec, during the battle of 

Saint Mihiel. 


SL BRAS ee OIL caste 
« “ a ut 


63 





7th F. A. caissons rolling into Seicheprey. 


28th Infantry, Ist Div., advancing in wave formation in the Seiche- 
prey sector at the opening of the battle of St. Mihiel. 


NonsARO 


Runt de Mad 


Sixteenth Inf., Ist Div., going forward near St. Baussant. 








Another view of the town of Mont Sec. 


Supply wagons going forward northeast of Mont Sec. 





, ae TERA ON LS OS ihe OIE ELE OR ORS . 
Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher and staff officers of the 42d Div. During the two days attack in the Saint Mihiel salient the 42nd Div., the center divi- 
sion of the 4th Corps, advanced 19 kilometers. L to R: Lt. Col. Noble B. Judah, Intelligence Officer; Col. W. W. Hughes, Chief of Staff; Maj. Gen. Menoher, 
commanding general; Maj. Murphy and Capt. Gill. 


French refugees in Essey after its capture. 


Air view of Essey while still occupied by Germans. 


Photo by U. 35. Air Service 





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The Cliff Dwellers. These are dugouts near Flirey that were occupied by the 89th Div. before it jumped off in the battle of Saint Mihiel. Every hillside 


in the salient was filled with similar underground habitations. Some were pretentious, built of concrete with bungalow effects. German officers’ quarters some- 
times contained bathrooms and had formal flower gardens in front. 


4) 





o 
Village of Flirey on the edge of the St. Mihiel salient Wrecked bridge at Flirey and supply trains which passed continu- 
ously for 80 hours during and after the battle. 
a 





Gassed patients of 82d and 89th Divs. 


Bathing eyes of gas victims belonging to 82nd and 89th Divs. 


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er, 


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The bridge at Flirey, blown up in 1914 by the French to prevent its 


Field headquarters near Flirey bridge. 
use by the Germans. Photo by U. 5. Air Service 





| 
|. 
| 
| 


Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman (center) commanded the 4th Corps (Ist, 42nd and 89th Divs.) at 
the battle of St. Mihiel. 





Air view of Essey and the Mort Mare Wood, 
St. Mihiel salient. Over this ground the 89th 


Div. attacked Photo by U.2. Air Bervies 





Pumping lead into the Ger- 
mans as they flee from the St. 
Mihiel salient. 


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Infantrymen dug in beside a road in the St. Mihiel salient. “Heavies” moving forward to batter the retreating Germans. 





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Air view of Pont-a-Mousson, on the edge of the St. Mihiel salient. For four years this town was pounded alternately by artillery and airplanes. 
American railway artillery located near here fired on Metz, seriously interfering with German railway movements. 


Photo by U. 8. Air Service 





A marine general commanding a 
regular army (2d) Division. Left to 
right: Lieut. Col. Hugh Matthews, 
Col. Preston Brown, Maj. Gen. J. A. 
Lejeune, Col. James C. Rhea, Lieut. 

~ Col. G. A. Herbst. 


Artillery observer sending back information to his guns. 


Battery B, 21st Art., 5th Div. 


Machine gunners and supply train waiting in a shattered town 
for the congested road to clear. 





* 








This lucky village of Villecey was not in the pathway of heavy fight- What the airmen saw. Network of trenches in vicinity of Villecey. 
ing and so escaped destruction. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


Victors and vanquished, except the wounded Germans, are equally ‘‘Booby traps’” were left by the departing enemy. This soldier from 


interested in having their pictures taken. the 103d Inf., 26th Div., was guarding the entrance to a dugout in the 
second line German trench until it could be examined for concealed bombs. 





Rushing supplies to the advancing Yanks of the 26th Div. A busy Patrol of Co. E, 168th Inf., 42d Div., waiting for word to “go over the 
day in Mouilly’s main street. top’ at Haumont. Meanwhile a barrage was emptying the town of 
Germans. 





This photograph was taken from a front line observation post two 
he St. Mihiel salient. 


days before the battle began for the reduction of t 


”” over which the 26th Div. advanced near Les Eparges. 


‘‘No Man’s Land, 


A quick lunch at Mouilly, served by Cook Barnacle, Battery E, 10Ist 
Art., 26th Div. 


First prisoners captured by 103d 
Inf., 26th Div., Sept. 12. Columns of 
enemy prisoners dribbling to the rear 
were signs of victory to the advancing 


Yanks in the Ist Army’s great drive in 
the St. Mihiel salient. 





Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett, who commanded the Ist Corps at St. 
Mihiel. Later he succeeded Gen. Pershing in command of the Ist 


Army. 


— Con a oe eee ow ee eee te Qh CO o 14 ~— 


AOA eres 


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Searching the first lot of prisoners for papers and weapons before turning them into the prison pens at Menil-la-Tour. Intelligence officers 
searched every scrap of paper found on prisoners for information that would reveal enemy plans. The stockades here shown were erected several 
days before the battle in anticipation of the big haul confidently expected. 


German officers captured by the 2d Div. on their way to headquarters Sloshing through mud and rain to the prison pens on the first day of 
to be questioned by American intelligence officers. the St. Mihiel drive. Yanks and Germans became badly mixed on the 


overcrowded roads. 





A “‘movie man”’ of the Signal Corps ‘‘shooting’’ German prisoners in From defeat, through ruined towns, to prison pens. ‘Those were drab 
order to show the folks back home how we were winning the war. days for the enemy. 








So I uke a eee Sis. ews OM ak 
A team of balky mules could hold up miles of traffic in those feverish days of St. Mihiel when all roads to the front were choked with guns, 
supplies, officers’ cars and support troops hurrying forward. When a transport stalled or broke down on the shell torn highways eager doughboys 


put their shoulders to the wheels and either pulled it out or threw it off the road into a ditch. This stalled ammunition wagon was photographed 
near St. Baussant on the second day of the battle. 
















Officer prison- 
ers were never so 
cheerful over their 
capture as the en- 
listed men. The 
glum looking one 


The question- 
ing of a 16 year 
old prisoner  af- 
fords much amuse- 
ment to his fellow 


captives. in the center pro- 
tested against be- 
ing photographed. 

LE eS 











Mrs. Walter Farwell and Miss Blanch- 


Doughnuts followed the flag very closely. A Sal- 
ard Scott, daughter of Maj.-Gen. Hugh L. vation Army girl turning them out. 
Scott, establishing their Red Cross canteen 

in Flirey during the battle. 


A Signal Corps field battalion tele- 
phone switchboard. On table at rear rests. 
a captured German instrument bearing the 
imperial arms. 





rS : iy, 
Se aa 
This tank plowed-through the tangled German wire in the advance of the Ist Div. on Mont Sec in the first day’s fighting, Sept. 12, After 


making a lane for the charging infantry it finally fell into a German trench. The next day its driver, Corp. George Heeszh, Co. C, 327thTank 
Battalion, rescued his pet and went on to further adventures. Tanks played an important part at St. Mihiel in clearing passages for our troops. 


* e\ 


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$y 


watt ” * walled . a a te +Eh ot oe! et a Se. APE 
Pressing the German retreat. The village in the foreground had been fired by the retiring enemy and raked by American shells. The ground 
over which the troops are advancing had been shell torn by the artillery of both armies. 





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When tanks were not fighting they were useful as tractors. This one, going forward to aid the American advance on the northern edge of 
St. Mihiel salient, was hauling a trailer filled with bicycles for army couriers. The picture was taken on the afternoon of the first day of the battle. 













Air view of Hattonchattel. Near 
here the Ist and 26th Divs. effected a 
juncture early in the morning of the 
second day of battle, thus completing 
the pinching out of the famous salient 
held for four years by the Crown 

Prince’s army. 
Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


SA SS (Saas 

EMS 
SLM Na 2D SS 

( Rss 

\ SS 


















Shell craters torn in the ground by H. E.’s. Compare size with the Maj.-Gen. Charles P. Summerall, commanding Ist Div., and his chief 
pockmarks made by ordinary shells. of staff, Col. C. D. Herron, looking over German prisoners. 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 





Letting the eagle scream a bit. ‘‘Hindenburgstrasse”’ didn’t seem to be an appropriate street sign in a town just captured by Americans so 
the victory flushed doughboys held an informal christening party and nailed up the hastily painted sign seen in the picture. Taken Sept. 13 at 
-Vigneulles, where the juncture of the Ist and 26th Divs. spelled the successful pinching out of the salient of St. Mihiel 


View of Bouillonville taken from an observation plane a week before A concentration of rolling kitchens to feed the troops pouring through 


the Germans were driven out. A Pa Bouillonville-—called by the soldiers ‘‘Souptown. 





When a German prisoner played for his captors on a wrecked organ the 


Light railway train captured from Germans hauling supplies to the 
German sergeant at the end was moved to dance a jig. 


American front line. The enemy had covered the salient with these 
narrow gauge lines. 


Exhausted by their rapid advance, these men of Co. H, 167th Inf., 42d Div., fell asleep in their shelter trench. Five minutes after a Signal 
Corps photographer snapped this picture, two soldiers were killed here by a shell. 





Lieut.-Col. R. D. Garrett, S. C., 42d Div., testing a German telephone 
wire left behind by the retreating enemy at Essey. The Germans witb- Used by the 3d Bn., 103d Inf., 26th Div., as battalion headquarters after 


A German concrete dugout used by the enemy as a first aid station 


drew from the St. Mihiel salient so rapidly that they failed to destroy 


h te the enemy’s retreat 
much of their wire 





| 


- | 
i 
“EN 


A supply officer's roadside workshop. Here he unlimbered his typewriter for ten minutes in an effort to catch up with his ‘‘paper work.”’ 
Then he and his clerks moved on towards the front with the wagon train. 


a. | 





Engineers returning from the 
front through shell torn Non- 
sard. Colors flying and all 
hands pleased. Engineer 
troops worked in the zone of 
shell fire and gas attacks, 
during the battle of St.Mihiel, 
to restore the shell torn roads 
for the advancing army. 








Military Police regulating traffic in a village street in the salient. A one way road, showing the congestion as supplies and reenforce- 
ments drove forward behind the American line of advance. 


We ae 


Telling how it happened. Slightly wounded men. They were in the first batch to return from the fighting and were giving their buddies 
first-hand details. Not being seriously hurt they had not waited for an ambulance but “‘hopped a truck.”’ Note the cross mark on the forehead 
of a man sitting in the tail end of the truck. That cross indicated he was a gas victim. 


Bs 





ofl rk Pe bi Socy: a 
‘vercprtymgga til] likes ae 
ee? ay : 

, ’ aor meee af a ‘yg \ . 


Pe) 
” cod 


Thiaucourt when the Germans held it. It was taken by the Ist Corps the first day of the battle. The 
destroyed the town. 


Germans fired it on their retreat and 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 








The burning of Thiaucourt. Being on our front line after the advance stopped Sept. 15, Thiaucourt was shelled daily by the enemy. One 
night the German artillery dropped 5 gas shells a minute into the town for more than two hours. 


For breakfast one morning during 
the St. Mihiel battle this rolling kitchen 
served sirloin steak with onions, French 
fried potatoes, green peas, bread, butter 

and coffee. 





Loading for the front in French trucks. Members of the 3d Bn., 39th As soon as the Germans were driven out the French refugees began 
Inf., 4th Div. returning to their ruined homes. 


Re | Kornp Arm Bat! 67 


’ 
§ 


The Germans left no beer in their abandoned canteens. This explanation is due one of the officers in the picture, who was a ‘‘dry’’ member 
of the Georgia legislature. But when an army photographer insisted on a drinking scene the Southern prohibitionist helped him out by posing 
with a stein in hand. 





Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois, of the Air Service, standing in front of one of the first Liberty planes to arrive in France. 
the Army as a private, became a pioneer in military aviation and at 37 was a brigadier general 


Gen. Foulois started in 








Rass sos 98 ile & 
An American De Haviland observation plane. Flying in these machines our officers gathered the information on which operations were based. 
before and during battle. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 





Farewell for a time to mud, cold, hunger, ‘‘cooties,’’ and bloodshed. Once aboard a hospital train the wounded were in the midst of modern 
American comforts and scientific equipment. These trains were complete hospitals on wheels, including even operating rooms. 


é 


A Y.M.C. A. movable kitchen on the edge of the St. Mihiel salient. These kitchens followed their outfits from place to place, serving the 
soldiers delicacies unobtainable in company ‘ ‘chow lines.’’ Misses Elizabeth Barker and M. A. Nash conducted this rolling cook shop, which was 


attached to the 3d Div. 





Road theatricals by Y. M. C. A. 
players. The soldiers witnessing this _ 
open air performance belonged to the 
89th Div. Shortly after this alfresco 
scene was photographed the 89th Div. 
took part in the battle of St. Mihiel. 














Mrs. F. T. Fitzgerald, of the Y. M. C. A., serving hot chocolate in Mary Shannon Webster, Red Cross canteen worker, serving chocolate. 
Bouillonville 48 hours after the Germans had been chased out. 


“Oe Rea 


Rp. 
iF 


was dropped on the 89th Div. ammunition dump at Lucey shortly before the St. Mihiel battle. The camera has 
caught here one of the series of explosions that followed. 











Pe ea 


o 
Wash day at the open air laundry in Lucey. Red Cross workers distributing cigarettes and chocolate to soldiers 
A Yank helps the woman in whose house =) bound for the front. 
he is billeted 
o 








Shock troops in battle, but children at play. Having a good time in At the altar of Joan of Arc in Domremy where the Maid of Orleans 
Lucey shortly before the battle of St. Mihiel. was born. 


rN at 


After peace had come to Saint Mihiel. The town was not badly damaged as it was never under direct artillery fire, although air bombs 
destroyed that part of the town lying close to the river. Chauvoncourt, just across the Meuse, was completely destroyed. Early in the war the 


French made an attempt to drive the Germans out of the village but the attacking force was annihilated by a subterranean mine. 
Photo by 








, . - 7 
2% S% d 


Four shots, each a direct hit.. At Baleycourt, beginning at 3:00 P. M., September 26, 1918, men of the 35th Coast Artillery Company fired 
four 1200 pound shells at the headquarters of two German Army Corps near a railhead thirty kilometers north. The aerial observer reported that 
each projectile had struck the target. This is a mobile railroad gun of 340 mm. caliber. It was manned by 122 soldiers under command of Maj. 


G. F. Humbert 


Pn ME 


THE MEUSE-ARGONNE 


Smashing the German Pivotal Position 
(Notes on operations in the Meuse-Argonne Drive. Prepared by Brigadier General Fox Conner, Chief G-3, G. H. Q.) 


It will be remembered that the decision reached in the conference 
on July 24th, between the Commanders-in-Chief concerned, did not 
extend beyond the reduction of embarassing salients and the freeing of 
certain regions in the north. On August 6th the reduction of the Marne 
salient had been completed. On August 8th the French and British 
attacked the Amiens salient. This attack was successful from the first, 
and as the days passed th enemy began to show signs which led to the 


belief that great results might be obtained if the Allies could continue the> 


pounding already begun. By August 30th this belief had crystallized and 
no difference of opinion as to the necessity of pushing the fight was to be 
found among any of the Allied High Commands. Some differences of 
opinion as to the method of employing American troops existed and to 
adjust these differences conferences were held and several letters ex- 
changed from August 30th to September 2nd. The general strategical 
plan included an offensive which would involve the entire front from the 
Meuse to the sea, the main attacks being made between the Meuse and 
Reims in the direction Sedan-Meziéres and by the British and French in 
the north toward Cambrai-St. Quentin. As a result of the conference of 
September 2nd the Meuse-Argonne front was assigned to the American 
forces, while the American attack was to be supported by the attack of 
the French 4th Army between the Argonne and Reims. In order that 
American troops might be available to undertake the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive, the St. Mihiel salient drive was, as we have seen, limited in the 
results sought. In a letter of August 30th Marshall Foch had contem- 
plated that the attack towards Meziéres should be launched between 
September 15th and 20th; during the September 2nd conference it was 
recognized that this allowed too little time for the necessary concentra- 
tion of troops and other preparations and the date of attack was tenta- 
tively fixed for September 20th to 25th; actually the attack was launched 
on September 26th. 


Throughout the Meuse-Argonne fighting the question of keeping our 
ranks filled was so acute that it is well to outline our difficulties in this 
respect before considering the actual operations. 


The General Organization Project which the Commander-in-Chief 
had submitted to Washington early in July of 1917 assumed the necessity 
of having in France a supply of replacements equal to 50% of the infantry 
of combat divisions and 25% of the other arms. The same project also 
invited attention to the necessity of preparing at home to assure the 
steady flow of additional replacements to France. The estimate as to the 
number of replacements to be maintained in France had as its basis the 
creation of a sufficient reservoir of personnel to enable us to carry out 
two principles which were assumed as fundamental: 

(a) All losses of combat troops should be promptly replaced, not 
only in order to keep up fighting strength but to maintain the morale of 
the organizations (this principle had been clearly shown to be fundamental 
by the experience of all our wars); 

(b) Sick and wounded should on their recovery be returned to their 
own units. 


The replacement organization in France, as originally contemplated 
(General Organization Project), included a so-called depot division and 
a so-called replacement division for each Army Corps of four combat 
divisions. These two divisions were to have a full complement of in- 
fantry, but one-half of their artillery and other auxiliaries were to be 
utilized as Corps and Army troops; the organization thus provided the 
50% reservoir of infantry and 25% of other arms considered necessary to 
insure carrying out the two fundamental principles mentioned above. But 
while experience more than justified the stress which the Commander-in- 
Chief so early placed on the importance of replacements and fully justified 
our early estimates of the numbers required, the German March 2|st 
and following offensives created conditions which, coupled with other 
reasons, prevented the functioning of the replacement system as originally 
planned. Some of the reasons for this failure were as follows: 

(a) The situation required our troops to be spread over France. 

(b) During May, June and July, 1918, every possible division had 
to be put into line, hence it was necessary to reduce the number of re- 
placement divisions from two out of six to one out of six. 


(c) The number of replacements required never reached France. 


(d) It became essential to fill up certain divisions on account of 
tactical necessities and since the shortage of replacements was at the time 
acute, sick and wounded returning to duty were sometimes necessarily 
sent to such divisions without regard to whether or not the soldier origin- 
ally belonged to the division to be filled. 


Our shortage of replacements became acute early in September and 
by mid October the situation was desperate. Only one recourse was 
possible—to utilize incoming divisions for replacements, holding the 
cadres to be reconstituted whenever replacements ‘in adequate numbers 
should be received from home. Even this action did not suffice to bring 
our 29 fighting divisions to full strength but we were able by a judicious 
use of the soldiers thus obtained, to maintain a reasonable strength in 
the divisions at the most critical points of attack. There is no doubt 
but that this decision to break up divisions contributed in a large degree 
to concluding the war in 1918. 


By the end of August, 1914, the German armies had reached the line 
of the Meuse north of Verdun, and the heights just north of the city 
became the pivot ef the great wheel of the German armies: although it 
was at one time practically entirely surrounded, the fortress of Verdun 
held. By September 5th this wheel had placed the center of the 
German armies well south of the Marne while Von Kluck, sweeping down 
from Brussels had passed just beyond range of the outer forts of Paris 
and stood with his army on both banks of the Marne at Meaux. The 
French armies which toward the end of August had stood along the 
Meuse north of Verdun had been forced back until on September 5th 
their battle line ran southwest from Verdun to Revigny; Revigny being in 
the hands of the French. The battle of the Marne (Ourcq) began on Sep- 
tember 6 and by September 12, 1914, the German lines between the Meuse 
and the western edge of the Argonne were practically those against which 
the American Ist Army launched its attack on September 26, 1918. 
Although the great German offensive in 1916 and the French counter- 
attacks of 1917 had witnessed fluctuations of the lines around Avocourt, 
Malancourt, Forges, Mort Homme, Esnes (all of which were points of 
direction either within or beyond our jumping off line of September 26th), 
neither French nor Germans had been able to force the other back 


materially and the net result was that in September, 1918, the German 
defenses were unusually deep and strong while No Man’s Land was as 
worthy of all that the name implies as any spot in the western front. 


All supplies and evacuations of the German armies in northern 
France were dependent upon two great railway systems; one, in the 
north, passing through Liége, while the southern system, with tracks 
coming from Luxemburg, Thionville, and Metz, had as its vital section 
the four-track line Carignan, Sedan, Meziéres. Neither of these sys- 
tems alone could supply the German masses in Northern France and 
no other important lines were available to the enemy because the moun- 
tainous masses of the Ardennes had forbidden the construction of east 
and west lines through that region. In addition to his dependence upon 
it for supply, the line Carignan, Sedan, Mezieres was essential to the 
German for movements of his troops. Should this southern system be 
cut by the allies the ruin of German armies would be complete. From 
the Meuse-Argonne front as it existed on September 26, 1918, the per- 
pendicular distance to the Carignan-Mezieres railroad line was about 
fifty kilometers. This region then formed the pivot of all German opera- 
tions in northern France and the vital necessity of covering the great 
four-track railroad resulted in the convergence on the Meuse-Argonne 
front of the several enemy defensive positions which further west were 
separated by 30 or even 60 kilometers. In fact, although in the northern 
part of the sector the works were not so complete, the German defenses 
on the Meuse-Argonne front consisted of trenches, wire, etc., one series 
behind another, to a depth of 20 kilometers or more. In thus preparing 
to hold a region which was so vital to him that utter ruin must follow 
its loss, the German was greatly aided by the natural features of the 
terrain. 


East of the Meuse the dominating heights not only secured the 
enemy's left but gave him positions in which powerful artillery could be 
installed to bring an obliqué fire on the western bank. Batteries located 
in the elaborately fortified Argonne forest secured the right flank arid 
could even cross their fire with those of the guns on the east bank of the 
Meuse. Midway between the Meuse. and the Argonne the heights of 
Montfaucon afforded the enemy perfect observation and formed a strong 
natural position which he had elaborately fortified. But while these 
were the most prominent features, the east and west ridges, abutting on 
the Meuse and Aire valleys, affording as they did perfect machine gun 





positions were perhaps the natural features which most favored the 
desperate defense which the enemy of necessity would have to make. 
Behind Montfaucon, wooded heights such as those west of Romagne and 
north of Barricourt constituted natural features which were most favor- 
able to the defense and unfavorable to the offense. Finally, not the 
least of the difficulties faced by the Ist Army were those resulting from 
the breadth of No Man’s Land and the absolute destruction of roads 
across that area. 


Even though the attack of the Ist Army would have to be made 
against so strong a natural position, to strengthen which the resources 
of Germany have been lavished for four years, it was nevertheless a sector 
in which the fighting could be forced. Thus, by compelling the enemy 
to draw in reinforcements, the advance of our Allies farther west could 
be best assisted. Above all, if the American Army could but win victory 
in this sector the end of the war would be in sight. 


When on September 2nd the decision to attack on the Meuse-Ar- 
gonne front was reached, the Ist Army was engaged in the preparation 
of the St. Mihiel drive. A portion of the staff was withdrawn from the 
St. Mihiel operation, however, and plans were at once begun for initiating 
the new operation. 


The origina! concentration for the Meuse-Argonne operation included 
15 divisions. Of these the Ist, 3rd, 4th, 35th, 80th, 82nd and 91st were 
involved in the pending St. Mihiel drive; the 29th, 37th and 92nd were 
in sector in the Vosges; the 28th, 32nd and 77th were in the neighborhood 
of Soissons: the 79th Division was in one of our own training areas, and 
the 33rd was near Bar-le-Duc. Practically all the artillery, air service 
and other auxiliaries which could be found for the new operation, were 
committed to the St. Mihiel drive and could only be moved after it was 
comp}eted. 


Arrangements to move ail units not to be employed in the St. Mihie! 
fight were begun at once and on the second day (September 13th) of that 
fight reserve divisions and army artillery units began moving toward the 
Meuse-Argonne front. Other artillery, corps and army artillery and 
tanks followed and finally some of the divisions which had been in first 
line in the St. Mihiel attack were withdrawn and joined in the masses 
moving to the new scene of action. To insure secrecy all movements 
had to be made at night and as only three routes were available the roads 


were jammed to utmost capacity. The movement of the masses involved 
was one of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war and its 
successful accomplishment is a tribute to the staff work of the Ist 
Army. 


On September 22nd the command of the front from east of the Meuse 
to the western edge of the Argonne passed to the Ist Army, with head- 
quarters at Souilly; the 17th French Corps with three divisions passed 
to the command of the Ist Army and the army front now extended from 
east of the Moselle to the western edge of the Argonne. The Meuse- 
Argonne front had been taken over from the 2nd French Army which had 
rendered much assistance in routing troops, filling dumps, etc., etc. 
Finally, after successfully adjusting a thousand and one difficulites and 
after having foreseen the other thousand and one necessities which con- 
front staffs, the Ist Army stood on the night of September 25-26th ready 
for the attack. 


On the night of September 25-26th the enemy had ten divisions in 
line and ten in reserve on the front Fresnes-en-Woevre-Argonne Forest. 
After St. Mihiel the Germans had naturally expected a further American 
effort but successful ruses east of the line of the Meuse, extending as far 
south as Lunéville, had deceived the enemy and as a consequence the 
actual attack came as a tactical surprise. The surprise feature had also 
been assisted by arrangements under which a screen of French troops 
covered our first line until the last possible moment before launching 
the attack. 


On the night of September 25-26th the battle order of the Ist Army 
from right to left on the sector of attack was as follows: the 3rd Corps, 
with the 33rd, 80th and 4th Divisions in line and the 3rd Division in 
reserve; the 5th Corps, with the 79th, 37th and 91st Divisions in line 
and the 32nd Division in reserve; the Ist Corps, with the 35th, 28th and 
77th Divisions in line and the 92nd Division in reserve; in army reserve 
were the Ist, 29th and 82nd Divisions in rear respectively of the 3rd, 5th 
and Ist Corps; the 5th French Cavalry Division was also in army reserve. 
Due to the fact that artillery organizations had not yet arrived for much 
of the infantry shipped over in the great troop movements of May, June 
and July, many of the divisions were not served by their own artillery 
brigades. The 33rd, 37th, 79th and 9|st divisions were supported by 
brigades not belonging to these organizations, while the 3rd, 32nd, 92nd 


and 29th divisions in reserve had no artillery brigades. The shortage 
in artillery material was largely made up by the assistance given by the 
French Command, who made ample French artillery units available for 
use in the operation, so that a total of 2,775 guns supported the attack. 


In addition the appropriate corps and army troops were available. 
These included 189 small tanks, of which 142 were manned by Americans, 
and the remainder by French, and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by Ameri- 
cans and the remainder by French. 


The Meuse-Argonne operation may properly be divided into two 
or more phases. For the present purpose the period September 26th to 
November ||th may properly be divided into two phases, the first of 
which closed with the end of October. 


Artillery interdiction fire on communications in the rear was begun 
six hours before the initial infantry attack. “Three hours before the attack 
fire was increased and intense artillery preparation all along the front 
commenced. At 5:30 a. m., September 26th, the artillery preparation 
changed to a rolling barrage, and the infantry advanced. 


The necessity for securing surprise had forbidden a long artillery 
preparation, and tanks had been unable to precede the infantry in the 
initial jump off. Therefore the infantry was practically dependent upon 
its own resources for cutting through the elaborate system of wire. This 
naturally slowed the infantry advance as did also the difficulties of the 
terrain. The infantry, however, progressed without encountering es- 
pecially serious resistance, except before Montfaucon. The early over- 
running of the enemy’s first positions, led to the hope that the 5th French 
Cavalry Division in army reserve might be pushed through the line to 
exploit the success in the direction of Grand Pré. However, blocked 
roads and other causes prevented the cavalry from getting through before 
the enemy reorganized his:defense. The cavalry did not reach Varennes 
and the 5th Cavalry Division (French) took no further part in the fight. 


The success of the initial assault having been assured the critical 
problem became the movement-of artillery and ammunition across the 
trackless No Man’s Land to support the continued progression of the 
troops. The strong point of Montfaucon, which had not fallen on the 
26th, also interfered with moving guns forward; but at 11:00 a. m., on 
September 27th, the 79th Division captured Montfaucon, and the center 
of the line, which had fallen behind both flanks, went forward. At that 


hour the right had made a splendid advance into the woods south of 
Brieulles-sur-Meuse, but the extreme left was meeting strong resistance 
in the Argonne. The attack continued without interruption and the 
enemy, recognizing his danger, threw six new divisions into line before 
September 29, developed a powerful machine gun defense supported by 
heavy artillery fire, and made frequent counter-attacks with fresh 
troops, particularly on the fronts of the 28th and 35th Divisions. 


By nightfall of the 29th the Ist Army line was approximately Bois 
de la Céte Lemont-Nantillois-Apremont—southwest across the Argonne. 
Some of the divisions had suffered severely. Units had become inter- 
mingled on account of the difficult nature of the ground over which they 
had attacked and the fog or darkness which had covered them. Relief 
of these divisions had therefore to be made before another coordinated 
general attack could be launched. Consequently, on the night of the 29th, 
the 37th and 79th divisions were relieved by the 32nd and 3rd divisions 
respectively, and on the following night the Ist Division relieved the 35th 
Division. 

At 5:30 a. m., on October 4th the general attack was renewed. “he 
order of battle of first-line divisions and corps from right to left was as 
follows: the 3rd Corps, 33rd, 4th and 80th divisions; 5th Corps, 3rd and 
32nd divisions; Ist Corps, Ist, 28th and 77th Divisions. The number of 
enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the Argonne had 
increased from 20 to 23 in line and in reserve, and comprised his best 
divisions. The resistance was desperate, and only small advances were 
realized, except on the right of the Ist Corps. By evening of October 
5th the line was approximately Bois de la Cate Lemont—Bois du Fays 

Gesnes- — Hill 240-— Fléville—Chéhéry—southwest through the Argonne. 


On October 6th the battle was extended to the east of the Meuse, 
in pursuance of instructions received to increase the extent of the battle 
front and thus involving more German divisions. On October 8th the 
17th French Corps made a general attack on the front east of the Meuse 
with the following divisions in line from right to left: 26th French Division, 
18th French Division, 29th and 33rd American Divisions. This attack fell 
on the exact pivot of the enemy’s salient formed by the whole of the ene- 
my’s armies in northern France and our troops encountered elaborate forti- 
fications and desperate resistance. Although the attack progressed until 
the 10th the advance realized was not sufficient completely to relieve troops 
west of the Meuse from enfilade artillery fire from the east bank. 


——————— 





In the meantime on October 7th, the Ist Corps launched the 82nd 
Division in an attack northwest toward Cornay to outflank the Germans 
in the Argonne, and to free the 28th and Ist Divisions from enfilade fire 
from the eastern edge of the forest. The success of the 82nd Division 
in this attack was marked and did much to break down resistance in the 
Argonne. The 28th Division was relieved on the night of the 8-9th by 
the extension of the front of the 82nd Division. 


On October 9th the 5th Corps attacked, with the Ist Division rein- 
forced by one infantry brigade of the 91st Division and the 32nd Division; 
the stubbornest defense was encountered and the fighting was desperate 
but an advance was made. On the 10th the Argonne was cleared and 
on the night of the I!|th the line was approximately Bois d’Ormont 
(north of Verdun) — Molleville Farm —— Sivry-sur-Meuse—Bois de la 
Céte Lemont—Bois de Forét--Cunel--Romagne—-Sommerance —Aire 
river west to Grand Pré. 


On the night of the 11-12th the Ist Division was relieved by the 42nd 
Division, and the 80th Division by the 5th Division, both relieving divi- 
sions coming from the St. Mihiel front. Local attacks continued on 
October 12-13th preparatory to a genera! attack, and on October 14th 
this attack was delivered on the front from north of Verdun to St. Juvin. 
The order of battle in line on the front of attack from right to left was: 
17th French Corps with 26th French Division, 18th French Division, 
29th and 33rd divisions; 3rd Corps with the 4th, 3rd and 5th divisions; 
5th Corps with the 32nd and 42nd divisions and the Ist Corps with the 
82nd and 77th divisions. Stubborn resistance was encountered every- 
where and on most of the front only small advances were realized. Never- 
theless the La Céte-Dame-Marie fell and the Kriemhilde line of defense 


was broken. 


On October 18th there was heavy fighting east of the Meuse, and 
the dogged offensive continued everywhere by local operations. On the 
23rd of October, the 3rd and 5th Corps pushed northward as far as 
Bantheville. It was now necessary to relieve certain troops, consolidate 
positions and generally to get forces and supplies in hand before attempt- 
ing another general attack. The remaining days of October (or to the 
end of the period we have called the first phase) were therefore devoted 
to preparing for the great attack to be launched November Ist. 


The material results which had been obtained by the Ist ‘Army up 


to the end of October may be summarized as follows: The enemy's 
most elaborately prepared positions had been broken through; the south- 
ern half of the Argonne was in our hands; 18,600 prisoners, 370 cannon, 
1,000 machine guns and countless material of all sorts captured; an 
increasing number of German divisions, arising from 20 in line and reserve 
on September 26th to 31 on October 31st, had been drawn into the fight: 


the great railroad artery through Carigan and Sedan was seriously 
threatened. 


But great as were the material results, the moral results were still 
more important. The American soldier had shown an unrivalled forti- 
tude in enduring incessant efforts and all the hardships due to constant 
bad weather and never ceasing battle. The Army had developed into a 
powerful and smooth running machine and everyone from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to the last arrival in France was supremely confdent of 
the ability of the American soldier to carry through any task. On the 
other hand the enemy’s morale had been reduced ':ntil his will to resist 
had reached the breaking point and he was ripe ror the disaster which 
was soon to overtake him 


in order that we may not fall into the error of supposing that 
the Meuse-Argonne offensive represented-the whole of America’s effort 
during the last days of the war it is well, before taking up the final 
attack of November Ist, to see what American troops were doing 
elsewhere. 


In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne attack the Ist Army had mere- 
ly extended its front, retaining command of the troops on the old St. 
Mihiel front. But by early October the ration strength of the Ist Army 
including the French troops, had risen to over a million men, and for 
this and other reasons the organization of another army was necessary. 
On October 10th therefore, the 2nd Army was created, and on October 
12th Major-General Robert L. Bullard was assigned to command it; the 
St. Mihiel front extending from Port-sur-Seille to Fresnes-en-Woevre was 
taken from the Ist Army and assigned to the 2nd Army. On October 
12th the Commander-in-Chief assigned Major-General Hunter Liggett to 
command the Ist Army and, establishing his advanced headquarters at 
Ligny-en-Barrois, assumed command of the group of armies formed by 
the Ist and 2nd American Armies. 


The prospect which became more and more a certainty of forcing 
an early conclusion of the war made it essential to keep all troops in line 
to the utmost of their powers of endurance, and therefore forbade the 
rest to which the tired divisions were richly entitled. Divisions which 
could no longer remain in the battle-front were therefore sent to the calmer 
sector of the 2nd Army. Notwithstanding the fact that it was constantly 
composed of tired divisions, the 2nd Army managed by its energetic 
attitude to keep the enemy in its front in constant dread. The 2nd 
Army was also prepared, as will be noticed later, to launch a powerful 
offensive when all plans were interrupted on November I Ith by the 
armistice. 


When the British attacked on August 8th, on the Amiens front, 
America was represented by the 33rd Division. 


When the Ist Army was formed at St. Mihiel the 3rd Corps with the 
28th, 32nd and 77th Divisions had been left on the Vesle. Early in 
September (3rd to 13th) the 28th and 77th Divisions attacked and as 


usual progressed. 


On August 29th the 32nd Division, which had entered the line 
northwest of Soissons, attacked and by a brilliant success materially 
aided the advance of the French on either flank. 


Che 6th, 8Ist and 88th divisions held sectors in the Vosges dur- 
ing September and October, the last division being relieved-on Novem- 
ber 4th. 

The 2nd Corps with the 27th and 30th divisions remained on the 
British front until the armistice. These two divisions played an im- 
portant part in breaking the Hindenburg line, and when the armistice 
was signed they had taken nearly 6,000 prisoners, 44 guns and over 
400 machine guns. 


The 4th French Army, attacking west of the Argonne, desired 
American troops. On September 30th the 2nd Division entered the 
French line and on October 3rd this division attacked a very strong 
position, broke through to a depth of 6 kilometers on the first day and 
thus allowed the French on either flank to advance. The 2nd Division 
not only held the positions it had gained, but made further progress 
until its relief on October 10th by the 36th Division. The 2nd Division 
had broken down the enemy’s resistance, having taken 2,296 prisoners, 
and the 36th Division, which had never been in the line before, showed 


that it was fully capable of profiting by the opportunity. In two days 
the 36th Division had reached the Aisne after an advance of no less than 
21 kilometers. 


In October while we were so heavily engaged in the Argonne the 
Commander-in-Chief received an urgent call from Marshall Foch for two 
American Divisions to help the French 6th Army and the Belgians, who 
were attacking in the extreme north. In answer to this call the 37th and 
91st Divisions (the 91st being accompanied by the artillery of the 28th 
Division) were promptly sent north, and on October 30th they entered 
the line and methodically broke down all the enemy resistance until 
November 4th. They again entered the line on November. 10th and were 
there when the armistice took effect on November | Ith. 


So insistent were the requests for American troops that it seemed 
that the commanders of our Allies felt that the very presence of American 
divisions assured victory; it is to the eternal glory of the American soldier 
that wherever he went he found victory. 


The French 4th Army, as well as our Ist Army, had felt the need of 
a period of comparative inactivity, so that the troops might be reorgan- 
ized and supplies accumulated for another concerted attack. It was of 
course desirable that the attack of the Ist Army and that of the French 
4th Army should be simultaneous. As a result of conferences with 
French G. H. Q. and Marshall Foch’s Headquarters, November Ist was 
finally selected as the day of attack. 


The general objective of the attack was still the region Sedan- 
Meziéres, and its primary purpose was of course to cut the great railroad. 


The first and immediate objective of the Ist Army was the capture 
of Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt, the outflanking of the northern 
part of the Argonne, and establishing contact with the 4th French Army 
near Boult-aux-Bois. 


The line on the night of October 30th-November Ist ran approxi- 
mately as follows: The Meuse river—-Cléry-le-Grand—north of Banthe- 
ville—-northern part of the Bois de Bantheville—south of St. Georges— 
north of St. Juvin--north of Cheviéres. The order of battle from right _ 
to left was as follows: 3rd Corps with the 5th and 90th Divisions in line 
and the 3rd Division in reserve; 5th Corps with the 89th and 2nd Divisions 
in line and the Ist and 42nd Divisions in reserve; Ist Corps with the 80th, 





pilee-->+ é . 
9 
, 
‘ : 


77th and 78th Divisions in line and the 82nd Division in reserve. The 
32nd Division was in army reserve. The attack was preceded by two 
hours of violent artillery preparation. By continuous effort all available 
artillery had been moved forward to suitable positions to cover the infan- 
try advance, and was well co-ordinated in a tremendous preparation. 
The enemy was overwhelmed and broke before the determined infantry. 
The 3rd Corps took Andevanne, and the 5th Corps pushed forward most 
rapidly and drove the enemy from the, heights of the Bois de Barricourt, 
a formidable natural obstacle which had blocked the way to Sedan. 


On November 2nd the Ist Corps joined more actively in the move- 
ment which had now become an onslaught that the enemy could not con- 
tain. On the 3rd, troops were rushed forward in motor trucks in the 
pursuit of the demoralized enemy. By the night of the 3rd the Ist Corps 
had reached St. Pierremont, the 5th Corp had taken Fossé and the 3rd 
Corps Beauclair. The enemy's line had been pierced to a distance of 
nearly 20 kilometers and selected heavy batteries were rushed forward to 
fre on the important railroad lines at Montmedy--Longuyon-~Conflans. 
The ultimate object of the whole operation was now within reach. 


On the 4th the pursuit was continued and operations were extended 
to the east bank of the Meuse. By night we were on the left bank of 
the Meuse, opposite Stenay, and on the 5th the line was beyond Stonne 
on the west bank of the Meuse, while on the east bank the 5th Division 
of the 3rd Corps had crossed the river and progressed over two kilometers 
east of Brieulles and Dun-sur-Meuse. Just west of the Meuse the enemy 
resistance had been completely disorganized. All his reserves had been 
used up and his first-line divisions were in flight. To the east of the 
Meuse, however, the enemy still held, and progress was slow. On Novem- 
ber 6th the Ist Corps pushed seven kilometers beyond Raucourt, the 
great railway artery was within easy artillery range and a continuation 
of our efforts and those of our Allies further north meant the end of all 
the German Armies in Northern France. 


Since October 7th, a date which coincides with that on which it 
became certain that the German could not wrest from the Ist Army its 
initial success in breaking the Meuse-Argonne line, the German Govern- 
ment had sought through the President of the United States to secure 
an armistice which, needless to say, would in the German mind be accept- 
able to Germany. Several exchanges of notes between the German 
Government and the President took place, until finally on November 5th 


the President informed Germany that the question of an armistice must 
be taken up with Marshall Foch, the Allied Commander-in-Chief. On 
November 6th, when the Ist Army had driven the German until his 
retreat became a rout, the German High Command asked Marshall 
Foch for a conference. Two such coincidences are not the result of 
chance and are themselves sufficient proof that the American soldier 
had borne his share in securing victory. The German representatives 
met Marshall Foch on the night of November 7th-8th. The Germans 
asked for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Marshall Foch refused 
and gave the Germans 72 hours in which to accept armistice terms which 
had eureacy been prepared; all the Allies were ordered to continue to 
attack. 


On November 7th the river line of the Meuse to a point not far from 
Sedan was in the hands of the 5th and Ist Corps. On November 7th, 
8th and 9th the German forces on the heights southeast of Stenay were 
pushed into the plain of the Woevre. The attack of the Ist Army was 
now directed toward Carignan. The Ist Corps was withdrawn and its 
sector taken over by the 4th French Army. East of the Meuse the pur- 
suit was continued. On November 10th, the 5th Corps forced a crossing 
over the Meuse, south of Mouzon, and on the morning of the | |th this 
Corps crossed at Stenay and occupied that town in liaison with our 3rd 
Corps on its right. 


Early on the morning of November | |th the German Commissioners 
accepted the terms of the Armistice; G. H. Q. was at once notified by 
Marshall Foch’s headquarters that the armistice would go into effect 
at 11:00 a. m. The Armies were at once notified, and they in turn 
transmitted the order through the Corps headquarters to the troops. 
The advance of our troops had been so rapid, however, that communica- 
tion beyond Corps headquarters was uncertain, and in at least one case 
one of our small detachments took prisoners after 11:00 a. m. 


On November 5th, the Commander-in-Chief directed the Ist Army 
to prepare to move towards Carignan upon the completion of the Meuse- 
Argonne operation, and at the same time directed the 2nd Army to ad- 
vance its lines and prepare to attack in the direction of Briey. On the 
same day, November 5th, Marshall Foch wrote a letter (received on 
night of November 6th-7th) asking the Commander-in-Chief to send six 
American divisions to assist in the attack which the French were prepar- 


ing in the region of Chateau-Salins. Six divisions were at once selected, 
but it was arranged that these divisions should operate under our 2nd 
Army. 


The move of the Germans ‘toward an armistice served to hasten all 
Allied preparations for the delivery of a final blow in case the enemy did 
not accept the terms offered him, and on the | Ith the six divisions needed 
to support the left of the French were enroute to the right bank of the 
Moselle to join in the attack, which was scheduled for November 14th. 


From September 26th to November | Ith the Germans employed 46 
divisions in attempting to defend the Meuse-Argonne sector. This was 
25’, of the enemy’s entire divisional strength on the western front, but 
since these divisions included the finest Prussian shock troops the actual! 
percentage of the enemy’s fighting strength represented by the 46 divisions 
was probably considerably more than 25%. (Lest we forget, remember 
also that American divisions confronted the enemy at other points on 
the front during this same period.) Notwithstanding the forces thrown 
in by the enemy, the Ist Army had been completely successful. The 
enemy's vital supply line had been cut; nearly 20,000 prisoners, over 400 
guns, more than 300 trench mortars, 3,000 odd machine guns and a 
large quantity of other material, including 3 locomotives and 100 cars 


had been taken. 


The American divisions actually engaged were the Ist, 2nd. 3rd, 
4th,5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 77th, 78th, 79th, 
80th, 81st, 82nd, 89th, 90th and 9Ist. The 6th Division was also in 
reserve, as was the 92nd Division, some of whose elements were for a time 
engaged. Many of the divisions were in line for a length of time that 
only the fortitude of the American soldier made possible, others were 


returned after a few days rest. The Ist, 5th, 32nd, 42nd, 77th and 79th 
Divisions were in line on this front twice, the 80th Division was in three 
times, while other divisions which were engaged were also engaged at 
other parts of the front during the period covered by the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive. 


The American casualties were just under 119,000. This number was 
large, but viewed in the light of the results achieved the casualties were 
light. 


As early as June, 1918, the Germans exhibited great apprehension 
as to the effect of America on the outcome of the war. On June 12th, 
for example, prisoners captured by the French stated with reference to 


the 2nd Division: 


“Tt was decided to use picked men against the Americans, to inflict 
on them a moral defeat. The purpose of the intervention of the 5th, 
Guard Division and the 28th Infantry Division was to prevent at all costs 
the achievement of success by the Americans.” 


A high German General Staff officer has stated: ‘‘It was the attack 
of the American troops west of the Meuse that, with the impetuosity 
which the German Staff had not believed possible for them upon so short 
a period of training, had gained the decision for the Allies and brought 
about the ruin of the German Army.” 


Volumes could, and will, be written on the American Soldier's part 
in the war, but only a brief statement of fact is necessary to establish for 
him a record to which no other nation can lay claim: In the defense no 
American division lost ground intrusted to it except locally and then only for 
a few hours, and no American division failed in attack. 











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Souilly, the headquarters of General John J. Pershing at the beginning of our greatest battle which involved the employment of 1,200,000 troops, the use of 2,417 guns and 4,214,000 
rounds of artillery ammunition. General Pershing’s office was in the mairie where Petain directed the defense of Verdun and Nivelle the recapture of Fort Douaumont. The 
road running past the mairie, and traversing the picture, is known as the “Sacred Road’’—the road which saved Verdun. It had witnessed, says Lt. Col. Palmer, all of the grim 
movements of troops who had fought under the inspiration of Petain’s saying: “They shall not pass.” Photo by U. S. Air Service 








Verdun, the great bastion overlooking our advance to the Meuse-Argonne front. The citadel of Verdun is built of solid rock in which there are many miles of tunnels running 
in-all directions. ° During the Crown Prince’s attack (Feb. 22—Sept. 9, 1916) several thousand troops were quartered in the caverns. The subterranean barracks included a 
bakery, mess hall, chapel, recreation rooms, commissary, electric light plant and immense sleeping quarters, all fully protected against the largest shell or air bomb. The Germans 
fred their last shot into Verdun on the morning of Nov. I], 1918. Photo by U. S. Air Services 


Preparing to “‘treat ‘em rough.” 
Tanks loaded on cars at Vadelaincourt, 
Sept. 25, in anticipation of the attack 
on the following day. In the Meuse- 
Argonne operations 324 tanks were used. 





“Onward, Christian Soldiers.’ Church services near Verdun. A view of Verdun looking north from Cathedral tower. 





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A 340 mm. gun manned by the U. S. Coast Artillery Corps firing into the German lines from the neighborhood of Nixeville, Sept. 26, 1918. 

In every hundred days that our combat divisions were in line they were supported by their own artillery for 75 days, by British artillery for 5 days, 

by French for | ' days and were without artillery support for 1814 days. Of these 1815 days, however, 18 days were spent in quiet sectors and 
only one-half of one day in active sectors. 








Thirty miles is the effective range of this 14 inch naval gun which formed part of a battery of railway ordnance manned by sailors and com- 

manded by Rear Admiral C. P. Plunkett. The first gun was shipped from the United States June 20, 1918. It went into action against the enemy 

Sept. 16, from which time this gun with its sister guns was engaged in firing against German bases hitherto completely beyond the reach of allied 
artillery. (Inset) Rear Admiral Plunkett 





Two miles an hour was the rate at which trafic moved through Esnes near the Meuse-Argonne front. The scene is typical of the congestion 
of vehicles back of the line. 


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A trafhe jam at Esnes. 


A drinking water reservoir for American troops moving toward the 
front. 








‘Shirt reading.” A catnap in a gun emplacement. 





The 326th Tank battery moving up front near Boureuilles Sept. 26. The outfit seems to have the entire approval of the buddy on the right 








Maj. Gen. C. P. Summerall. ‘‘Per Schedule’’ Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, Brig.-Gen. Malin Craig and Col. A. C. Voris. When General 
Summerall he was called. From July 18 to Oct. Liggett assumed command of the Ist Army on Oct. 16, 1918, General Dickman succeeded him as com- 
11, 1918, he commanded the Ist Div. Then he : manding general of the Ist Corps. 

commanded the 5th Corps. 


















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An outstanding figure in the Meuse-Argonne operations, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Robert L. Bullard. In the early period Gen. Bullard 
commanded the 3d Corps and later the 2d Army. Left to right, front row: Maj. Gen. R. L. Bullard; Brig. Gen. Stuart Heintzelman; Col. David 
L. Stone, between and behind the generals. Second row, left to right: Lieut. Col. G. W. Wilson; Lieut Col. F. M. Thompson; Lieut. Col. G. P. 


Tyner, Capt. Shirey, aid-de-camp; Lieut. Col. O. Hope; Col. W. N. Haskell. October 20, 1918. 








Cellar dugouts 
in a village near 








troop 


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movements 


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Negro infantrymen of the 92d Div. advancing to the Argonne front 


The endless stream of trucks passing through Esnes. 


along screened highway. 





‘“And unextinguished laughter shakes the skies 











An observer escaping in parachute from balloon set afire by German Secretary Baker made a second visit to the front in September. 


shell. Piste be. Ue ke Herve Maj. Gen. J. W. McAndrew, Chief of Staff, A. E. F., and the Secretary 
photographed at Fort de Marre, Sept. 26, 1918. Fort de Marre is one 
of the chain of outer forts around Verdun. 





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Preparatory to the advance engineer troops clear away wire entanglements from old German position to make way for new road to the front. 











Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander, Commanding Men 
General 77th Div 


of the 308th Inf., 77th Div., resting after their frst advance in the Argonne, Sept. 26. 


A halt during the drive through the Argonne. 








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Field Artillery liaison officer reporting the progress of the attack over a field telephone. 





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A direct hit on a German ammunition dump which exploded with a terrific roar. . Charles H. Muir, Commanding 


General, 28th Div. 





Members of Co. B, 108th M. 
G. Bn., 28th Div., halt near 
Boureuilles Sept. 26, 1918. 


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While the 28th Div. was pushing forward an observation balloon of Not dead or wounded; just taking 40 winks after a hard drive. Men 
the 5th Co. was attacked and brought down by German airmen. of 28th Div. near Boureuilles Sept. 26. 
Forty-three of our balloons were destroyed during the war. 





Tanks of the 326th Battery, 31 1th Tank Center, near Boureuilles on way into action, Sept. 26, 1918. These machines carried two men, a driver 
and a gunner. About half of these tanks were equipped with 37 mm. cannon and about half with machine guns. The speed was five to six miles 
an hour; grade capacity 45 degrees; weight 15,000 pounds. 


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Secretary Baker and Maj. Gen. J. W. McAndrew at Rarecourt, Sept. 26, 1918, watching the examination of a German officer by intelligence 

officers, Ist Lt. Jennings and 2d Lt. McCoy. Military information required for general purposes included the enemy order of battle, his strength, 

condition and morale and the strength, position and condition of his reserves. Data of this character were obtained mainly from prisoners and 
captured documents. 





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Caring for enemy wounded at a first aid dressing station in a ruined village during the advance. Some of our own lightly wounded men are in the truck 
standing alongside. The dressing station is marked by the Red Cross flag seen in the right of the picture. 


Burst of phosphorous bomb. Used in combat operations to light enemy positions at night and thus mark them for attack or artillery fire. 





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Maj. G Not, a stone remains of the village of Vauquois, on the line of our 
headquarters. Both he and Maj. D. C. Cordiner, to whom he is talking, “jump-off” Sept. 26. It has been fought over by the Germans and French 
are in full combat equipment. Gen. Traub is carrying an old type gas many times in the previous four years. Photo by U.S: Air Service 
mask while Maj. Cordiner is carrying the new respirator, slung on the back. 








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In their retreat before the Yanks the Germans dynamited this bridge across the River Aire. Engineers hurriedly repaired it for the 35th Div. and other 
outfits hurrying after the retiring enemy. 





Old mine craters beyond Vauquois. In the early days of the war the French and Germans both set off mines on this spot. Tunnels were run from the 
lips of the craters and listening posts established at the heads of the tunnels. The opposing lines were often not more than 40 feet apart. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


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Varennes, taken on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne battle. It was in the advance of the 28th and 35th Divs. Probably few of the Pennsylvania 
and Missouri National Guardsmen of those divisions knew that 127 years before Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette were captured here and turned back to Paris 
and the guillotine. 








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Battery C., 108th Field Artillery, 28th Div., firing on the retreating Germans from the ruins of Varennes. 





Tank crawling out of a shell hole at Varennes. (Inset) Ready for action. Sergt. C. C. Peters is the driver. His gunner, Sergt. Thomas Hamlin, stands 
alongside. Gen. Pershing had 189 small tanks at the opening of the battle. 


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The fringes of the Argonne. The celebrated forest, further west, offered more serious obstacles to progress. The 35th Div. cleared its way through this 
desolate stretch of shell-torn trees and tangled underbrush east of Varennes without serious difficulty. 











Yanks streaming through the captured town of Varennes, taken Battery of 155 mm howitzers helping to speed the enemy on his 
in the first day’s advance by the 28th and 35th Divs. way. Firing from the gaptured town of Varennes. 


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Shelter tents of a Yank outfit on the outskirts of Cheppy. By the time the 28th and 35th Divs. reached this point, Gen. Pershing says in his final report, 
the Germans “had developed a powerful machine gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made frequent counter attacks with fresh troops.” 


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Charpentry, one of the numerous village ruins turned into machine gun nests to hold up our advance. Taken in the sector by the 28th 
and 35th Divs. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


Baulny, in the same area. “We were no longer engaged in a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient,” says Gen. Pershing in his final report,“ bar ee 


committed to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy.” Pb+te by U. 8. Air Service 














During the first three weeks of the Argonne battle the Commander- Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett, comrnanding the Ist Corps at the open- 
in-Chief personally commanded the Ist Army, with headquarters at ing of the offensive. He took over command of the Ist Army, Oct. 16, 
Souilly, whence he made frequent trips to the advancing front. from Gen. Pershing, who then moved: his headquarters to Ligny-en- 

Barrois, from which place he directed the Ist and 2d Armies. 


The Commander-in-Chief on one of his almost daily trips to the front lines. He is discussing with Maj. Gen. William H. Johnston, 91st Div., some of 
the problems that officer faced in leading his Pacific Coast fighters against the Germans. 





A demolition bomb caught by the camera. These bombs were aimed 
at enemy dumps, railheads and wherever supplies were concentrated. aon aie 
The largest bombs manufactured for our army weighed 1,000 pounds ae 
and carried 570 pounds of explosives. They had fins to steady their flight. 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 


What happened when a demolition bomb struck an enemy concen- 





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Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


. charged in the advance on the town of Montfaucon. 


Montfaucon Wood and the German trench s 


79th and 37th Divs 





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“Wild Luke,” our second ace, with a record of bringing down 14 enemy observation balloons and 4 planes. Lieut. Frank Luke, 27th Aero Squadron, 
went after his last record Sept. 28, 1918, after notifying his comrades of his intended victims. He shot down two enemy balloons in flames and never was heard 
of again. ‘He was swallowed up in the skies,” said Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker. No trace of him or his machine was ever found. 


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Montfaucon presented one of the hardest nuts the Americans had to crack. It occupied the dominating height of the terrain. The view givenh 
the nature of the land over which the 79th and 37th Divs. charged in storming the hil! 


ere shows 


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“ Malancourt was inthe pathway of the 79th Div. in its first day’s 
rush for Montfaucon. This air view shows the enemy machine gun posi- 
tion and wire entanglements that had to be overcome by our men in 
their advance. Photo by U. 3. Air Service 


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Ruins of Montfaucon, where the Germans made their strongest stand 
in the first phase of the fighting. Shell holes in the foreground show the 
concentration of artillery fire. 


Photo by U. 3. Air Service 








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In the foreground of this air photograph may be seen the famous observatory that the German Crown Prince used during the six months’ struggle for 
Verdun. From its tower he had a splendid view for miles in every direction. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 








From this safely armored retreat at Montfaucon the Crown Prince of Germany watched his men die by the thousands when they flung themselves on 


Verdun. Inside the house a steel and concrete tower was built for the prince. Through this tower ran a periscope that rose a foot above the roof. Wilhelm 
took his observations from a dark room far below. 


Another view of the Crown 
Prince’s armored observatory on 
the hills of Montfaucon. 





Advancing infantry of the 79th Div. passing the Crown Prince’s American and French observers with field glasses and periscopes 
observatory after the capture of the town. watching the German retreat from Montfaucon. 














This observation balloon had been hit by an enemy airman. The Maj. Gen. Joseph &. Kuhn; commanding the 79th Div., which took 
observer is dropping to safety in a parachute near Montfaucon. A few Montfaucon. 


moments later the German who destroyed the balloon, Hans Heinrich 
Marwede, was brought down by anti-aircraft guns. 


Concrete posts erected by the Germans on all roads approaching Still going strong after its terrific struggle at Montfaucon, the 79th 


Montfaucon.: There were three in each road. Div. reached Nantillois the night of Sept. 29. This area was subjected 


te heavy enemy shell-fire from across the Meuse. 





German shells bursting in Nantillois and a Signal Corps photographer right there to make pictures of them. 





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“There were but four roads available across this deep zone,” Gen. Pershing reports, “and the violent artillery **** fire had virtually destroyed them.” 


The engineers and pioneers repaired them and by afternoon of Sept. 27 all the divisional artillery but a few heavy guns were supporting the infantry. This 155 


mm gun was a victim of the bad roads. 





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Souvenirs. This first sergeant has forgotten For youthfulness and dash Col. Tenney Ross, C of S., 79th Div., said that Brig. Gen. W. J. Nicholson 
the hell of battle in the pleasure of collecting 62 years old, who commanded one of the infantry brigades of that division could not be beaten. He is here 
trophies. conferring with Col. J. W. Kilbreth of the Artillery. 





A first aid’ dressing station 
near Nantillois. 





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Gathering the battle victims for buriaL. The enemy-dead in the pathway of our advance. 





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Danger from gas attacks was impressed on our men by every means in order to enforce obedience to the army orders concerning the carrying and wearing 
of gas masks. This exhibition was staged for the benefit of soldiers by Maj. Evarts Tracy, C. E. In 1918 from 20 to 30 per cent of all our battle casualties 


were due to gas. 








Lieut. Col. William Mook, an army skin expect, treating a soldier 
burned by mustard gas. 


Mustard gas victim, showing effects: of this gas on the skin. 


Maj. Gen. William G. Haan, commanding the 32d Div., addressing General Haan, whose division relieved the 37th Div. in the fighting 


officers and non-coms of his outfit. line on the night of Sept.29 and continued in the advance for eighteen days. 





While the ground soldier fought for days to gain a trench system or a’ patch of woods the airman sailed above viewing and reading the terrain like a map. 


Photo by U. S. Air Service 








A Breguet bomber. While the ground soldiers were pushing back the Germans through the Argonne bombing planes went forth each night to increase 
the enemy troubles. These bombers destroyed railway lines, supply bases and munition dumps behind the lines. 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 


Bombing Montmedy, 42 kilometers north of Verdun, while American troops advance in the Meuse-Argonne Sector. Three bombs, loaded with T. N. T., 
have been released by a Yankee aviator. One has already hit the supply station and two are speeding on their errand of destruction. That the Germans are 


making desperate efforts to wing the plane is shown by the two black puffs of smoke indicating the explosion of anti-air craft shells. To the right may be seen 
a Red Cross on the roof of a building. The aviator respected it. ; 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 








German plane C. L. 11 | A 3892-18 brought down between Montfaucon and Cierges. 


Maj. Gen. Beaumont B. Buck who command- 


ed the 3rd Div. Aug. 31-Oct. 17, 1918. 


Pursued by a “Flieger.” While the Germans were being thrust back in the Meuse-Argonne sector 
American aviators made distant forays over enemy territory. One Yankee pilot was tooling his ship 


over the Rhine at Ludwigshafen and Mannheim when a German plane darted after him. His observer 
took time to record the incident with his camera. 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 





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Several days before the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne operations our observers, with their cameras, reconnoi 


were to advance. The picture on the left shows the terrain near Bethincourt. On the right is the strongly organiz 
sector. 


tered ground over which American troops 
ed Ravin de Tillemont in the same active 
Photo by U.S. Air Service 









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Battery E. 16th F. A., 4th Div., advancing through Malancourt in the Meuse-Argonne drive. Notice the gas masks attached to the horses’ bridles. 
(In inset) Col. C. A. Bach, Chief of Staff, 4th Div. 





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Scanning the horizon for signs of the retreating Germans from a hill overlooking the ruins of Cuisy. Supply trains of the 4th Div. may be seen movin 
up along the road. 8 





This buddy, who is a member of the 4th Div., has a problem. He is a “walking case.” If he can reach Septsarges, across the valley, he will find a first 
aid station in a ruined house. To get there he must crawl and scramble over the intervening space which is swept by machine gun fire. 














Bombing a supply station at Thionville, 30 kilometers north of Metz: 
Note the missles in flight. They are filled with T. N. T., one of whose 


ingredients is tolnol. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


American observation balloon falling in flames after attack by German 
aviator near La Claire, Meuse, Sept. 26, 1918. 





S # 
Die i 


Our cannoneers served the 75’s so rapidly that a captured German officer is reported to have asked the privilege of seeing the American 75 mm. machine 
gun. By its recuperator device the field gun of today is chiefly distinguished from its brother of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Without a recupera- 


tor the gun would leap out of aim at each shot and would have to be pointed anew; but one with a recuperator needs to be pointed only at the beginning of 
the action. We are indebted to the French for the recuperator. 


BY age ee : 5 4 





Nine kilometers in two days. This was the advance made by the 80th Div. after the jump-off in the Meuse-Argonne operations beginning Sept. 26. Here 
are seen the commanding general of the division, Maj. Gen. Adelbert Cronkhite, and Colonel William H. Waldron, Chief of Staff. They are examining a map 


of the sector on their front. Our armies were at all times supplied with an abundance of excellent maps, reproduced for the most part in the printing plant 
Langres, whose equipment and personnel were unexcelled on either side during the war. 


Thorough preparation for its role in the Meuse-Argonne operations was made by the 33d Div. Elements of that organization are here shown maneuvering 


at Willeroncourt. 





An inspection by Maj. Gen. Geo. Bell, commanding 33rd Div. Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Cameron, 5th Corps, and Maj. Gen. Geo. Bell, 


33rd Div., during liaison maneuver. 





132nd Infantryman and his'donkey at La Claire, Sept. 14. 


On Sept. 10, 1918, the 33rd 
Div. took over the Mort Homme 
sector. These are dugouts of 

132nd Inf. at Germonville. 


Men of 108th Sanitary Train at Montzeville carrying wounded to 
hospital, Sept. 14. 


A % 
; ny . ss lll oa. oes ‘ < 





Members of the 132d Inf., 33d Div., in a trench at Alexandre, Meuse, Sept. 17, 1918. From this position could be seen the valley of the Meuse. 





Photo by U.S. Air Service 


The bombing of the fortified town 


trafed.”’ 


‘ 


y s 


‘ 


of Mainz. 


While the advance in the Meuse-Argonne sector progressed towns in the interior of Germany were severel 


x 
Morion Sage’. 


“Fightin’ fools” is what admiring “Aussies” called the men of the 33d Div. when they were up with the British but never did they show such desperate 
courage as when they scourged the Germans out of the almost impregnable positions here shown. Upon this ground pivoted the entire American advance in 
the Meuse-Argonne sector. On the immediate front were Forges stream and swamp. Beyond were great systems of wire and trenches and still farther on was 
Forges wood, wirebound and teeming with machine guns. Inset: (left) Col. J. L. Sanborn, 13Ist Inf. (right) Col. Abel Davis, 132d Inf. Pre be Us aiedle Beccles 





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Trains of the 129th Inf., 33d Div., winding through the ruins of Bethincourt, Sept. 29, 1918. 





Pounding the German lines north of Exermont. 


Filming a battle near Exermont. While shells burst in the foreground Capt. Nicholas McDonald, Sig. Corps, courageously cranked his machine and made 


600 feet of what Lieut. Pierre Marcel, chief of the French photographic section pronounced the best shot ever made of actual conflict. A battery of the 6th F. A. 
is on the crest of the opposite hill. Its position became untenable and it was compelled to move to another position. 








Another part of the panorama covered by the range of Capt. McDonald’s motion picture camera. The battery has been dragged from the hill down to 
the road. Later the animals are hooked on and it moves out. There were casualties. 





A battery of “heavies” in the Argonne firing at dawn. The night mists have not yet disappeared. 


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“Happy” Dietz, they called him. On the i Soldiers in a ruined church at Exermont. 
tolls he was Sgt. Will A. Dietz, 27th Bn., Tank 
Corps. 





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Street scene in Exermont. On the night of Sept. 30 the Ist Div. relieved the 35th Div. For the next eleven days there was almost continuous fighting 
as the Ist advanced seven kilometers down the Aire Valley in the face of desperate resistance. The casualties of the Ist Div. in this period were 8,500. 


Fleville, Exermont and its environs were taken. Fourteenshundred prisoners, 13 field guns and quantities of stores were captured. When this picture was 
taken Exermont was being shelled. Note the dead German lying on the roadway. 





A moment after the preceding picture was taken the warning screech of a high explosive shell was heard and the men who had been loitering in the street 
scrambled for cover. About 30 seconds intervene between the time when the shell is heard and the time when it arrives. 


thE MEMORY OF 


WHat SVS SCE OWE FS FIRE: 


OCF OBER TS? Ya He 1916 


in the Ardennes Forest. Note the 
foreground 


. F. A. Hussey leading a patrol i 
dead German in the 


Sgt 


Aire. 


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Ist Div., who perished during the drive down the valley of the 














The Germans were unceremoniously evicted by the 77th Div. from four years’ comfortable occupancy Sgt. Geo. Norman, Co. C., 308th Inf., 77th 
of these dougouts in the Argonne Forest, Div., and one of his buddies. They have just 
been wounded and are being taken to a dressing 

station. 


Twenty-six thousand Germans cried “Kamerad” during the opera- 


tions of the Ist Army in the Meuse-Argonne sector. 





A great many Landsturm troops were on the 77th Div. front in the Argonne. Here are some——captive. 





This shattered church in the ruins of Neuvilly, not far from the Argonne forest, furnished temporary shelter for American wounded, while the struggle 
that rid the woods of Germans was being waged. 










A truckload of _ slightly 
wounded. American _ soldiers, 
heroes of the fighting in the Ar- 
gonne, watch with grim satisfac- 

tion a file of Germans pass. 








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Domesticity in the Argonne. Dreaming of home. Men of 77th Div. in deserted house at Cornay. 





Brambles and thickets of dense forests, unending systems of wire entahn 


concentrations—hell on earth—none of these balked for long the triumphant advance of the ga 
from the ravine east of Pont a |’Aulne. 


glements, sniper’s posts, machine gun pill boxes, toxic gases and terrific artillery 
llant First Army in the Meuse-Argonne sector. Looking east 


Panorama of Grandpre. Grandpre was captured in part by the 
77th Div. The 78th Div. completed the capture after heavy fighting 
in the streets. The investment of Grandpre on Oct. 10 cleared the Ar- 

gonne forest of theenemy. _Photo by U. S. Air Servier 


Despite heavy bombardment with anti-air craft shells (note black 
puffs of smoke) an American pilot drops incendiary bombs on German 
supply station. Bombs contain oil emulsion, thermite and metallic 


sodium, a combination that burns with intense heat. 
Photo by U.S. Air Service 





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Drenched with bombs of T. N. T. Storehouses at Buhl, southeast of Saarburg bombarded by American airmen. Half a dozen of the destructive missiles 
may be seen exploding. The terrain is shot with holes made by bombs dropped the day before. 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 





A yard at a time. Soldiers of the 308th Inf., 77th Div., advancing north of St. Juvin, Oct. 31, 1918. A plume of smoke from an exploding rifle grenade 


may be seen in the thickets ahead. (Inset) Col. Cromwell Stacey, 308th Inf. Col. Stacey received the Croix de Guerre for carrying a wounded soldier through 
shell fire to a dressing station. 





Men of the 308th Inf., 77th Div., 
entered the line for the first time, Aug. II, 


pressing the attack, have fired a volley of grenades into the brush. Near St. Juvin, Oct. 31, 


1918. From the time it 
1918, until the close of hostilities, the 77th Div. made a total advance of 71.5 kilometers again 


st resistance 


a i hay. 


All that remained of the “Lost Battalion” of the 77th Div., after having been cut off by tine enemy for six days. Seven hundred men stormed the German 
entrenchments and seized the Ravin de Chaulevaux, Oct. 2, 1918. The outfit comprised elements of two battalions of the 308th Inf., sections from Co.’s C and 
D, 306th M. G. Bn., and Co. K, 307th Inf. Cut off that night, the composite battalion, without food, fighting from its fox holes, withstood the enemy although 
attacked with liquid fire, rifles, grenades and machine guns. When relief came, Oct. 8, only 252 men, some wounded, filed out for rest. 








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“Break through and hold at any cost.” Acting under these orders Maj. Charles W. Whittlesey led what was to become the “Lost Battalion” 
enemy in the Argonne Forest. During the six days and nights through which they fought, hungered, thirsted, were wounded and d 
heroic band. When a demand to surrender came from the Germans, “Go to Hell Whittlesey” didn’t say “Go to hell,’ 
fight Maj. Whittlesey was promoted to lieutenant colonel and decorated with the D. S. C. 


4 9 ac © ve 


against the 
ied, his spirit buoyed up this 
‘but he didn’t surrender. For his part in the 


Prisoners captured in the Ar- 
gonne fighting being conducted to 
division headquarters. There 
they were quizzed and searched 
before being sent in to the prison 
pens farther behind the lines. 
The doughboys at the roadside 
preserve a judicial air as they 
scrutinize the men who recently 
were battling against them. It 
was remarked throughout the war 
that the American soldiers seldom 
showed any animosity toward 
captive enemies. 





The Ith Inf., (formerly 8th and 16th Penn. Inf.), 28th Div., com- Always hungry. Two wounded soldiers enjoying refreshments near 
ing out of the line after being relieved. Food is being distributed by Chatel Chehery, Oct. 10, 1918. They will continue to the field hospital 
Red Cross and Salvation Army workers in the building in the rear. after lunch. 


Neuville, Oct. 19, 1918. 





How the Argonne was won. Like their Indian fighting ancestors the Americans fought from behind trees and bushes, digging a “fox hole” for cover when- 
ever they paused. This photograph was taken by a Signal Corps operator during the advance of the |8th Inf., Ist Div., up the slopes of Hill 240, near Exer- 
mont, Oct. 11, 1918. These soldiers fought their way to the top in the face of heavy machine gun fire and drove the enemy from the position. The bullet-torn 
helmet in the foreground tells the story of a “buddy” who lies “over yonder.” 








In the Argonne fighting the Americans held the superiority in the air. Throughout the struggle the infantry was supported by the Air 
We had at the start 821 airplaines, 604 manned by Americans. Service. The air was filled with the throb of engines carrying fighters, 
spent ae bo: bombers and observers on their missions. Photo by U. 3. Air Service 








Our troops went forward over ground torn by artillery of both armies and pockmarked by mines and bombs. 
Photo by U. 8. Air Servicw 


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ee 


tated 


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Oct. 8 


g a major and three lieutenants, and put 


tol on Hill 223 near Chatel Chehery 


As Second Elder of a Tennessee mountain church at 


pis 


prisoners, includin 


0 Germans. captured | 3. 


when he fought his epic battle with rifle and automatic 


standing on the ground where he killed 2 
82d Div.. 


York was a corporal in Co. G, 328th Inf.. 


“greatest individual fighter of the war.” 


35 machine guns out of bu 
1918. He came home 


the beginning of the w 


siness. 
a sergeant wearing the DS. ¢€ 


Alvin G, York. 


Congressional Medal of Honor 


Later he was awarded the 


*. and Croix de Guerre. 


ar. York thought he was a conscientious obiector but he changed his mind 


Air view of the town of Gesnes, captured by the 9!st Div. This division comprised men from Pacific coast states. In the Argonne battle it advanced 
from west of Avocourt, Sept. 26, to a line north of Gesnes which it held until relieved Oct. 6. One brigade remained in line until Cet. 16, fighting alongside 


the Ist Div. 


Photo by U.S. Air Service 





“Uncle Joe,” 
J. C. Kernan, a 
K. of C. worker 
caring for a refu- 
gee recently es- 
caped from the 
Germans. 


When the shrapnel was hailing down these iron shelters, known as 
‘elephant backs,” made pleasant retreats. This one was on a road lead- 


ng into Cunel. 


The bar at 
Bar-—a doughboy 
bit of fooling that 
immensely tickled 
his buddies. Sergt. 
Hughey, 305th 
Eng., tending bar. 





Lt. Col. Paul B. Clemens and Lieut. William J. Niedprune quizzing 


German officer about enemy artillery positions. 








Street scene in Romagne-Sous-Montfaucon. In the vicinity of this town the 32d Div. entered the Argonne battle Sept. 30. 





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Members of Battery C, 10th F. A., 3d Div., hard at it inthe Argonne. These gunners are loading a ““75’' which is shelling.the Bois de Foret, four kilo 


meters distant from the battery at Madeleine Farm, near Nantillois, Oct. 18. This position had just been heavily shelled by the Germans and the Americans 
are now retaliating. 


a ? in” 4 i ts : 


Romagne, in the advance of the 3d Div. From Oct. 4 to Nov. | there was severe fighting in the territory around this town, participated in by the 3d, 
32d and 89th. The Kriemhilde Stellung ran close by. Twenty-five thousand Americans, who fell in the Argonne fighting, now lie buried in the U. S. Military 
Cemetery at Romagne. It is the largest American Cemetery in France. Photo by U.S. Air Serview 








While the earthbound soldiers were fighting For three weeks Romagne was under almost constant shell fire. This photograph was taken by an 
in the Argonne the airmen were bombing enemy 89th Div. Signal Corps operator just after a German shell had struck the church tower. The tower was 
supply centers, like Morhange, seen in this pic- destroyed by the fire which followed. Oct. 29. 


ture. Photo by U. 3. Air Serview 





[mecourt after the 80th Div. had occupied it Nov. 3. The narrow village street is filled with the bustle of activities that always occupied troops during 
the rush of an advance. 


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Fe te 





Machine gunners of the 80th Div. using a Browning heavy machine gun to speed the departing Germans. The Browning heavy machine gun was pro- 
nounced by military experts the most effective weapon of its kind ever produced. General Pershing refused to use the Browning gun until he had a plentiful 
supply in September, 1918, because he feared the Germans might capture one and reproduce the type before America was fully equipped 


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ea nie sy 


Between fighting periods some of the divisions in the Argonne battle were withdrawn temporarily for rest, but the 


training. Here is a sample of what our generals called “rest.” 
seen in this picture practicing an advance through a smoke scre 


Sa ay, 
an 


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3d 5 F “ 4, * ¢ ae ‘ = 7 
DN de ky Ce pa ORR & TIS bey 4. nary 


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‘rest’ time usually was spent in hard 
This regiment of the 80th Div., the 318th Inf., had just come back from the fighting line. It is 


en. Two weeks later it was back on the front putting into practice the training lessons. 












Spa oe ne = 








Graves of American soldiers 
on the edge of the Bois de Fays, 
near Brieulles-sur-Meuse. The 4th 
Div. fought there before its with- 
drawal for rest Oct. 4, as did the 
80th Div. 





A 210 mm. gun captured by the 80th Div. in the Argonne drive. These Yankee general inspects Teutonic mural decorations of French 
men took the artillery piece from the Germans. Where they obtained chateau. Maj. Gen. Cronkhite, commanding 80th Div., Imecourt, 


the umbrella is a mystery. Nov. 4. 


Removing ammunition from 
the roadway, where it was a temp- 
tation to German. bombers. 


Cunel, Oct. 31. 





A Red Cross worker cheering up a wounded man with something to Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, Chief of the Air Service, A. E. F. 
eat. Near Grandpre, which was captured by the 77th and 78th Divs. Gen. Mitchell went to France as a colonel in 1917. As Chief of Air Service 
Oct. 10. The capture of this town completed the clearing of the Argonne of the Ist Army at St. Mihiel he commanded 1,200 allied planes, more 


Forest than had ever before been assembled under a single command. 





Early morning at a crossroads in the Argonne. A military policeman directing traffic near Chattancourt. This supply train belongs to the 33d Div. 
The fog was just lifting when this photograph was made by a Signal Corps operator. 


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SS ‘ 
ome AN; TAWA TTENT IN «3. 


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Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, commanding the 4th Div. in front of dug- Officer and men of 61st Inf., 5th Div., in advance northeast of Cunel, 
out used as post of command of his division. Cunel, Oct. 1. A few days Oct. 30. 
later Gen. Hines was promoted to command the 3rd Corps. 





German machine gunner on 
the Hindenburg Line who carried 
out his orders to die in his tracks 
rather than retreat or surrender. 





American newspapers were distributed by airplanes at the front and Occupying shell holes in the advance near Cunel, Oct. 30. 
were so precious that men read them until they fell to pieces from handling. 


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Mangabe Tr. 


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Consehyes 


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Coil wat 5 ‘Mp y Jf, SOC nea Ser 
The town of Consenvoye while still occupied by the Germans, Oct. 3. At Brabant two battalions of the 132d Inf., 33d Div., crossed the 
Meuse in the advance on Consenvoye. Thirty-third division engineers 
Photo by U. 35. Air Service 


Men of 132d Inf. (2d and 7th Inf. I. N. G.), 33rd Div., in an observation 


On Oct. 8 the 132d Inf. crossed the Meuse under heavy fire and provided the bridge. 


post. 
captured Consenvoye. 





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Holding the pivotal position on the west bank of the Meuse opposite Consenvoye. The men behind the old German camouflage in this picture belong 
to the 132d Inf., 33d Div. From Sept. 27 to Oct. 4 this division held the west bank, patrolling and reconnoitering in anticipation of the attack of Oct. 8, which 
involved crossing the river. 














The type of German defensive positions along the Kriemhilde and Another machine gun nest where stubborn defense was made. Some 
Hindenburg Lines that the American Army had to overcome in their of the enemy gunners lie amidst the debris where they fell. 
advance. This is a concrete strongpoint defended with machine guns. 
Photo by U. 3. Air Service 


The Germans left this trench near Consenvoye so hurriedly that 33d Div. men, hot on their trail. found beer, cigars and bread in the dugouts. An informa! 
“Kommers” was held by the Yanks during a pause in the fighting. 





Chaplain Gerard, 108th Sanitary Train, 33d Div., administering holy communion to men of his outfit. The service took place in a shell-wrecked church 
in the wake of the retreating Germans. 





Maj. Gen. John E. McMahon (left), Lieut. Col. R. W. Kingman and 


Capt. W. A. Knapp, at 5th Div. post of command studying battle map. 
Near Cuisy, Oct. 12. 





The Signal Corps photog- 
rapher who took this picture said 
the two sleeping soldiers were hav- 
ing the first real rest they had had 
in Il days. They belong to the 
6th Inf., 5th Div. Near Nantil- 
lois, Oct. 22. 


Brig. Gen. Paul B. Malone, 5th Div. In the early fighting in June, 
1918, Gen. Malone, then a colonel, commanded the 23d Inf., 2d Div.. 


in the vicinity of Chateau Thierry. 





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A) 


Ambulances carrying wounded to hospitals in the rear. The tree branches atop the vehicles serve Maj. Gen. Hanson E. Ely, commanding 5th 
to camouflage them from enemy bombers. Div. from Oct. 24 to Nov. II. 





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eng 


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Aincreville, captured by the Third Corps, 5th and 90th Divs., on the night of Nov. 1, the opening Bantheville. Severe fighting took place on 
day of the third phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle. The infantry went over ‘after two hours violent all sides of this place prior to the general advance 


artillery preparation. of Nov. | that marked the beginning of the third 
and last phase of the war. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 











Pvt. Fred Rambus, Co. E., 61st Inf., 5th Div., taking a squint at the Thawing out some of the Argonne chill. Members of 31 Ith Inf., 78th 
enemy through a German trench telescope left behind in the retreat. Div., near Grandpre, Oct. 29. 
North of Cunel, Oct. 30. 





The 78th fought desperately for two days before it definitely took Grand- Grandpre, Oct. 18. 


0 : ‘ate 

Some of the men who took Grandpre. Co. E, 31 Ith Inf., 78th Div. Men of 312th M. G. Co., 78th Div., picking off German snipers near 
pre, Oct. 16. 

oO 











Wounded men of 312th Inf., 78th Div., being carried to first aid Bridging the Aire. Men of Co. B, 303d Engs., 78th Div., rebuilding 
station, Bois de Negremont, near Grandpre, Oct. 21. bridge near Grandpre that had been three times destroyed by German 
shells. 





The backwash of battle. Attending to wounded in rear of first line Capt. “Eddie” Rickenbacker in a Spad plane with which he was 
during gas attack. Jaulny, Oct. 27. bringing down enemy flyers during the Argonne drive. 





A freshly won position on the road from Marcq to Cheviers. Men Pvt. Frank Maia, Co. F, 312th Inf., on duty in Grandpre. When 
of 311th M. G. Co., and Medical Corps detachment of 78th Div. the picture was taken the Germans still held the opposite end of town. 


View of Grandpre and the Valley of the Aire as seen by German machine gunners dug in at the point. The hill from which this picture was made is one 
kilometer north of the city. It was here that the Germans in this sector made their most desperate resistance. The entire strong point bristled with machine 


guns which poured a murderous fire into the attacking American forces as they advanced down the trough of the Aire. The Americans captured the position 
after three unsuccessful atternpts. 





An editor- 
gunner. Capt. 
Joseph Medill 
Patterson, 149th 
F. A., 42d Div. 


Jazzing while the heavies boom. 


Maj. Gen. 
Charles T. Meno- 
her, 42d Div. 





Thirteen thousand feet above Landres-et-St. Georges. 





A shell bursting among men of Company E, 312th Inf., 78th Div., while they were repairing a road near Brieulles-sur-Bar that was mined and blown up by 
the Germans. The soldiers may be seen running to cover immediately after the explosion. Photographed Nov. 4, 1918. 


Sgt. J. W. Killigrow, 78th Div., pals with the children of Authe Poilus of the 320th Regt. 4th French Army and doughboys of the 
312th Inf., 78th Div., advanced northward together. 





M. and Mme. Baloux, prisoners at Brieulles-sur-Bar four years Prisoners four years. Chaplain Jackson, 78th Div., fits a pair of 
thank their doughboy deliverers, Philip Tangor and Allen Floyd. old issue shoes on a French child at Brieulles-sur-Bar. 














_ Help for stricken refugees. Men of 306th Amb. Co., 77th Div., Battery F, 306th F. A., 77th Div., passing through Buzancy, Nov. 

establish first aid station at St. Pierremont. Nov. 7, 1918. 3, 1918. Buzancy had been an important German railhead, and on 
the outskirts of the town in a chateau was the headquarters of Gen. ven 
der Marwitz who commanded the Germans opposite our Army 


Achlung! 
FeiwNaen find, Fieger unter oon der Strasse? 
Teder berihme seine Neugiev! 

‘  Deckung in Kellern Erdgeschossen ! 
fliegerbombe 2erscblagtebee Dac as Keller. 
Weg von Turen,u. Fenstern! 
Banke er dori Test Tire ce ewe eer 
Nach der ersten Goombe oi nach Spite shes! 
Er mie(t meist 6:8 Bomben! 


His wounds did not i i j 
prevent this soldier from i I 
at the hospital of Johns Hopkins unit. nS 


oss 
**eeee 
eee 








The operating room of Base hospi . 
ospital 101. inisteri 
Ministering to a badly wounded soldier at Base hospital 18 


General von der Marwitz, commander-in-chief of the 5th German Eitel Friederich, second son of Wilhelm Hohenzollern, who com- 
Army operating in the Meuse-Argonne sector. Between Sept. 26 and manded the First Guard division in the Meuse-Argonne operations 
Nov. 11 there were 47 German divisions in line in the Meuse-Argonne He had been raised to the rank of Major General after the Chemin des 
vainly resisting the advance of 22 American and 4 French divisions. Dames offensive, May 27, 1918. 





Life, Liberty and Happiness. 


So long as the Administration is determined to keep the 
war going there is only one way for you to get out of this 
miserable fix and that is for you to stop fighting. You can 
do this honourably. As a free born American citizen you 
have the right to 


life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 


The American constitution guarantees to you these rights. 
Exercise them! 

Get out and dash to safety! If you don’t, you stand a very 
slim chance of ever seeing Broadway or the old home again. 

The Wall Street millionaires may like this war, because 
they are becoming billionaires. But you will have to pay for 
it all, my boy, . 

pay for it with your blood and taxes 
and the tears of your loved ones at home. 

If you were fighting on your own soil against a foreign 
foe it would be another matter, but what are you doing in 
Europe? France is not your country, neither is Belgium nor 
Alsace Lorraine. Are you satisfied that you are in the full 
enjoyment of your “inalienable rights to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness“ as promised to you by the 


American bill of rights. 


The years will be lean and weary and the work will be 
hard and long for you and the longer the war lasts the longer 
will be the debt which you will have to pay to the money 
magnates of Wall Street for the munitions you are shooting 
away. 

Don't give up. your life till you have to and don't give 
any more labor for the benefit of the money trust! Quit it! 





ry 








German propaganda, one of Ludendorf’s own specialties, caused the debacle of Cadorna’s army in Italy in 1917. It is‘said to have contributed to the 
defeat of Gough’s 5th Army on the British front in 1918, but all it got from our soldiers was raucous laughter. The picture on the left shows a German “hot 
air’ Balloon that was wafted over our lines and fell at Sommedieue. -On the right is a reproduction of one of the leaflets it contained. 


Official figures. 
Der Bogen, wo fid) die Deutfden 


The captures made by the Allied armies | The captures made by the Allied , 
on the west front hetween September 1 armies on all fronts from July [5 4 Sabre lang behauptet hatten, wurde in 27 Stunden 


and September 30 amounted to : to September 30 amounted to : 


2,844 Ofticers §,518 onticers 
1 20, 192 Men 248,494 Men 
1,500 Guns 3,669 Guns 
More than 10,000 Machine guns. || More than 23,000 Machine guns 


von den Winerifanern cingenommen. 


DHobines, Didier 5 Or 
oy ee oN ayn ay j 










OVER eee 


23,018 







* Gy “—v: 
gi highivite “SCN igneuites.. 
mn D> ae ee ees = 
4— tre. af cae | ¥ 
eg 
hi r 4 card 


a » Ne ficou et Nensaedes Aiegjnot yy AER 
: hs ane Se 


FA : 
= oF ne 
aah E> 7 















me 


; S Behn 2 5 
arenes a rs 


a ” sata 


Me 


ER’S 









“Maney Ret sie 
a -  Jezpian’ 


The Embarkation of American Troops heros tit(f)  -Purrnetie®, 


to all Theatre of the War 


er 





Ge Fab Bo 
Say aR 










Jp seer | be 
\Foug eg 


Laudiont} oLixi os 
Le i 


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eres leaodiadae* 4 
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rg Seri ty ot! 
Rn SAR az 


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ae fe ek 


ee ae 
“Coad Otel 













The German Retreat from July 15'* to October 10 1918. 


Questions for the German soldier. ecocoee grout am 13. September friib. 
1. Will you ever again be as strong as you were in July 1918? 
2. Will your opponents grow stronger or grow weaker ? me 
3. Did your terrible losses in 1918 bring the victory promised by : 

your leaders? 390 Onadratfilometer wurden  erobert. 
4. Have you the slightest hope of victory in the future? Dic Bahl der Gefangencn betrigt 15.000. 
5. Are you going to throw your lives away in a hopeless struggle? 





American counter propaganda came within the purview of Brig. Gen. Denni ola i 

& ith g. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, Chief of G-2, G. H. Q., A. E. F. Here are samples. In the 

ae oe the Pant fact ean the St. tne a ee the Germans for four years was captured by the Americans in 27 hours is Pee ot Of 
e value of propaganda Gen. Nolan says: ‘In general it can be said that it has little or no effect on an organization in a high state of 

excellent effect in further depressing the morale of a unit which is already in a low state.” : Kaas 











rae 
: 


Py 
4 
* 
= 





Maj. Gen. Frank L. Winn commanded the 89th Div. during the third phase of the Meuse-Argonne operations. L. to R.: Brig. Gen. T. G. Hanson, 


Maj. Gen. Frank L. Winn, Gen. Gerard, 3d French Army; Gen. Passaga, 32d French Army Corps; Col. J. H. Reeves (behind Gen. Winn); Col. D. C. E. Kil- 


bourne (behind Gen. Gerard). During the active operations the division captured 506! prisoners, 127 pieces of artillery and-455 machine guns. It advanced 
36 kilometers against resistance. The division’s casualties were 1419 killed and 7394 wounded. 





French mud and the “black wax” ot Texas all in one. That was the consistency. of the oozy camping ground at Epinonville as the 314th F. S. Bn., 


moved up with the 89th Div. to the line along the Sommerance-Romagne road. Holes that the wire men had dug to sleep in were filled with water by morn- 
ing Oct. 16, 1918. 








Remonville, the first town to be wrested from the Germans by the 89th Div. as it advanced in the Meuse-Argonne sector. 





Under heavy shellfire, reserves of the 89th Div. sought the lee of the stone buildings along the principal street of Bayonville, Nov. 2, 1918. 








; Ae 
7 be * . - 
Sn! So. Sere 


Flooded area in the vicinity of Mouzay. On Nov. 9 the !79th brigade, The 90th Div. (Alamo) never failed to accomplish a mission and 
90th Div., crossed the Meuse at Sassey and by all night marching occupied never yielded a foot of ground to the enemy. Its commander was Ma). 
Mouzay on the right bank of the river. The following day the enemy Gen. Henry T. Allen. 

threw into the line against the 90th his last reserve division. 


hae we BEAT 


wee 


Panorama of Dun-sur-Meuse. “The Third Corps, turning eastward, crossed the Meuse (Nov. 5) in a brilliant operation by the 5th Div., driving the 
enemy from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a general withdrawal from the positions he had so long held on the hills north of Verdun.’’ Gen. John 
lf Pershing. Photo by U. 3. Air Service 





Troops crossing the Meuse 
at Dun-sur-Meuse Nov. 6 on 
the way to the front. 








Prisoners captured near Dun-sur-Meuse. Soldiers resting on the bank of the River Andon near Clery-ie-petit 





The sentinel of the sky. Sitting comfortably aloft the observer in the kite balloon basket had the whole panorama of his particular station before him. 
His powerful glasses could note accurately everything transpiring in a radius of 10 miles or more. He was constantly in touch with his batteries by telephone 


and not only could give by co-ordinated maps the exact location of the target and the effect of the bursting shell but could and often did supply most valuable 
information of enemy troop movements, airplane attacks and the like. 





we ee en ve 
ts Sars = oe 
ees Pa. oa a PO . 


As the 42d Div. moved up along the Imecourt road to take part in the last phase of the Meuse-Argonne operations there were everywhere evidences of 
the desperate resistance the enemy vee made. In the foreground is a dead German machine gunner who had been killed at his post. Photographed Nov. 4, 1918. 


su ( 


The last photograph made by Lt. Ralph Estep, a Signal Corps photographer. It shows a patrol of the 42d Div. advancing toward enemy trenches near 


Sedan. Nov. 7, 1918. 
e 
x 
" | eS 
te if 


A 





Co. A, 3d Bn., 166th Inf., 42d Div., at Champigneulles on the way Shell bursting immediately in front of Lieut. Estep’s camera. Estep 
to the front. Nov. 3, 1918. lost his life at this spot in an effort to get “‘close-ups’’ of the war. 





Detachment of 166th Inf. (formerly 4th Ohio) resting in front of Cheveuges, near Sedan, Nov. 9, 1918. Cheveuges was captured by the Americans Nov. "| 
(Inset) Colonel Henry J. Reilly, who commanded the 83d brigade, comprising the 165th and 166th Inf., in front of Sedan. 














Na» 





Left—The dash to Sedan. Scene in dark and misty woods near Thelonne: Officer wearing barracks cap like those.of German officers is directing combat’ 
force. Lt. W. J. Black, 16th Inf., challenges. Tells officer he’s under arrest. “I’m General MacArthur’ is the prisoner's answer. “What the — are you doing 
in the 42d Div. sector?” ““We’re going to Sedan,” replied the lieutenant. In photo: Gen. MacArthur and the cap that caused the trouble. Right—Brig 
Gen. Frank Parker, commanding general Ist Div.; operating in front of Sedan, talking with Lt. Col. Roosevelt, C. O. 26th Inf., Ist Div., and Mrs: Roosevelt. 


=. gaged io 
eas Be: a 4 f 
; 


Sedan, the goal." The actual fact is that nobody captured Sedan in this war. It was evacuated by the Germans under American and French artillery fire and, after the Armistice went 
into effect, French troops peacefully entered it. At least six American divisions and one French divison were actively in the race. Four of the American divisions—-the 2d, 77th, 80th and 
6th—did not come within view of tht city. The other two—the Ist and the 42nd—fought their way to the hills overlooking the city en Nov. 7 and were to take it the following day if orders 


to withdraw had not come from Marshal Foch. Sedan, where Napoleon III surrendered in 1870 with 100,000 men, was too rich in memories for the French to encourage its capture by 
Americans.” Junius B. Wood. 


Photo by U. S. Air Service 








10:59 A. M. Nov. II, 1918. “Calamity Jane” firing her last shot in the war. This gun was manned by a section of the [lth F. A. Its position was in 
the Bois de la Haie on the Laneuville-sur-Meuse-Beauclair road. 









ae 


Uo enor ee ee 






Se . Pam ae a 


11:01 A. M. Nov. 11, 1918. After this gun section of Battery D, 105th F. A., had fired its last shot at Etraye the men raised Old Glory amid triumph- 


ant shouts. 








Where brave men sleep. Graves at Cheveuges of the last Americans to be killed in the operation in front of Sedan. 





Varennes. 


a a) 
| Smith College girls take a joyride on Sgt. L. K. MacIntosh’s tank at The town crier of Gondreville. | 
2 a 





“Living the life of Reilly.” Girls of the Jewish Welfare Board. 


Interior of the 
main corridor of 
Gen. _Pershing’s 
quarters, the 
Chateau Val des 
Ecoliers, Chau- 


mont. 





Chateau Val des Ecoliers, Gen. Pershing’s residence near Chaumont, Drawing room at Val des Ecoliers. 


American G. H. Q. 


itnitie 4 


FI 
3 
Ed 
- 
Ye, 
3 
ad 


Carter H. Harrison of the Red Cross, former mayor of Chicago, Home coming after the German retreat from Dun-su--Meuse. 
writes a letter for Private William Howard. : 





| 


Mrs. W. K. Vanderbilt and her co-workers at Red Cross headquar- 


ters, Paris. 


AK. of C. tea party. 


Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. (without hat), entertaining members 
of the women’s division, Y. W. C. A., at her residence in Paris. 


Mrs. Walter Hines Page. wife of the (then) American ambassador 
to England distributing flowers to wounded Yanks at Dartford, England. 








Pneumonia porch at Camp 
hospital No. 45, Aix les Bains, 


Savoie, France. 





i BES , chief , U. S. Military hospital No.57, The medical high command. L to R: Brig. Gen. J. R. Kean, Maj. 
es ne para Gen. M. W. Ireland, Chief Surgeon, U. S. A.; Col. (later Brig. Gen.) 


Walter D. McCaw and Col. James D. Glennan. Photographed at Tours, 
Sept. 10, 1918. 


ares) + 
Re ” 


‘(a Ges |) ace 





Dressing a wound at Base hospital No. 18, manned by Johns Hopkins 


é Convalescent hospital No. 2 at Agay, Var, France. 
unit, 


4 


Dp 


The High Command at General Headquarters. The Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and the Adjutant General. 
Front row, left to right: Brig. Gen. H. B. Fiske, G-5 (Training Section); Maj. Gen. J. W. McAndrew, C. of S.: Gen. John J. Pershing, C. in C.; Brig. Gen. 
Fox Conner, G-3 (Operations Section); Brig. Gen. G. V. H. Moseley, G-4 (Co-ordination of Supply Services). Rear row, left to right: Brig. Gen. A. D. Andrews, 
G-I (Administrative Section); Brig. Gen. Leroy Eltinge, Deputy Chief of Staff; Brig. Gen. D. E. Nolan, G-2 (Information Section): Brig. Gen. R. C. Davis, A. G. 





id 
er Se 








5 o 

The Signal Corps telephone operators at General Headquarters, The entente at Salmagne 
Chaumont. a 

oO a 





Blindfold boxing at Aix-les-Bains. Lieut. E.. F. Clark, Hdars. troop, 35th Div., receiving a French lesson. 


on 


ERP RE Be Se ee ool itty res . : 5 


Jewish soldiers attending religious seryices at Chaumont, American G. H. Q. The French officer, wearing a beard, at the left of the picture is Capt. A. 
Levy, Mayor of Chaumont. His wife sits néxt to him. The American officer, wearing a garrison cap, next to Mme. Levy, is Rabbi Jacob Kohn of New York 
City. Both American and French soldiers attended this service of their common religion. 








The Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. being decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal on the parade ground at G.H. Q. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss 
made the presentation to Gen. Pershing, Nov. 16. 1918, five days after the Armistice brought the war to a victorious close. In the words of the official citation 
this medal was presented to Gen. Pershing “‘as a token of the gratitude of the American people to the commander of our armies in the field for his distinguished 
services, and in appreciation of the success which our armies have achieved under his leadership.” 


BI ie 


ON OTHER FRONTS 


British—Italian Russian 


Throughout the Summer and Fall of 1918 public interest in the United 
States was centered on the three principle campaigns of our fighting forces 
abroad. During the time, however, that American arms were gaining 
glory around Chateau Thierry, St. Mihiel and in the Argonne, other divi- 
sions and units were fighting as gallantly on other fronts. Even after the 
Armistice had brought peace to the western front some elements of our 
army were still engaged in active hostilities in-Northern Russia and in 


Siberia. 


On the British front American troops especially distinguished them- 
selves. As early as July 4, 1918, the 33d Div., represented by elements 
of the 13Ist and 132d Inf. regiments, had taken part with the Australians 
in the attack on Hamel. In the great British offensive which began 
Aug. 8 the 33d Div. broke the German line at Chipilly Ridge and Gres- 


saire Wood, and then moved on to its later successes in the Argonne. 


The Second American Army Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Geo. 
W. Read, and comprising the 27th and 30th Divs. never fought on any 
other front than the British. To these two divisions, one from the North, 
the other from the South, fell the honor of smashing the Hindenburg 
Line at Le Cateau, where the St. Quentin canal passes under a hill through 
a tunnel. The 27th Div. was made up of New York National Guard 
units and was commanded by a National Guard officer, Maj. Gen. John 
F. O'Ryan. This division entered the line with British units opposite 


_ Mt. Kemmel, later moving to the Dickebush sector in Belgium. On 


Aug. 31 the 27th was in the front line in the attack on Vierstaadt Ridge. 
In conjunction with the 30th American Division and the Australians the 
New Yorkers smashed through the famous Hindenburg Line between 
Sept. 29 and Oct. |. After a short rest it took up the pursuit of the re- 
treating Germans, advancing about 25 kilometers. 


The 30th Div., composed of National Guard troops from Tennessee, 
North and South Carolina, had its baptism of fire near the famous town 
of Ypres, the scene of the Germans’ first gas attack in 1915. Here it held 
the canal sector from Ypres to Voormezeele and from Aug. 3 to Sept. | 
took part in the fighting before Mt. Kemmel. Next came the attack on 
the Hindenburg Line with the Australians and 27th Div. Marshal Haig 
in his final report laid special emphasis on the gallant conduct of the 30th. 
Its fighting qualities may be gauged by the fact that this division won 


12 Congressional Medals of Honor. Maj. Gen. Edward M. Lewis 
commanded the 30th Div. 


After the general advance of the Allies from Switzerland to the sea 
had got into full swing, Marshal Foch called upon Gen. Pershing for two 
American divisions to assist the Sixth French Army in Belgium. This 
occurred in the middle of October when the Americans were fighting the 
greatest battle in American history, in the Meuse-Argonne sector, but 
Gen. Pershing complied without demur. 


The 37th and 91st Divs. were sent to the Belgian front in compliance 
with the request of the Allied generalissimo. The 9Ist was accompanied 
by the artillery of the 28th Div. Both divisions entered the fighting line 


Oct. 30 and thereafter shared in the Flanders offensive until the Armistice. 


An early request for American troops had been made by Italy but the 
critical situation on the French and British fronts made it impossible for 
the Commander-in-Chief tocomply. After repeated requests it finally was 
decided to have American arms represented with the Italians for the moral 
effect. One regiment, the 332d Inf. of the 83d Div., an Ohio outfit, was 
despatched to the Italian front in July, 1918. 


By direction of the Secretary of War an American expedition was sent 
to the North Russian coast in the vicinity of Archangel in August, 1918. 
This was in compliance with the decision of the Supreme War Council 
which had decided that Allied forces ought to be sent to the aid of the 
Russians struggling against the Bolsheviki. The American forces, de- 
tached from the 85th Div., comprised the 339th Inf., Ist Bn., 310th Engs., 
337th Field Hosp. Co., and the 337th Ambulance Co., all under British 
command. This small force held a front of 450 miles under trying Arctic 
conditions until May, 1919, when it was sent home via Brest, France. In 
its engagements against the Bolsheviki the American forces lost 82 killed. 
Brig. Gen. Wilds P. Richardson was in command. 


At the same time troops were sent to North Russia a small force, com- 
prising the 27th and 31st Inf. regiments, with auxiliary troops, were sent 
into Siberia by way of Vladivostok to co-operate with the Japane-. and 
other Allied forcés. The use of American troops in various parts of the 
former Russian empire was distinctly distasteful to the American public. 
There was constant public criticism until both expeditions were with- 
drawn. 


. ors ve pa “A 
x ia & we , 
¥ é Key , roi pote, Sm TOs “? 7 
gn saan. eats MAI ae 
tr) we ie Rs tx = ao) CS Tees we 

“Them guys is butchers,” an Australian sergeant declared after four companies of the 33d American division had attacked with the “Aussies” before 

Hamel, July 4, 1918. It was hand to hand fighting with the bayonet. King George personally pinned on the breast of the Yankee officers and men the British 

decorations they won. The King and General Pershing are seen in this picture on their way to the decoration ceremonies at Molliens-au-Bois, Aug. 6, 1918. 

Maj. Gen. George Bell, commanding the 33rd Div. is the officer with white mustache and imperial walking behind the King and Gen. Pershing. 


ef: 
e. 


~>e ; j 
. it e re hy * 


Cae 





The King of England decorating a Chicago bo 
modest looking Yank whom the monarch is honoring. His feat of arms consisted in silencing an enemy sniping post and bringing in eight prisoners, July 4, 1918, 
when his regiment hit the German line at Hamel. 





Village of Mericourt, cap- 
tured by the 33d Div. while 
fighting with the British. This 
town was a German stronghold 
in the Albert sector and was used 
by the enemy as a headquarters. 
The white streaks on the distant 
hill tops are the German trenches. 





Mt == | 8 
# Neirens) 4 
7 Sualh fe xe S32 6 Ne sy Res tty 

soy 





Second Lieut. Harry Yagle, 132d Inf., 33d Div., receiving British Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in France 
Military Cross from King George for rushing a machine gun and capturing congratulating Maj. Gen. Bell, 33d American Div., on account of gallant 


eight prisoners at Hamel, July 4, 1918. conduct of his men at Hamel. 


Mis ; ey e oe % 


i . oe zis He “ar Saar ae a GHIA se Ss 8 ae eg ; 

A German gun that never fired on Amiens. When the 33d and 30th U. S. Divs., fighting with the Australians on the Cambrai-St. Quentin front pushed 
the enemy back in July the Germans dynamited this gun because they had no time to remove it. The length of the broken barrel is 45 feet. This cannon would 
have been dropping shells into Amiens, 20 miles away, in a few days had the British-American advance not ousted the German troops. 


hs. 


+ 








Maj. Gen. James H. Mc Rae, 
and staff, of the 78th Div., while 
training on- the British front. 
Gen. Pershing ordered this divi- 
sion to the American front in 


time for the battle of St. Mihiel. 








Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the British forces in Maj. Gen. James H. Mc Rae, 78th Div., receiving the King of Eng- 
France, on a visit to Gen. Pershing at the latter's chateau. land at the American general s headquarters, Rollecourt, Aug. 8, 1918. 








Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan, and staff, 27th Div., at headquarters, Oudezelle, Aug. 18, 1918. The 27th Div. comprised elements of the former New York 
National Guard 





Planning an attack. Maj. Gen. John F. O’Ryan (right), and his chief All the American commanders who fought solely on the British front 
of staff, Col. S. H. Ford, 27th Div., Oct. 18. On the following morning are in this group. Right to left: Maj. Gens. George W. Read, 2d Corps. 
the 27th attacked with the British, advancing 500 yards. John F. O’Ryan, 27th Div., E. M. Lewis, 30th Div.: Lieut. Gen. Sir Henry 


Davidson, British Army, at left. 


ro 
° bonne . 
a otenw. 
P ~ 
wr mo we 


ts SD Niniyiae omens ont 


Qi 


24 


After the victory was won. March of 102d Field Signal Bn. to review. A Bnitish battery hurrying to the front in the British-American ad- 
Corbie, Nov. 19, 1918. vance in the Cambrai-St. Quentin sector. 





One of the 60 pound guns, firing a shell 15,000 yards, in action cn the Taking a shot at Fritz from the front line near St. Souplet, Oct. 19. 
British-American front near Vaux-Andigny. Men of Co. A, 105th M. G. Bn., 27th Div. 


Battle practice before the 
Germans were pushed back from 
Amiens. The 27th and 30th 
American Divisions trained and 
fought entirely with the British. 
These American soldiers are re- 
hearsing an attack back of the 
lines. A British tank is mowing 
down barbed wire to make a 
pathway for the Yanks. 





Thirtieth Div. marching from Calais, where it landed in France, June Lewis machine gun post of 119th Inf., 30th Div.. in the Ypres sector, 
24, 1918, to its training area at Eperlecques. Aug. 9. 


British operating with 27th and 30th U. S. Divisions, sending up 
American propaganda for the Germans. Templeaux-la-Fosse, Oct. 10. 


Shell battered Peronne after the Germans had been driven out by the 
British-American advance late in September on the Cambrai-St. Quentin 
front. 


Chateau at Bellicourt once used as headquarters by Hindenbure’ 
Captured by 30th Div. when it smashed the Hindenburg Line at Belli- 
court, Sept. 29. 


Hindenburg Line where St. Quentin canal enters tunnel under ridge 


near Bellicourt. Captured by 30th Div., Sept. 29. 








nt a ' 





A view of St. Quentin canal. At the left is an entrance to one of the tunnels dug into the hill by the Germans and in which they concealed thousands of 
troops. After the 27th and 30th American Divisions had broken the Hindenburg Line at this point the enemy reserves poured out in their rear. This ruse failed. 


* KK * 


The American communique of Sept. 30, 1918, said: “Our attack on main Hindenburg system was made with tanks on front of 3,000 yards and was 


completely successful, penetrating enemy’s line to a depth of 5,000 yards.” 


Maj. Gen. Edward M. Lewis, commanding general of the 30th Div. 


during the period of its victorious advances through the Hindenburg this sector Canadian troops outflanked St. Quentin and forced the Ger- 
Line on the Cambrai-St. Quentin front in September and October, 1918. mans out. The 27th and 30th American Divisions fought north of the 


town, helping in the victory. 


Ruins of St. Quentin cathedral. In the British-American advance in 








The ruins of St. Quentin cathedral after withstanding four years of shell fire. This picture was taken shortly af iti 

: af : y after the British-American ad , Sept. 
29, had driven the Germans out. The British took St. Quentin but were helped by the 27th and 30th U. S. Divisions, fighting just north of rhe ie Boeke 
day,” wrote the official correspondent with the Australian forces, “when the full story of the battle can be told the American people will thrill with pride in these 
magnificent troops upon whom a tremendous task fell.” : 





September-October advance of the British-American forces, it was found through Bellicourt. This town was taken by the 30th Div. The horse- 
that the church marked with a Red Cross had been used by the enemy as man is an Australian. 
a barrack. Its sanctuary was stripped of art treasures. 


oO a] 
| After this town, Braye-sur-Somme, had been freed of Germans in the One of the British tanks that led the American advance, rolling | 
Po a 





Yank Signal Corps photographers get a lift from a British tank on American and Australian victors on the Cambrai-St. Quentin front 
their way to the battle front. watch a group of 1,000 prisoners marched back to prison pens. 


fi “a al 


7. : 


Strange surroundings for Pacific Coast men.. Supply wagons and mess outfits of 91st Div. in front of Hotel de Ville (City Hall) Audenarde, Belgium, 
Nov. 10, 1918. This city hall was built in 1531. Audenarde was captured by the westerners of the 9Ist Div. in the Lys-Scheldt campaign, Oct. 31-Nov. |}. 
After fighting ten days in the Argonne, the 91st was sent to Belgium at Marshal Foch’s request to aid the 6th French Army. On Nov. 22 elements of the 91st 
marched in the triumphal entry of the King and Queen into Brussels. 





Begin ‘’ De = 


FASS 


Seeing the 
sights of Thielt, 
Belgium, from a 
native “rubber 
neck bus.” Pvt. 





Uti 


John Thompson, ee Site 
9lst Div., and a pe 
buddie of the 37th vie 





Div. 


Amateur theatricals. filled much of the 
soldier's play time. Steel helmets done over 
in spring styles by 27th Div. “actresses.” 

























The 27th Div., from New York, had many pro- 
fessional actors in its ranks who knew the art of ‘‘make- 
up.” Oudezeele, Aug. 8. 













Celebrating 
the Armistice. 
Soldiers of +27th 
Div., around an 
improvised ‘‘Lib- 
erty Bell,” cheer- 
ing the news that 
the war is over. 





Pvt. Cornelius Vanderbilt (wearing cam- 
paign hat), son of Brig. Gen. Cornelius Vander- 
bilt, 27th Div. This heir to a great Ameri- 


can fortune was a despatch rider. 





e 


+ v brea acetic 4 
Pe ee ee n 


Seay aor 








Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor An American on outpost duty on the Piave front in Italy taking a 


visits the front while on a government mission to Italy. Taken in the look at the Austrian lines not far away. Member of the 332d Inf., 83d Div 
American trenches on the Piave. 








The Piave front was filled with small streams and overflowed areas. on the Piave. Later they helped rout the Austrian army on this front. 


i] Qo 

Italian soldiers instructing Yanks how to cross rivers in pontoons. Soldiers of the 332d Inf., 83d Div.. in their trenches with the Italians 
Third Bn., 332d Inf., 83d Div., Porto di Fiera, Italy, Oct. 6, 1918. 

oO o 








These soldiers of the 332d Inf., were not robbing beehives. They Hand grenades for the Austrians. Men of the 332d Inf. training 
wore mosquito net masks and gloves to protect themselves from insects behind the Piave front for the battle where they later aided the Italians 


while fighting in the marshes on the Italian front. in victory. 





Fighting the Bolsheviki on the Vologda railway front in North Russia. These Michigan and Wisconsin men of Co. I, 339th Inf., 85th Div., are part of 
the American expedition into the Arctic regions that held 450 miles against the “Reds” from August, 1918, until May, 1919. From left to right they are: Corp. 
Stanley Pijut, Pvts. Arnold Buzburger, Eddie Egher, and George Johnson. 




















SS cane (ee 
SZ ——— 
SSL fi AS SS 

(BSS 





Two platoons of Co. A, 339th 
Inf., 85th Div., at their berracks 
in the village of Visorka on the 
Volga River. The building in 
the czar’s day has been the home 
of an imperial forester. Many of 
the men in the 339th Inf. were of 
Slavic origin, chosen because they 
could speak Russian. 
















A sample of weather in Northern Russia where elements of the 85th. Convoy of 339th Inf. hitting the trail between Archangel and Bere- 


Div. fought the Bolsheviki, and styles of clothing worn to combat the zinski, Jan. 18, 1918. The distance was 44 versts and there was only one 
cold. Men of 2d Bn., 339th Inf. rest house on the way. 


e 


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qs 
“4 
Sd 3 
f 
ap 
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Men of Co. I, 339th Inf., 85th Div., who received the Croix de Guerre 
for bravery in action in North Russia. Left to right: 2d Lieut. Dwight 
Fistler, Corps. Smelinski, Sieloff, and Groebel; Pvts. Rank, Lightee and 


SSS 6) 





Sodor. 





take command of the American forces after the Armistice. 
ardson commanded a brigade in the 28th Div. in France. 





Brig. Gen. Wilds P. Richardson, who was sent to Northern Russia to 
Gen. Rich- 
oO 


ORTH RUSSIA 
2: 


Ke a! 


Unloading supplies at warehouse in Archangel, Russia, where all 


Allied stores were held. Detail of 2d Bn., 339th Inf., 85th Div., Oct. 27 


Staff of 339th Inf., 85th Div., at Headquarters, Archangel, Russia. 
Oct. 25, 1918. ch 


5 BORK, 


Buildings that housed American soldiers in the Archangel sector had Miss Marcia Dunham, Y. W. C. A., the only American woman then 
to be warm. Shoveling sawdust between double walls of barracks under at the Russian front. A post on the 450-mile American front. Nov. 16, 


erection. 





Russian girl serving tea and sandwiches to Yank soldiers in Y. W. C. 


Yanks feeding Bolsheviki prisoners at Archangel, Oct. 21, 1918. 
A. hostess house at Archangel. 


Prisoners used old tin cans and wooden spoons which they carried in their 


boots. 


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ams 


Headquarters building, Co. M., 31st Inf., Suchan, Siberia. The 31st and 27th Inf 
ing the Bolsheviki. Maj. Gen. William S. Graves commanded the Siherian ex ec hilsd 


forces were under the supreme command of the Japanese General, Kizuzo Otani 


d to Siberia, Aug. 7, 1918, to aid the other Allies in check- 
pedition, which landed in Vladivostok from Manila, re 15, The Aas 


Maj. Gen. William S. Graves, 
and staff. Gen Graves is seated 
number 4 from the left, first row. 
He may be distinguished by the 
two silver stars on the cuff of 
his overcoat. This picture of 
the commander of the Siberian 
expedition was taken at Vladivos- 


tok, Nov. 23, 1918. 





U. S. transport Crooks unloading quartermaster supplies at the A. Yanks of the Siberian forces having mess on the road near Vladivostok. 
E. F. dock in Vladivostok. 





Thirty-first Inf. on a practice march near Vladivostok, Dec..3, 1918. This regiment, commanded by Col. Elmore F. Taggart, is a regular army outfit sent 
from Manila when it was decided to lend American aid in checking the wave of Bolshevism threatening Siberia. 


ao Me al 
a » ber 


Allied peace parade in Vladivostok, Nov. 15, 1918, to celebrate the 
Armistice of Nov. 11. The leading troops are Americans of the 3lst Inf. 








Twenty-four hours after this picture was taken these Bolshevist Admiral Kolchak, head of the Russian provisional government 
leaders were executed by the Czechs at Ekaterinburg. The girl was an opposing the Bolsheviki in Siberia during 1918 and 1919, 
official “Red” stenographer. 


WEES @rs: 


Supplying the United States Army in France with all those things an 
army needs was a commercial enterprise that utilized the services of 668,- 
312 soldiers at the period of greatest expansion—Nov. !1, 1918. 


The Services of Supply of the A. E. F., known to the Army as the 
S. O. S. , was charged with procuring, storing and transporting whatever 
the 2,000,000 Americans soldiers in Europe demanded to eat, and wear, 
and fight with. In order that the details might be lifted from the shoulders 
of the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff at G. H. Q., the Services 
of Supply were grouped under, one head, the Commanding General of 
the Services of Supply, with headquarters at Tours. 


This officer handled all projects in connection with roads, docks, 
railroads and buildings; the transportation of men, animals, and supplies 
by sea, rail and inland waterways, the operation of telephone and tele- 
graph systems, control and transportation of replacements, the hospiteliza- 
tion necessary for 2,000,000 men and all those entertainment and welfare 
activities that became so important in the life of the American fighting 
man abroad. Last, and mest important in the eyes of the soldiers, the 
S. O. S. controlled the final embarkation of the troops for home. 


For administrative purposes the S. O. S. was sub-divided into eleven 
territorial sections, each with a territorial commander. In order that all 
the services concerned with the supply of combat troops should work 
without friction, this work was co-ordinated through the Fourth Section 
of the General Staff at General Pershing’s headquarters at Chaumont. 


It will aid the reader to visualize the volume of work performed by 
the S. O. S. if he is informed that each combat division, consisting of 
approximately 28,000 men, required 25 French railway carloads of sup- 
plies for its daily consumption. These cars had to be delivered wherever 
the division was located. This demand was met by providing railroad 
regulating stations at strategic positions behind the lines occupied by 
American troops. From these stations supplies were forwarded to the 
fighting fronts. From the regulating stations supplies were forwarded 
by trains to railheads still closer to the front, and to these railheads the 
‘combat divisions sent their motor and horse drawn transport for daily 
supplies. 


Because of lack of sufficient ocean tonnage there always was a short- 
age of supplies coming from America. To meet the Army’s demands pur- 
chases were made in Europe whenever possible. In order to prevent 
waste through competitive buying against the Allies, Gen. Pershing 


created a General Purchasing Board, headed by Brig. Gen. Charles G. 
Dawes. A total of ten million tons was bought by this board, most of 
it in France. 


The difference between the tonnage of supplies asked for and the 
amounts received is illustrated by Gen. Pershing in his final report to the 
Secretary of War, wherein he gives a table of figures showing that in the 
months of July, August, September and October, 1918, he cabled for 
3,072,991 tons and received.2,112,015, leaving a shortage of 960,976 tons 


to be overcome by purchase in Europe. 


Construction in the S. O. S. was undertaken on a program to provide 
ultimately for an army of 4,000,000 men. This phase of S. O. S. activities 
was carried out by Engineer troops, whose undertakings included docks, 
railroads, warehouses, hospitals, barracks and stables. Of 160 new ships’ 
berths provided for in the plans approximately one-half were completed 
when the Armistice halted activities. 


New railway trackage to the extent of 1,002 miles was constructed. 
Twenty million square feet of storage houses were erected for supply 
depots. Marrs, a hospital city of 700 buildings, covering a space of 33 
acres, is typical of the manner in which the S. O. S. was called upon to 
provide hospital facilities for numbers that fortunately never reached the 
figures estimated. Had the war continued, however, hospital building 
would, of necessity, have been extended. Marrs alone had a capacity of 
4,000 beds. Isolated instances give an idea of the immense program that 
was carried out by the S. O. S. until “cease firing” sounded along the 
front Nov. 11, 1918. The city of Gievres was a great supply center. The 
refrigerating plant there had a capacity of 6,500 tons of meat a day and 
500 tons of ice. At Is-sur-Tille a mechanical bakery was constructed 
with a capacity of 800,000 pounds of bread a day. 


Official figures show that if all the buildings erected by our army 
in France were placed end to end, of a width equal to a standard barrack, 
they would extend 730 miles. 


Twenty thousand cars and 1,500 standard gauge locomotives were 
shipped to France and assembled there by railroad troops. 


War means waste, but the S. O. S. took steps to insure that there 
should be no unnecessary waste. To this end a Salvage Service was 
organized, charged with saving the scraps. An estimated saving of 


$89,000,000 was achieved by this branch. 


EB 


DELIVER &. 


THE GOODS 


Rune 


— panty 


SERIE, AM ARES tial GSA 


Ma). Gen. James G. Harbord, commanding general of the S. O. S. (Services of Supply) of the A. E. F. American supplies unloaded on the banks 
Before becoming head of the expeditionary forces’ supply system he had been Chief of Staff of the A.E. of the Loire at Nantes. 
F., and had led the Marine brigade of the 2d Div. in the fighting around Belleau Wood and Chateau- 
Thierry. Brig. Gen. Charles G. Dawes, at the right, was chief purchasing agent of the A. E. F. 





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ag 


American docks at Bassens, Base Section No. 2, Bordeaux, June 
The U. S. Army Engineer Corps built 83 others before the Armistice. 
mated 1,000,000 tons a month. Wherever possible the Americans used 





8, 1918. Originally the French turned over 23 ship berths to the American Army. 
At the time this picture was taken our overseas shipments of supplies approxi- 


cranes, of many styles and sizes, for handling freight. 
marvel at the way in which the Yankees substituted machinery for hand labo 


The French never ceased to 
r. 


a ae 
| 











|| Bassens dock 
|| at Bordeaux, one 
of the principal 
|| base ports turned 
| over to the Amer- 
ican Army by the 
French. 





View of Amer- 
ican docks on the 
Gironde River, 
near Bordeaux. 














Scene at U. S. Dock No. 3 at St. Nazaire in the Spring of 1918 when 
the great troop movement was beginning to speed up. St. Nazaire was 
one of the principal American base ports. 


Unloading supplies from America for the A. E. F. at Bassens docks, 
Bordeaux. This view offers a suggestion of the vastness of American 
dock facilities. 





ti a n oF 


Part of a day’s production of freight and tank cars at a U.S. assembling shop in a base port of the S.O.S. In all 18,313 freight cars of the 60,000 
_ pound type were shipped to the Army in France. They were assembled at the base ports upon arrival. Arrangements had been made to send cars overseas 
complete on their wheels when the Armistice halted shipments. 


7" 


Julius Rosenwald, Chicago philanthropist, reading a message from the governor of Illinois to a group Secretary Baker's special commissioner, Mr. 
of Illinois soldiers in the S. O. S. Mr. Rosenwald, formerly a member of the National-Council of Defence, Rosenwald, reading the governors’ and senators’ 
was sent to France by the Secretary of War to carry messages of cheer from the governors and senators messages to soldiers at another point in his 
of all the states. A. E. F. tour. 





Gen. Pershing inspecting troops of the Air Service Photographic At Tours, Hdars. S. O. S.; L to R: Maj. Gens. F. J. Kernan and J. W. 
Section at Tours Hdgrs. S. O. S. The officer next to Gen. Pershing is McAndrew, Gen. Pershing, Maj. Gen. J. G. Harbord, Commanding 
Lieut. (later Capt.) Fred Place. Ehatorey. 0.6. in Beryice General S. O. S., and his Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood. 


Coating American locomotives with asbestos at assembling plant, Some of the 1,303 standard gauge consolidated American locomotives 
St. Nazaire. shipped to the American Army in France during the war. Each one cost 


$45,000. 











So want the S O 5S. to 
4 the First Army a 
“4a the prompt res; 
uerte ta every demar 


Winners in the first week’s race between stevedore units engaged in 
unloading vessels. The victors at Dock No. 2, Marseilles, are being 
entertained by the band of-the 134th Inf. 


Fighters of Cuban and Philippine wars who helped speed up S. O. S. 
work in France. Sergt. Samuel Bradshaw, Ist Sergt. Thomas Henshaw, 


and Sergt. Arthur Steger, all of 807th Stevedore Regt., Bordeaux. 





Night crew of stevedores at Marseilles listening to a band concert Brig. Gen. Edgar Russel , Chief Signal Officer, A. E. F., being decor- 
before marching to work on the-docks. ated by Marshal Haig with the British order of Commander of the Bath. 
Chaumont, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : 


a ll 


se ee ee ee 


CONQUERING 


In 1917 when the United States entered the World War the fate of the 
Allies hung upon the U-boats. So did the fate of Germany, for if her 
undersea navy could shut out food from England and prevent American 
troops from reaching France in large numbers the war was won for the 
Kaiser and his Allies. ‘When Admiral Sims went to London in the Spring 
of 1917 the British Admiralty frankly told him Germany was winning the 
war and that the Entente Allies could not hold out longer than six months 
unless the strangling ring of U-boats could be broken. 


To this task our Navy addressed its first efforts. The best naval 
judgment of the Allied counselors was that destroyers, if procurable in 
sufficient numbers, would furnish the best offensive and defensive weapon 
against the submarine menace. A wise method of precaution adopted 
largely through American insistence was the convoy system, under the 
workings of which our transports crossed the Atlantic in close formation, 
and large groups, protected in front, flanks and rear by naval vessels. 
Admiral Sims, commanding the American Naval Forces in Europe, is on 
record as declaring that the convoy system was what snatched victory 
from defeat at the moment when tonnage losses had reached its gravest 
proportions. 


Another important step in checking U-boat activities was taken when 
the great North Sea mine barrage was laid from Scotland to Norway. 
In this undertaking, and similar though smaller ones in other European 
waters, the United States provided, transported and laid 59,439 mines, 
The distance covered by the North Sea barrage of mines was 250 miles, 
and the work done in conjunction with the British, engaged 6,700 sailors. 


A division of dreadnaughts under Admiral Hugh Rodman joined the 
British Grand Fleet at its base in the Firth of Forth and acted as a squad- 
ron of the British Battle Fleet throughout the war. Our co-operation 
with the British in the most active area of the sea fighting did not, how- 
ever, complete the sum of American sea effort. 


THE U-BOAT 


Under Admiral Mayo, commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet, 
vessels were detached for operations with the French and Italian navies in 
Atlantic and Mediterranean waters, and even in the White Sea. Mean- 
while, of course, the main fleet had to be kept mobilized along the Atlantic 
Coast for emergency defense of home ports. 


Men of the American navy served on vessels of every class from the 
cockle shell submarine chasers to the super-dreadnaughts. The Navy 
also had its own aviation corps, whose ofhcers and men distinguished 
themselves by their courage and ability. 


Queenstown, Ireland, and Brest, France, were the principal bases for 
American naval activities in European waters, for it was from these ports 
that the destroyers, submarines and submarine chasers dashed forth on 
their vigils against the enemy undersea. In all, however, the United 
States had 15 naval bases in Europe. An idea of the extent of the 
American naval effort may be obtained from the report of the Secretary 
of the Navy for 1918, concerning aviation. In that connection the Navy. 
established two repair and assembly bases, four kite balloon stations, 
eighteen seaplane stations, five bombing plane stations, and three dirigible 
balloon stations. For manning these a complement of 624 officers and 
15,000 enlisted men was required. 


How well the Navy performed all the tasks assigned to it is revealed in 
the statistics of accomplishment. In the single feature of convoying the 
transports which carried 2,079,880 soldiers to France, it is satisfying to 
National vanity to recall that not a single east bound ship carrying troops 
was lost by enemy action while under the protection of our forces. 


Every soldier who went to France during the period of hostilities will 
retain always a feeling of admiration and gratitude for his comrades in 
blue who kept the sea Janes safe for him by their vigilance and gallantry. 
The American ‘‘doughboy” feels he played a big_part in winning the war 
but he knows the ‘‘gob”’ made it possible by carrying him safely to Eurupe. 


Destroyers protecting mine layers in the North Sea. The plan to close the North Sea with mines, thereby hindering the activities of the German U-boats, 
had its inception in the American Navy. Admiral Mayo, Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Atlantic fleet, carried the plan to the British Admiralty, which 
approved it. Both navies worked together in laying the mines. 


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U.S. destroyers threw out smoke screens to protect the operations of mine layers in case of attack by enemy U-boats. Secretary Daniels said in his annual 
report for 1918 that there was reason to believe the mine barrage across the North Sea accounted for ten German undersea boats. 





A mine layer at work, protected by the guns of an accompanying U. S. battleship in the North Sea. The mine barrage extended from the Orkney Islands 
to the territorial waters of Norway, a distance of 250 miles, and across the English channel. More than 50,000 American mines were laid. The U. S. Navy 
laid 80 per cent of the entire barrage. (Inset) Capt. Reginald R. Belknap, U. S. N., in charge of the active operations of laying the North Sea mine barrage. 


Admirals 
Mayo and Sims, 
and their staffs, at 
a conference in 
Paris, Sept. 1917. 
Admiral Mayo 
(left) was com- 
mander-in-chief of 
the Atlantic fleet, 
while Sims was in 
charge of the forces 
in European 
waters. 








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2M 


ia ite eC telat 
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: 





" 


ae 


The King of 
England attends a 
baseball game 
July 4, 1918. The 
three central fig- 
ures are (left to 
right): Franklin 
Roosevelt, Asst. 
Secretary of the 
Navy, the King 
and Admiral Sims. 





Rear Admiral Strauss, commanding the mine laying 
force of the Atlantic fleet, and his staff. Admiral 
Strauss is No. 4 from the right. 


Admiral William S. Sims, commanding 
American Naval Forces in Europe. 


Vice-Admiral H. B. Wilson, commanding 
U. S. Naval Forces in France, with head- 


quarters at Brest. Official Photo U. 8. 








rs] a 

One of the many methods of fighting U-boats—dropping depth Navy hydroplane armed with Davis automatic gun, ready to fight 
bombs from navy planes. submarines or enemy planes. 

o fa) 








Effect of explosion of depth bomb dropped into the sea from a plane. A submarine skimming along on the surface, as seen from a height 


of 850 feet. 


- 


; 
eager iwtons sie 


7 RS eR Seared 


The British and American naval commanders-in-chief, and their aides, A mine dump at Inverness, Scotland. These American mines were 
on the U. S. S. Pennsylvania. Admiral Beatty has his hands in his used in the North Sea barrage. 
pockets. Admiral Mayo wears a white cap. 





Our only mystery ship, the U. S. S. Santee, after being struck by a Part of the crew of the Santee. All are U.S. Navy officers, disguised 
German torpedo in the Irish Sea on her first expedition. as merchantmen to mislead German U-boat commanders. Mystery 
ships sought attacks in order to force U-boats to battle. 





Six of America’s latest type submarines in the harbor at Queenstown, Ireland, our base of action against enemy U-boats in the Atlantic and Irish Sea. 
(Left inset) Capt. J. K. Taussig, U. S. N:, commander of the first American destroyer division sent to Europe during the war. (Right inset) Launching 
a torpedo. 


War vessel in its coat of 
camouflage. 








Setting the depth charge ready for firing. On board the U. S. S. The Y-gun, built especially for firing depth charges. This projector 
Perkins. can throw depth charges astern or on either side of an enemy boat. 


ARR Ae — nea 


re ; % Star ag \ 
ate sea — Fee 


5}. Navy dirigibles. Every soldier who sailed to France will recall the thrill he got when, on approaching the coast, one or more of these fast flying 
sailed out and escorted his transport to harbor. The “blimps” searched the coastal waters for U-boats lurking beneath the surface. 


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2 


ra a 
ty Ss ew a 
rn / | 
TS was.) 

fT Se ee : 





_American battleships, composing Sixth Battle Squadron of the The Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet, all American 
British Grand Fleet, in the North Sea. vessels, at anchor in the Firth of Forth. This base port of the Grand 
Fleet was a place of fogs, mist and rain. 














A gob’s relax- 
ation from war- 
fare. Some mild 
fighting. 





~~ Smtr 





A tame pirate. 
in a British harbor. 











Captured German U-boat 


Nothing to do till the bugle blows. 


Zid age 
* 


Torpedoes in 
tubes ready for 
launching. Des- 
troyers, cruisers, 
and battle cruisers 
carry torpedoes. 







Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, who com- 
manded the U. S. Battle Squadron with the 


British Grand Fleet. 








2 al 


a ew oe 





VICTORY AND THE ARMISTICE 


In September, 1918, Germany began to break under the Allied offen- 
sives delivered by Marshal Foch. The evidence of weakening was 
quickly apparent after Prince Maximilian of Baden became Imperial 
Chancellor, October 3. On October 5 he addressed a note to President 
Wilson asking him to notify all the Allies that Germany desired an 
Armistice. In accordance with this request the matter of terms was 
submitted to the Supreme War Council sitting at Versailles. 


The first formal meeting of the Entente powers took place at Versailles, 
October !3. Col. E. M. House, Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, and Admirals 
Benson and Sims represented the United States. The terms agreed upon 
were completed November 4, and on the following day President Wilson 


‘notified the German government that Marshal Foch had been empowered 


to receive German envoys and communicate to them the conditions on 
which an Armistice would be granted. Three days of communication by 
wireless followed between Paris and the German Great Headquarters at 
Spa, Belgium. 


Arrangements for the German delegates to cross the lines having been 
completed by these means, the latter presented themselves at Marshal 
Foch’s field headquarters in the Forest of Compiegne, November 8. 
Germany was represented by Mathias Erzberger, Secretary of State, 
Gen. H. K. A. Winterfeldt, Count Alfred von Overndorff, Gen. von 
Gruenell and Naval Captain von Salow. With Marshal Foch at the 
conferences that ensued’ were Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, First Sea 
Lord of the British Admiralty and Gen. Weygand, Chief of Staff to the 
Marshal. 


When the Armistice terms finally were signed in Marshal Foch’s 
private car, standing on a side track at Rethondes station, at 5 o'clock 
in the morning, November | 1, word immediately was sent telegraph, cable, 
telephone and wireless-to all parts of the world. 


Gen. Pershing, in his final report to the Secretary of War, thus describes 
the receipt of the news at American General Headquarters: “At 6 o'clock 
A. M. on the 11th, notification was received from Marshal Foch’s head- 
quarters that the Armistice had been signed and that hostilities would 
cease at 1] A. M. Preparatory measures had already beentaken to 
insure the prompt transmission to the troops of the announcement of an 
Armistice. However, the advance east of Beaumont on the morning of 
the 11th had been so rapid and communication across the river was so 
difficult that there was some fighting on isolated portions of that front 
after 1] A. M.” 


The last sentence explains why some American elements were engaged 
after I1 o'clock, a feature that aroused some criticism in certain unin- 
formed quarters at the time. 


By the terms of the Armistice the Allies were to occupy German 


territory on the west bank of the Rhine, with bridgeheads on the East 


bank of 30 kilometers radius at Cologne, Coblentz and Mayence. Amer- 
ican forces were assigned the territory around Coblentz, with that city as 
headquarters. Under orders from Marshal Foch, Gen. Pershing set his 
American troops in motion, November |7, for the march to the Rhine. 
For the purpose in view the American commander-in-chief hastily formed 
a Third American Army, known as the Army of Occupation, and placed 
at its head, Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, who had been a division and 
corps commander in the combat period. 


Following through the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, close upon the 
heels of the retreating Germans, the American Third Army crossed the 
Sauer and Moselle Rivers into Rhenish Prussia, November 24. Signal 
Corps and ambulance details were the first elements to cross the border. 
The advance of the main army entered Trier, advanced headquarters, 
December |. Unruly elements in the Coblentz territory gave cause for 
fear of an outbreak. To forestall! this, and at the request of German 
authorities, a battalion of American troops was rushed by special train 
to Coblentz, December 8. Thereafter the American forces moved into 
the occupied territory according to schedule and settled down for their 
watch on the Rhine without further difficulty. At first the population 
was sullen but in time relations that might almost be described as friendly 
were established. 


The next step in ending the World War that called for the attention of 
the Allied world was the Peace Conference. This was convened in Paris. 
President Wilson, accompanied by a large staff of diplomats and expert 
advisers, sailed for France on the U. S. S. George Washington, landing in 
Brest, December 13, 1918. The representatives of the United States, 
other than the President, at the Peace Conference, were Robert Lansing 
Secretary of State; Henry White, former ambassador to France; Edward 
N. House and Gen. Tasker H. Bliss. 


Paris gave President Wilson a tremendous ovation when he arrived 
there December 14, and drove through troop lined streets to the residence 
of Prince Murat, where he resided during his first stay in France. Before 
the opening of the Peace Conference, the president visited England and 
Italy, being everywhere received with great warmth by the populace. 
A month passed before the great conference opened. The first plenary 
session, an informal one, was held at the Quai D 'Orsay, home of the 
French Foreign Ministry, January 13, 1919. Thereafter the sessions 
continued until the terms finally agreed upon were signed by the German 
plenipotentiaries in the Halls of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, 


June 28, 1919. 


In the interval between the cessation of hostilities and the signing of 
the treaty of peace with Germany, the American Army command was 
occupied with caring for the well being of 2,000,000 soldiers impatient to 
return to their homes. 


é 


ag 


Saat 


Grand Hotel Brittanique at Spa, Belgium. The Kaiser had his headquarters here when Prince Maximilian of Baden, imperial chancellor, announced 
his abdication, Nov. 9, 1918. In fact, the Kaiser actually signed his abdication at Amerongen, Holland, Nov. 28, 1918, seventeen days after he fl 


ed with his 
personal staff from German Great Headquarters. (Inset) The War Lord when his “shining armor” was brightest and he was able to exclaim: “We stand 
with our hearts toward God-—to the dust with all the enemies of Germany.” 








be "aah A ee ‘ Ds 38 tan ‘ A £ 
rid ee ate. RSet id ale a Se Sa 


Here ended the World War. At 5 o'clock Monday morning, Nov. |1, 1918, the German plenipotentiaries, headed by Secretary of State, Mathias Erz- 
berger, signed the Armistice terms in Marshal Foch’s private car, No. 2419 D. The train to which the car was attached stood on the track at the station of 
Rethondes, in the Forest of Campiegne. Marshal Foch was accompanied by his chief of staff, Gen. Weygand and Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, First Sea 
Lord of the British Admiralty. (Inset) Marshal Foch, generalissimo of the Allied Armies, who presented the peace terms to the Germans. 





tice Commission after the signing of terms, but prior to that occupied by Green, Adye, Haking, British Army; Rhodes, American; Nudant, French; 


Qo a 

Villa Sous Bois at Spa, Belgium, headquarters of the American Armis- Generals of the Allied Armistice Commission at Spa. (R to L) 
Marshal Hindenburg. Debobda, Belgian. 

Q o 





Celebrating the Armistice at the Meuse-Argonne front. Members Captured German cannon in the Place de la Concorde, Paris, Nov. || 
of Co. M, 6th Inf., Nov. 12. Hotel Crillon, headquarters of American Peace Commission at left. 


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Celebrating the Armistice in Broad Street, New York City. Tons Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Nov. !1, 1918, when the celebration of the 
of confetti sprinkled the streets. Every known device for making a noise Armistice was at its height. A Chicago newspaper said: “Chicago turned 
was used. Traffic in Fifth Avenue, Broadway, and the financial district topsy turvy today. Babel at its worst could not have been worse than 
was stopped. ausrel Haws Ebote Berrice Chicago was today.” Int. Film Service 





8 


With the Army of Occupation marching into Germany. The 149th F. A., 42d Div., crossing the Sauer River from Echternach, Luxembourg, into enemy 
territory. 


The defeated army homeward bound. German troops passing Co. A, 39th Inf., marching through Schweich on their way to the 
through Luxembourg’s- capital on their retreat. Rhine. 





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Maj. W. J. Jack and Lieut. J. F. Ryan, Ist Bn., 28th Inf., Ist Div., Maj. Gen. E. F. McGlachlin (at left) watching his Ist Div. troops 


crossing Moselle River bridge onto German territory at Winchrenger, cross the Moselle into Germany at Winchrenger, Nov. 30. 
Germany. j 





Mayen, Germany, Dec. 7, 1918. 


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| Band of 125th Inf., 32d Div., announcing the entry of Americans into A quiet corner in ancient Mayen is visited by U. S. Marines. | 
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Citizens of Treves, Germany, view the passage of the Ist Div. Their The entry into Saarburg, Germany, of Co. B, 38th Inf., 3d Div.. 
facial expressions are worth studying with care: Dec. |, 1918. 





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The town and castle of Cochem on the Moselle River. « This ancient fortress was occupied as headquarters of the 4th Army Corps of the American 
Army of Occupation. Sergt. Maj. A. M. Owens, 12th M. G. Bn., and Miss R. D. Holmes, Y. M. C. A. worker, walked into the picture just in time to be 


embalmed in history 














Castle and vil- 
lage of Montabaur 
during American 
occupation. Head- 
quarters Ist Div. 


er 


View of Moselle valley from Castle Cochem, headquarters 4th Army 
Corps 


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The 26th Inf., 
Ist Div., leaving 
Montabaur for a 
practice “hike.” 
The castle appears 
in background. 





Advance of 28th Inf., Ist Div., crossing Moselle River into Germany, 


at Winchrenger, Nov. 30. 








Maarksburg Castle. The hills of the Rhineland around Coblentz, _ Yankee sentinel of 5th Marines, 2d Div., on guard at gateway of 
occupied by the American 3d Army, were crowned with these ancient Altwied Castle, Altwied, Germany. 
strongholds. Whenever these castles were habitable they were occupied 
as headquarters for American troops. Photo by U. 8. Air Service 


‘ 


(—— 









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ADS 
APL — 


ARPS” 


Fort Ehren- 
breitstein, oppo- 
site Coblentz, on 


the Rhine. Ger- 


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Supply train 
of Ist Div. across 
the Rhine from 
Coblentz. Ehren- 


breitstein in back- 









frontier fort. Oc- 
cupied by the Am- 
ericans. Dec. 10, 


1918. 












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Establishing amicable relations with the These frauleins of Hundsaugen, Germany, seem to The “starving women and children of 
enemy. Sewing on a 4th Army Corps shoulder have eaten well during the war. Dec. 29, 1918. Germany” we had read about. Factory 
badge, Cochem, Germany. workers at Bitburg, Dec. 2, 1918. 


¢ rao es ry. 
conan meee dina ushered ule 





Ehrenbreitstein as seen from Coblentz, headquarters of the American Army of Occupation. This fortress occupies the rocky heights 400 feet above the 
Rhine. Because of the fear of revolution the German authorities requested the Americans to take it over as soon as they reached Coblentz. The Ist Div. 
occupied it. A balloon of the 3d Balloon Co. is keeping watch up and down the Rhine. 





1 Changing the guard on the Rhine. Sentinels of 42d Div., Nieder-Breisig, Dec. 9, 1918. 2. Judging winners at 32d Div. horse show, Weis, Germany. 
Feb. 8, 1919. 3. Maj. Gen. Chas. H. Martin, 90th Div. at 90th Div. Horse Show. 4. This “Pied Piper” of Cochem is Pvt. Joe Foster, 5Ist Pioneer Inf. 
5. The Prince of Wales (left) and Brig. Gen. B. H. Wells, Chief of Staff, 4th Army Corps, Cochem, Jan. 11, 1919. 6. Junius B. Wood, war corres- 
pondent gives his dog a view of the Rhine. 


Maj. Gen. J. T. Dickman, Commanding the Army of Occupation, 
reviewing Rhine River fleet taken from Germans. Feb. 6, 1919. 


“SEGGH finanan cites 
WMSELY. et inst ag wey 1A 








The municipal bath at Neuwied was operated by the Y: M. C. A. for This is where “‘buck”’ privates, 42d Div., dined while on leave at the 
Yanks on leave. famous Bad Neunahr. It formerly was the Kurhaus. 


















Brig. Gen. 
Marlborough 
Churchill, Chief 
of Military Intel- 
ligence Division, 
General Staff, who 
accompanied Pres- 
ident Wilson to 
Peace Conference. 





President Wil- 
son on board the 
George Washing- 
ton, Brest, France. 


Dec. I1, 1918. 


















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The President and Rear Admiral Grayson, his personal physician, President and Mrs. Wilson landing at Brest, Dec. 13, 1918. Miss 
on deck of George Washington, bound for the Peace Conference. Margaret Wilson is just behind the President. 


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President Wilson and President Poincare leaving railway station Dec. 14, 1918, on the occasion of Wilson’s arrival in Paris to take part in the Peace 
Conference. In state carriages the American president and his entourage were driven through the Champs Elysees and principal thoroughfares to the residence 
of Prince Murat, where President Wilson lived during his first stay in France. The boulevards through which the distinguished guest drove were lined with 
French troops. It was estimated that one million spectators greeted him on this occasion. 





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President Wilson in his happiest mood. He is saluting the Parisian populace, whose shouts of “Vive Veelsong” filled the air when the American executive 
drove in state through the streets of the French capital upon his arrival to take part in the Peace Conference. President Poincare sits at the President's left. 
This Signal Corps photograph was the president’s favorite of all those taken of him while abroad. After the cares of state began to absorb his time and atten- 
tion he never appeared so buoyant as in this picture. 





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How Paris greeted President Wilson.’ This picture was taken in the Rue Royal in front of the Madeleine. That famed church is the pillared structure 
in the background. Six months prior to the joyous occasion when this photograph was made, a shell from the German long distance cannon had beheaded 
one of the angel statues adorning the facade. At that time—June 1918—the Germans were on!y 50 miles away and one million people had fled from Paris. 
Wilson symbolized the great American nation that saved France and Paris strove to show its appreciation. 








Residence of Prince Murat, in the Rue Monceau, President Wilson’s The Guard of Honor at President Wilson’s Paris residence. Each 


a 

| official residence in Paris. Prince Murat is descended from Marshal officer and man was picked for physical appearance and military efficiency. 
Murat, King of Naples, and Caroline Bonaparte. 

a 





Reception by President and Mrs. Wilson to guard company and house Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Quai D’Orsay, Paris, where Peace Con- 
staff at Murat palace. Jan. 24, 1919. ference held formal meetings. 


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House, Robert Lansing, Secretary 


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President Woodrow 


ex-am- 


Gen. Tasker 


Wilson, Henry White 
H. Bliss, U.S.A. Dec. 18, 1918. 


bassador to France; 





official headquarters 


, 


on the Place de la Concorde 


of U. S. Peace Commission. 


The Hotel Crillon 


Behind the five 


delegates are the experts, military, naval, diplomatic and financial. 


The American Commission to negotiate Peace. 


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Christmas Day, 191 8. The president addressing troops at review During his Christmas day visit to the Army President Wilson climbed 
near Chaumont. into a doughboy billet in a stable at Sorrey. 





‘In the sleet and mud the 26th Div. passed in review before its Commander-in-Chief, President Wilson, Christmas Day, 1918, near Langres. 


Before settling down to the long grind of the Peace Conference, President Wilson made a visit to England. This Signal Corps photograph shows his 
departure from London. R to L: Mrs. Wilson, Queen Mary, Mr. Wilson, King George. In the background in the state train on which the presidential 
party traveled. Jan. 31, 1918. 








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The Recorder of Dover, Sir Archibald Bodkin, reading address of President Wilson inspecting guard of honor at Mansion House, 
welcome to President Wilson on his arrival at Dover, December 26, 1918. London, December 28, 1918. 

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President Wilson and Lord Mayor of Manchester, Manchester, Eng., Thomas Watson, only surviving pupil who attended Sunday School 
Dec. 30, 1918. taught by Rev. Thomas Woodrow, greeting latter's grandson, President 
Woodrow Wilson. Carlisle, Eng., Dec. 29, 1918. 


President Wilson and the King 


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lly shown in this photograph. Jan. 5, 1919. (Inset) 


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President Wilson and his party viewed the largest and most enthusiastic crowd seen on 


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1919. 


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In the immense square before the royal palace at Milan, Italy 
It was estimated that 25,000 people were in gathering partia 


of Italy at the station in Rome, Jan. 4 


the trip. 





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Delegates of 27 Allied nations standing while the President of France, Raymond Poincare, opens the Peace Conference with a formal address, Jan. 1, 
1919. Immediately after Poincare’s speech Georges Clemenceau, premier of France, was named permanent chairman, This momentous conclave sat in the 
Salle d’Horologe (Hall of the Clock) in the Ministry of Foreign affairs, popularly known in Paris as the Quai D’Orsay. Although generally known as the 
Peace of Versailles, the treaty with Germany actually was formulated at the Quai D’Orsay. The signing took place at the Palace of Versailles. 





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Interpreter translating President Poincare’s speech into English at opening of Peace Conference. The interpreter is standing. The proceedings of the 
conference were carried on in English and French. Each speech was interpreted into some other language. President Wilson sits at the interpreter’s right, 


reading a paper. - 





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The Big Four—L. to R.: Orlando, premier of Italy; Lloyd George, prime minister of England; Clemenceau, premier of France, and President Wilson. 
As the days of the conference drew on these leaders, known formally as the Council of Four, were empowered to shape the form of the growing treaty. Sessions 
of the Big Four were held in the library of President Wilson’s Paris residence, where this photograph was made by a Signal Corps operator. 








“Col.”” E. M. House, President Wilson’s confidant and one of the Lloyd George, prime minister of England and head of the British 
five American plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference. Mission at the Peace Conference. The British statesman was not given 
to formal dress, as this picture shows. 


One of the unofficial powers 
attending the Conference. The 
man with a cane in his hand is 
Lord Northcliffe, owner of the 
London Times and. numerous 
other British journals. 








Among the notable figures in Paris during treaty making days was The man with bared head, descending the stairway, is Signor Orlando, 
Paderewski, pianist and statesman, head of the Polish delegation. then prime minister of Italy and head of the Italian delegation. 


While the statesmen of 27 
nations were busy shaping the 
treaty in Paris many distinguished 
personages visited the A. E. F. 
Among the guests of the American 
Army were the King and Queen 
of Belgium, here seen on the occa- 
sion of their visit to Gen. Pershing 
at Chaumont. Behind the King 
(standing at salute) are Gen. Per- 
shing, the Queen, M. Levy, 
Mayor of Chaumont, and Mrs. 


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The Queen “snaps” Gen. Pershing. At Gen. Pershing’s residence. L to R King Albert of Belgium, 


Countess of Caramonchimay, the Queen, Gen. Pershing. 





With the end of the war the generals permitted themselves a little social relaxation. Here is a distinguished group taken on the steps of Gen. Pershing’s 
chateau near Chaumont. In front row, L to R: Brig. Gen. F. R. McCoy, Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett, Marshal Petain, commander of the French armies in 
the held: Gen. Pershing, Maj. Gen. J. W. McAndrew, Chief of Staff, A. E. F., Brig. Gen. L. R. Holbrook. Jan. 14, 1919. The American officers in the group 


have just received from Marshal Petain decorations of the Legion of Honor. 





While the fighting lasted 
wounded men’s desire to return 
to their outfits was their incentive 
to get well. After peace came 
nurses devised all kinds of methods 
to keep up their patients’ interest 
while they mended. These men 
in Hospital No. 69, Savenay, are 
making bead bags, and painting 
fans and baskets. March 3, 1919. 





Whiling away time while waiting to come home. Miss Elsie Mc- Among the entertainers who helped cheer up the doughboy during 
.M.C.A., telling fortunes. T: ,G , Feb. 11, 1919. conference days was Miss Margaret Wilson, daughter of the President. 
oe 2 eal ie Sausteteg: ' She sang throughout the A. E. F. Miss Wilson stands at the right. 





Paris. Regard these doughboys at Biarritz, one time playground of are passing part of their 14 day leave. 
royalty and millionaires. 


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| It was a hard life in the leave areas while statesmen talked peace in In the billiard room of a Y. M. C. A. hotel at Nice, these enlisted men | 
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A. Buck, on leave, never found enough girls to dance with him, but See what this “Sam Browne’ drew at the Red Cross convalescent 
he did not fare so badly, as this scene at Biarritz indicates. home at Beychevelle. 


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As soon as the fighting was over the American doughboy, encouraged Boxing was a favorite sport. Candidates for championship honors 


by G. H. Q., turned at once to Athletics. This the 89th Div. football toured the A. E. F. seeking victims. 


team, champion of the A. E. F. 





It was an unambitious outfit that did not boast a theatrical company. “Die Wacht am Rhein” troupe, Ist Engs., Ist Div. Wirges, Germany, 
These “chorus girls” of the “Snap It Up” show belonged to the 29th Div. Feb. 7, 1919. 





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Here at last d Mn sonny ! , BX, 
was “Sunny |} — a > On the beach 
France.” Sight- —— — a at Biarritz, March 
seeing -doughboys | jis a Geese Ss ace ne . al | 23, 1919. 


on the Riviera. 





After the “chow lines” in the Argonne these Riviera Hotel dining On the shores of the Mediterranean. 
rooms were not bad. 


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The “chow line” at he great A. E. F. University at Beaune, where thousands of soldiers resumed their college courses during the days of the Peace Con- 
ference while they waited for orders to go home. There was no rank here. Officers and enlisted men lined up together for meals and classes. The war was 
over; democracy once more ruled. 





American soldier students at Poitiers University. This picture was Army pupils drawing from casts at the Art Training Center, Bellevue, 
taken on the steps of the Palais de Justice, the spot whence Jeanne D’Arc near Paris. 
began her march on Orleans in the I4th Century. 





University of Paris. April 28, 1919. men are learning to read and write at a post school at Commercy. 


o a 
| A class in constitutional law at: l’Ecole de Droit (Law School), There were grades for soldiers of all degrees of learning. These | 
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Farmers Institute for soldiers at Creon, Jan. 29, 1919. Agricul- See how much interest these Yanks took in their French lesson at 
tural courses were popular. the University of Grenoble. 





Great Gate, Trinity College, Cambridge University, Eng., May 20, Dr. F. O. Murray, of Selwyn College, Cambridge University, Eng., 
1919. There were American students at all the British Universities, in and American students, St. Johns College on the right, Divinity School 
England, Scotland and Ireland. at left. 


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While the Peace Conference was meeting in Paris, the U. S. Govt sent the Employers Industrial Commission to Europe to solve labor problems. First row; left to right: Roger W. 
Babson, Dir. Gen. I_& E. L. Dept. of Labor; Geo. W. Coleman, Dir. Inf.; E. T Gundlach, Chairman of the Commission; W. B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor; W. H. Ingersoll and Eldon Keith, 
Commissioners; Benj. M. Squires, Statistician. Second row, left to right; Geo E Macllwain, Secretary; John A. Witt, Asst. Secy. and James R. Hawkins, fiscal agent. Absent, R. J. Caldwell 


Dor E. Felt and R. R. Otis, Commissioners; Dr. Royal Meeker, economic advisor, and E..N. Phillips, Asst. Sec. Underwood & Underoneal 





When President Wilson re- 
turned to Paris from his flying 
visit to America in the Spring of 
1919, he occupied this residence 
at No. I! Place des Etats Unis. 
The striped sentry boxes on either 
side of the main entrance were for 
the occupancy during rainy wea- 
ther of the French National 
Guard sentinels, who, through the 
courtesy of the French govern- 
ment, guarded the President’s 
home. 





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Henry White, veteran diplomat and Republican delegate on the Robert Lansing, U. S. Secretary of State, at his desk in the American 
American Peace Mission. He had been Ambassador to France. Peace headquarters, Hotel Crillon, Paris. 


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Before they left their headquarters at the Hotel des Reservoirs, Versailles, May 7, 1919, for the Trianon Palace Hotel, where they received the treaty 
containing the Allies terms of peace, the German delegates posed for Corp. E. N. Jackson, a U. S. Signal Corps photographer. Reading from left to right 


the German envoys are: Herr Leinert, President of the Prussian National Assembl 


y; Dr. Karl Melchior, financial expert; Herr Giesberts, Minister of Posts; 


Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Foreign Minister and head of the delegation; Dr. Landsberg, Minister of Justice, and Dr Schucking, an expert on international law. 


e in the Trianon Palace Hotel, Versailles, May 7, 1919. The representatives of the 
that received the Germans’ peace terms after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau created a sensation at the Trianon Palace Hotel meeting by failing to rise when he replied to M. Clemenceau. All the Allied delegates had risen when the Germans 
entered the room and the French premier stood, as may be seen in the picture, while he addressed the enemy delegates. 


Georges Clemenceau, premier of France, delivering to the German delegates the Allies’ terms of peac 
27 allied nations were present on this historic occasion. Clemenceau had been a member of the French Assembly 





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President Wilson made a trip to Belgium shortly before the signing 


of peace and his return to America. On this occasion he made a special Hall) Brussels, June 19,1919 LtoR: King Albert of Belgium, standing; 
trip from Brussels to Malines to pay his respects to Cardinal Mercier, President Wilson, Mrs. Wilson, Brand Whitlock, American Ambassador 
with whom he is here seen conversing in the doorway. June 18, 1919. to Belgium; Queen Elizabeth of Belgium; Miss Margaret Wilson. 


Presidential party attending a ceremony at the Hotel de Ville (City 





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_ This photograph was made by a U. S. Army Air Service officer, June 28, 1919. It shows the Palace of Versailles and the crowds streaming through the 
gates to witness the signing of the Treaty of Peace. “The space outside the gateway is filled with a throng waiting to witness the arrival of the celebrities. 


Photo by U. 8. Air Serview 








The Hall of Mirrors in the Chateau Louis XIV (Palace of Versailles) A corner of the Palace of Versailles showing exterior of Hall of Mirrors 


where the German peace treaty was signed June 28, 1919. A few yards where the delegates of Germany and the Allied nations affixed their sig- 
from this spot William I was crowned German Emperor, Jan. 18, 1871. natures to the treaty. 


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View of the Palace and City of Versailles, taken "from a U. S. Army airplane, June 28, 1919, while the delegates were assembling for the ceremony of signing the German treaty. The 
palace building spreads about the grand court in the lower left corner of the picture. The horse shoe shaped buildings at the right are the former royal stables. The German delegates, Mueller and 
Bell, were the first to affix their signatures. Next came President Wilson. The signing lasted 35 minutes. The Chinese delegates refused to sign on account of the Shantung clause, transferring 
former German rights to Japan The treaty text comprises approximately 80,000 words. Dhstn tow ts, Wake 





Photograph by a U. S. Army Signal Corps operator of ‘the actual signing of the German peace treaty, in the Hall of Mirrors, Palace of Versailles, 3:10 
P. M., June 28, 1919. Outside cannon boomed and bells rang to announce to the world that peace finally had been sealed. Within this room, a few yards 
from where the German Empire was proclaimed 48 years before, delegates of the new German Republic affixed their signatures to the document which ended 
German military autocracy. Outside the crowds cheered as Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and other well’ known figures took their departure. 








Pershing Stadium, Joinville, near Paris, where the inter-Allied Army Athletic Contests were held in June, 1919. This Stadium was built by American 


Army engineers. At the close of the games, when our troops were leaving France, it was presented to the French nation. (Inset) King Nicholas of Monte- 
negro presenting a medal to a Yankee victor in Pershing Stadium games, June 22, 1919. __ Photo by U. 8. Air Service 





Marshals Joffre and Foch, and staff of Allied officers, leading the Victory Parade through the Arc de Triomphe, Paris, July 14, 1919. Ahead of the two Marshals marched 1,000 wounded 
French soldiers in civilian clothes. Note that Marshal Joffre, victor of the-first Battle of the Marne, and Senior Marshal of France, rides slightly in advance of Foch. Joffre is in dark uniform. 
Behind these two followed picked battalions from all the Allied Armies. The Arc de Triomphe was built by Napoleon !. None but victorious armies are permitted to march through the Arc, 
which stands at the head of the Champs Elysees. At other times heavy chains bar passage way. 


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Forty American regimental flags in the Victory Parade, Paris, July Gen. Pershing and staff passing through Place de la Concorde in 
14, 1919. A battalion of picked troops represented America. The flags Paris Victory Parade. Behind the general his orderly carries his four 


represented combat troops. starred personal flag. 





American composite regiment in Place de la Concorde, Paris Victory > The U: S. Navy's representatives in the Paris Victory Parade march- 
Parade. This regiment comprised picked men from combat units, chosen ing through the Arc de Triomphe and down the Champs Elysees. 
for size, bearing and record. ; 





Gen. Pershing leading the American contingent in the Paris Victory Parade: With him rode Maj. Gens. J. G. Harbord, Henry T. Allen, John L. Hines, 
Brig. Gens. Dennis Nolan, Fox Conner, and other officers of his headquarters. The Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. was given the place of honor directly 
behind Marshals Joffre and Foch and their staffs. 


Massed American colors pass- 
ing the King’s reviewing stand in 
the London Victory Parade, July 
19, 1919. Here, as in the Paris 
Victory Parade five days earlier, 
Gen. Pershing and the American 
composite regiment, comprising 
picked men from combat units, 
were given an ovation. A London 
newspaper said of the American 
colors: 

“The Stars and Strips were 
fluttering in the wind like things 
of flame. They passed up Con- 
stitution Hill, a bunch of flapping, 
leaping fire.” 





Gen. Pershing saluting the King. A London paper said: “Then King George receiving the American salute. 
Gen. Pershing came —a big, thick-set man, with a thrusting chin, all smiles 
as the crowd let him have it, but steady and soldierly, as his hand went 
up to salute the King.” 


. 
tres Ta ne ere ic 


In the royal reviewing 


Manuel of Portugal, the ex-Queen of Portugal, Marshal Foch, Gen. Pershing, King George, Queen Mary and the. Dowager Queen Alexandria. The parade was six 
miles long. The Americans wearing their trench helmets, came first and were wildly received by the populace. Each of the 3,500 Yankee soldiers had been chosen 
for his height and soldierly bearing and they had been drilled together for three months for the Victory Parades. ‘‘Pershing’s Own,” they were called in the press. 


stand as the military of all the Allied nations swept by in the London Victory Parade, July 19, 1919. Left to right, ex-King 





“When do we go home?” was asked by every American soldier as soon The job done “‘over there,” these men are starting “back to the good 
as the Armistice was signed. Here are some of the earliest to leave. old U.S.A.” U.S.S. Mercury, St. Nazaire, December 6, 1918. 


The 49th Inf., embarking at Brest, January 11, 1919. 





Homeward bound—these lucky fellows are boarding the Wilhelmina Headquarters Co., 319th F. A., 82d Div., boarding transport Alaskan 
at Bordeaux, January 5, 1919. for home. April 27, 1919. 


aae- 





It required 19 months to transport 2,079,880 American troops to Europe but the exodus from France was much more rapid. The backward flow really 
did not get well under way until April, 1919. By September the last division, the Ist, was back in the United States. This photograph shows one of the 
earliest outfits to return, the 87th Div., loading on the transport Manchuria at St. Nazaire, Jan. 10, 1919. 


Pershing and Foch say “‘goodbye’’ at Brest, September |, 1919. Farewell to France. Gen. Pershing, on the bridge of the Leviathan, 
Foch holds paper in hand. Pershing stands at his left. waves at the receding shores of the land he helped to save. Sept. 1, 1919. 





Some one apparently has told the General a ‘‘good one.’ On board Home again. Gen. Pershing points out the first signs of land, Sep- 
the Leviathan homeward bound. tember 8, 1919. 


“HELLO, AMERICA.” 





Leviathan, our greatest troop 

carrying transport, docking at 

Hoboken, April 25, 1919. The 

arrival of a troopship in New York 

harbor with heroes of the A. E. F. 

was ever an occasion for outbursts 

of pleasure and gratitude. The 

ship was met down the bay with 

tugs carrying welcoming com- 

me mittees, bands and anxious rela- 

sh ~ a ; 7 tives. The procession up the bay 
_ ' patina was to an accompaniment of 


SOREL whistles, cheers and music. 





Carrying off wounded from U. S. hospital ship Mercy, New York, Negro troops of 93d Div., on Leviathan, in New York harbor, Feb- 
December 12, 1918. ruary 2, 1919. 





“Welcome home” to the 27th Div., the New York National Guard outfit that helped break the Maj. Gen. John F. O’Ryan (right), 27th Div., 
Hindenburg Line in September, 1919.. Passing through the Victory Arch at Madison Square, New reviewing his men as the division marched up 
York City, March 24, 1919. ; oh ih al de Fifth Avenue in its final parade. March 24, 1919. 


Central News Photo Service 








Famous fighters of many wars. The 165th Inf. (69th Inf., N. Y. N. G.) marching through the Victory Arch and up Fifth Avenue upon their return 
from France. This regiment, known as the “Fighting Irish’, was part of the 42d (Rainbow) Division. It fought at Chateau Thierry, St. Mihiel and in the 
Meuse-Argonne, suffering heavy losses in all those campaigns. (Inset) Maj. Gen. Alexander, and staff, leading 77th Div. in its victory march up Fifth Avenue, 
New York, May 8, 1919. The 77th was composed of New York City draft men. Paul ‘Thompson 


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Immense crowds greeted him 


Photo by U. 3. Air Services 


1919, when Gen. Pershing arrived from France. 
ed from his train he was greeted by Vice-President Marshall (President 
Escorted by cavalry he drove to his temporary 


Scene at Washington, D. C. railway station on the afternoon of Sept. 12, 
at the station and along Pennsylvania Avenue as he drove to his hotel. Where he descend 
Wilson was out of the city) Gen. March, Chief of Staff, U.S. A., and committees from both Houses of Congress. 


headquarters. 








The Commander-in-Chief’s last ride with the A. E. F. On Sept. 17, 1919, Gen. Pershing led the Ist Div. up Pennsylvania Avenue on its final review 
as part of the American Expeditionary Forces. Twenty-five thousand strong, this regular Army division, the first in France and the last back, paraded in full 
combat equipment. When it gave the final salute to the Nation’s chief officials gathered in the grand stand before the White House, the great American Army 
of Freedom ceased to exist. International Film Service. 


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The Ist Div. marching up Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, in its Gen. Pershing and staff at the moment of starting on the final review. 
final review as part of the A. E. F. In the background is the Capitol. Washington, September 17, 1919. Underwood & Underwood. 
In this parade the division was equipped as for combat service—the first 
and last division of the American Army that ever marched thus equipped 
in the United States during the World War. Photo by U. S. Air Service 


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Receiving his reward. Gen. Pershing (standing at reading desk) receiving the thanks of Congress at joint session and replying to same, September 17; 1919. On September 4 he had been 
The Congressional resolution of thanks was as follows: “The thanks of the American people and the Congress of the United States are due, 


made “General of the Armies of the United States.” 
and are hereby tendered to Gen. John J. Pershing for his highly distinguished services as commander-in-chief of the American expeditionary forces in Europe and to the officers and men under his 
International Film Service. 


command for their unwavering duty and valor throughout the war. 





ts el ee 


—— 





FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING 


(Up to and including the return of troops to the United States.) 


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. 


To the SECRETARY OF WAR. 


September 1, 1919. 


: Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith my final report as Commander-in- 
Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe: 


PART I. 
PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION. 


1. I assumed the duties of this office on May 26, 1917, and, ac- 
companied by a small staff, departed for Europe on board the S. S. 
Baltic May 28. We arrived at London on June 9 and, after spending 
some days in consultation with the British authorities, reached Paris 
on June 13. 

2. Following the rather earnest appeals of the Allies for American 
troops, it was decided to send to France, at once, | complete division 
and 9 newly organized regiments of Engineers. The division was 


- formed of regular regiments, necessary transfers of officers and men 


were made, and recruits were assigned to increase these units to the 
required strength. 

The offer by the Navy Department of one regiment of Marines to 
be reorganized as Infantry was accepted by the Secretary of War, 
and it became temporarily a part of the First Division. 

Prior to our entrance into the war, the regiments of our small 
army were very much scattered, and we had no organized units, even 
approximating a division, that could be sent overseas prepared to take 
the field. To meet the new conditions of warfare an entirely new 
organization was adopted in which our Infantry divisions were to con- 


sist of 4 regiments of Infantry of about treble their original size, 3 
regiments of Artillery, 14 machine-gun companies, | Engineer regiment, 
| Signal battalion, | troop of Cavalry, and other auxiliary units, mak- 
ing a total strength of about 28,000 men. 


MILITARY SITUATION. 


3. In order that the reason for many important decisions reached 
in the early history of the American Expeditionary Forces may be 
more clearly understood, and the true value of the American effort 
more fully appreciated, it is desirable to have in mind the main events 
leading up to the time of our entry into the war. 


1914. 
4. Although the German drive of 1914 had failed in its immedi- 


- ate purpose, yet her armies had made very important gains. German 


forces were in complete possession of Belgium and occupied rich in- 
dustrial regions of northern France, embracing one-fourteenth of her 
population and about three-fourths of her coal and iron. The German 
armies held a strongly fortified line 468 miles in length, stretching 
from the Swiss border to Nieuport on the English Channel; her troops 
were within 48 miles of Paris and the initiative remained in German 


hands. y 


In the east the rapidity of the Russian mobilization forced Germany, 
even before the Battle of the Marne, to send troops to that frontier, 
but the close of 1914 found the Russian armies ejected from East 
Prussia and driven back on Warsaw. 

The entry of Turkey into the war, because of the moral effect upon 
the Moslem world and the immediate constant threat created against 
Allied communications with the Far East, led to an effort by the Allies 
in the direction of the Dardanelles. 


192i: 


5. Italy joined the Allies in May and gave their cause new 
strength, but the effect was more or less offset when Bulgaria entered 
on the side of the Central Powers. 

The threatening situation on the Russian front and in the Balkans 
was still such that Germany was compelled to exert an immediate 
offensive effort in those directions and to maintain only a defensive 
attitude on the western front. German arms achieved a striking series 
of successes in the vicinity of the Mazurian Lakes and in Galicia, cap- 
turing Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, and Vilna. The Central Powers over- 
ran Serbia and Montenegro. Meanwhile, the Italian armies forced 
Austria to use approximately one-half of her strength against them. 

In the west, the French and British launched offensives which cost 
the German armies considerable loss; but the objectives were limited 
and the effect was local. 

The Dardanelles expedition, having failed in its mission, was with- 
drawn in January, 1916. In Mesopotamia the Allied operations had 
not been successful. Although the British fleet had established its 
superiority on the sea, yet the German submarine blockade had devel- 
oped into a serious menace to Allied shipping. 


1916. 


6. Germany no doubt believed that her advantage on the eastern 
front at the close of 1915 again warranted an offensive in the west, 
and her attack against Verdun was accordingly launched in the spring 
of 1916. But Russia was not yet beaten and early in June, aided at 
the same time by the threat of an Italian offensive in the west, she began 
the great drive in Galicia that proved so disastrous to Austria. 

Roumania, having entered on the side of the Allies, undertook a 
promising offensive against Austria. The British and French Armies 
attacked along the Somme. Germany quickly returned to the defensive 
in the west, and in September initiated a campaign in the east which, 
before the close of 1916, proved unfortunate for Russia as well as 
Roumania. 


SPRING OF 1917. 


7. Retaining on the eastern front the forces considered sufficient 
for the final conquest of Russia, Germany prepared to aid Austria 
in an offensive against Italy. Meanwhile, the Russian revolution was 
well under way and, by the midsummer of 1917, the final collapse 
of that government was almost certain. 

The relatively low strength of the German forces on the western 
front led the Allies with much confidence to attempt a decision on this 
front; but the losses were very heavy and the effort signally failed. The 
failure caused a serious reaction especially on French morale, both 
in the army and throughout the country, and attempts to carry out 
extensive or combined operations were indefinitely suspended. 

In the five months ending June 30, German submarines had ac- 
complished the destruction of more than three and one-quarter million 
tons of Allied shipping. During three years Germany had seen 
practically all her offensives except Verdun crowned with success. Her 
battle lines were held on foreign soil and she had withstood every Allied 
attack since the Marne. The German general staff could now foresee 
the complete elimination of Russia, the possibility of defeating Italy 
before the end of the year and, finally, the campaign of 1918 against 
the French and British on the western front which might terminate the 
war. 

It can not be said that German hopes of final victory were ex- 
travagant, either as viewed at that time or as viewed in the light of 
history. Financial problems of the Allies were difficult, supplies were 
becoming exhausted and their armies had suffered tremendous losses. 
Discouragement existed not only among the civil population but through- 
out the armies as well. Such was the Allied morale that, although 
their superiority on the western front during the last half of 1916 and 
during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local attacks could be 
undertaken and their effect proved wholly insufficient against the Ger- 
man defense. Allied resources in man power at home were low and 
there was little prospect of materially increasing their armed strength, 
even in the face of the probability of having practically the whole 
ae strength of the Central Powers against them in the spring of 
1918. 

8. This was the state of affairs that existed when we entered the 
war. While our action gave the Allies much encouragement yet this 
was temporary, and a. review of conditions made it apparent that 
America must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible. 
After duly considering the tonnage possibilities I cabled the following 
to Washington on July 6, 1917:. 








Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men 
by next May. 


ORGANIZATION PROJECTS. 


9. A general organization project, covering as far as possible the 
personnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units, was forwarded 
to Washington on July 11. This was prepared by the Operations 
Section of my staff and adopted in joint conference with the War 
Department Committee then in France. It embodied my conclusions 
on the military organization and effort required of America after a 
careful study of French and British experience. In forwarding this 
project I stated: 


{t is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 is the smallest unit 
which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced, and inde- 
pendent fighting organization. However, it must be equally clear 
that the adoption of this size force as a basis of study should not 
be construed as representing the maximum force which should be 
sent to or which will be needed in France. It is taken as the force 
which may be expected to reach France in time for an offensive 
in 1918, and as a unit and basis of organization. Plans for the 
future should be based, especially in reference to the manufacture 
of artillery, aviation, and other material, on three times this force 


—i. e., at least 3,000,000 men. 


The original project for organized combat units and its state of 
completion on November I1, 1918, are shown in the charts appended 
to this report. With a few minor changes, this project remained our 
guide until the end. 

10. While this general organization project provided certain Serv- 
ices of Supply troops, which were an integral part of the larger combat 
units, it did not include the great body of troops and services required 
to maintain an army overseas. To disembark 2,000,000 men, move 
them to their training areas, shelter them, handle and store the quantities 
of supplies and equipment they required called for an extraordinary 
and immediate effort in construction. To provide the organization for 
this purpose, a project for engineer services of the rear, including rail- 
ways, was cabled to Washington August 5, 1917, followed on Septem- 
ber 18, 1917, by a complete service of the rear project, which listed 
item by item the troops considered necessary for the Services of Supply. 
Particular attention is invited to the charts herewith, which show the 
extent to which this project had developed by November I], 1918, 


and the varied units required, many of which did not exist in our Army 
prior to this war. 

11. In order that the War Department might have a clear-cut 
program to follow in the shipment of personnel and material to insure 
the gradual building up of a force at all times balanced and symmetrical, 
a comprehensive statement was prepared covering the order in which the 
troops and services enumerated in these two projects should arrive. 
This schedule of priority of shipments, forwarded to the War Depart- 
ment on October 7, divided the initial force called for by the two 
projects, the service of the rear project, and the schedule of priority of 
each. 

The importance of the three documents, the general organization 
project, the service of the rear project, and the schedule of priority of 
shipments should be emphasized, because they formed the basic plan 
for providing an army in France together with its material for combat, 
construction, and supply. 


AMERICAN FRONT AND LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. 


12. Before developing plans for a line of communications it was 
necessary to decide upon the probable sector of the front for the eventual 
employment of a distinctive American force. Our mission was offensive 
and it was essential to make plans for striking the enemy where a 
definite military decision could be gained. While the Allied Armies 
had endeavored to maintain the offensive, the British, in order to guard 
the Channel ports, were committed to operations in Flanders and the 
French to the portion of the front protecting Paris. Both lacked troops 
to operate elsewhere on a large scale. 

To the east the great fortified district of Verdun and around Metz 
menaced central France, protected the most exposed portion of the 
German line of communications, that between Metz and Sedan, and 
covered the Briey iron region, from which the enemy obtained the 
greater part of the iron required fer munitions and material. The 
coal fields east of Metz were also covered by these same defenses. A 
deep advance east of Metz or the capture of the Briey region, by 
threatening the invasion of rich German territory in the Moselle Valley 
and the Saar Basin, thus curtailing her supply of coal or iron, would 
have a decisive effect in forcing a withdrawal of German troops from 
northern France. ‘The military and economic situation of the enemy, 
therefore, indicated Lorraine as the field promising the most fruitful 
results for the employment of our armies. 

13. The complexity of trench life had enormously increased the 
tonnage of supplies required by troops. Not only was it a question 


of providing food but enormous quantities of munitions and material 
were needed. Upon the railroads of France fell the burden of meeting 
the heavy demands of the three and one-half million Allied combatants 
then engaged. 

The British were crowding the Channel ports and the French were 
exploiting the manufacturing center of Paris, so that the railroads 
of northern France were already much overtaxed. Even though the 
Channel ports might be used to a limited extent for shipments through 
England, the railroads leading eastward would have to cross British 
and French zones of operation, thus making the introduction of a line 
of communications based on ports and railways in that region quite 
impracticable. If the American Army was to have an independent 
and flexible system it could not use the lines behind the British-Belgian 
front nor those in rear of the French front covering Paris. 

The problem confronting the American Expeditionary Forces was 
then to superimpose its rail communications on those of France where 
there would be the least possible disturbance to the arteries of supply 
of the two great Allied armies already in the field. This would 
require the utmost use of those lines of the existing French railroad 
system that could bear an added burden. Double-track railroad lines 
from the ports of the Loire and the Gironde Rivers unite at Bourges, 
running thence via Nevers, Dijon, and Neufchateau, with lines radiat- 
ing therefrom toward the right wing of the Allied front. It was 
estimated that these with the collateral lines available, after considerable 
improvement, could handle an additional 50,000 tons per day, required 
for an army of 2,000,000 men. The lines selected, therefore, were 
those leading from the comparatively unused south-Atlantic ports of 
France to the northeast where it was believed the American Armies 
could be employed to the best advantage. 

14. In the location of our main depots of supply, while it was 
important that they should be easily accessible, yet they must also be 
at a safe distance, as we were to meet an aggressive enemy capable 
of taking the offensive in any one of several directions. The area 
embracing Tours, Orleans, Montargis, Nevers, and Chateauroux was 
chosen, as it was centrally located with regard to all points on the 
arc of the western front. 

The ports of St. Nazarie, La Pallice, and Bassens were designated 
for permanent use, while Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac were for 
emergency use. Several smaller ports, such as St. Malo, Sables- 
d’Olonne, and Bayonne, were available chiefly for the importation of 
coal from England. From time to time, certain trans-Atlantic ships 
were sent to Le Havre and Cherbourg. In anticipation of a large 
increase in the amount of tonnage that might be required later, arrange- 


ments were made during the German offensive of 1918 to utilize the 
ports of Marseilles and Toulon as well as other smaller ports on the 
Mediterranean. 

For all practical purposes the American Expeditionary Forces were 
based on the American Continent. Three thousand miles of ocean 
to cross with the growing submarine menace confronting us, the quantity 
of ship tonnage that would be available then unknown and a line of 
communications by land 400 miles long from French ports to our 
probable front presented difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable 
as compared with those of our Allies. 


15. For purposes of local administration our line of communica- 


tions in France was subdivided into districts or sections. The territory 
corresponding to and immediately surrounding the principal ports were, 
respectively called base sections, with an intermediate section embracing 
the region of the great storage depots and an advance section extending to 
the zone of operations, within which the billeting and training areas for 
our earlier divisions were located. 

_ 16. In providing for the storage and distribution of reserve supplies 
an allowance of 45 days in the base sections was planned, with 30 
days in the intermediate section and 15 days in the advance section. 
After the safety of our sea transport was practically assured, this was 
reduced to a total of 45 days, distributed proportionately. When the 
Armistice was signed all projects for construction had been completed 
and supplies were on hand to meet the needs of 2,000,000 men, while 
further plans for necessary construction and for the supply of an addi- 


tional 2,000,000 were well under way. 


GENERAL STAFF. 


17. The organization of the General Staff and supply services 
was one of the first matters to engage my attention. Our situation in 
this regard was wholly unlike that of our Allies. The French Army 
was at home and in close touch with its civil government and war 
department agencies. While the British were organized on an overseas 
basis, they were within easy reach of their base of supplies in England. 
Their problems of supply and replacement were simple as compared 
with ours. Their training could be carried out at home with the ex- 
perience of the front at hand, while our troops must be sent as ships 
were provided and their training resumed in France where discontinued 
in the States. Our available tonnage was inadequate to meet all the 
initial demands, so that priority of material for combat and construc- 
tion, as well as for supplies that could not be purchased in Europe, 
must be established by those whose persnective included all the services 


= 





and who were familiar with general plans. For the proper direction 

and coordination of the details of administration, intelligence, operations, 

supply, and training, a General Staff was an indispensable part of the 
rmy. 

The functions of the General Staff at my headquarters were finally 
allotted to the five sections, each under an Assistant Chief of Staff, as 
follows: To the First, or Administrative Section—ocean tonnage, 
priority of overseas shipments, replacement of men and animals, organ- 
ization and types of equipment for troops, billeting, prisoners of war, 
military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work and amusements; 
to the Second, or Intelligent Section—information regarding the enemy, 
including espionage and counterespionage, maps, and censorship; to the 
Third, or Operations Secticn—strategic studies and plans and employ- 
ment of combat troops; to the Fourth Section—coordination of supply 
services, including Construction, Transportation, and Medical Depart- 
ments, and control of regulating stations for supply; to the Fifth, or 
Training Section—tactical training, schools, preparation of tactical 
manuals, and athletics. This same system was applied in the lower 
echelons of the command down to include divisions, except that in 
corps and divisions the Fourth Section was merged with the First and 
the Fifth Section with the Third. 

18. As the American Expeditionary Forces grew, it was considered 
advisable that, in matters of procurement, transportation, and supply, 
the chiefs of the several supply services, who had hitherto been under 
the General Staff at my headquarters, should be placed directly under 
the supervision of the commanding general, Services of Supply. At 
General Headquarters, a Deputy Chief of Staff to assist the Chief of 
Staff was provided, and the heads of the five General Staff sections 
became Assistant Chiefs of Staff. 

The General Staff at my headquarters thereafter concerned itself 
with the broader phase of control. Under my general supervision and 
pursuant to clearly determined policies, the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
coordinated by the Chief of Staff, issued instructions and gave general 
direction to the great combat units and to the Services of Supply, keeping 
always in close touch with the manner and promptness of their fulfill- 
ment. Thus a system of direct responsibility was put into operation 
which contemplated secrecy in preparation, prompt decision in emergency, 
and coordinate action in execution. 

19. With the growth of our forces the demand for staff officers 
rapidly increased, but the available number of officers trained for staff 
duty was very limited. To meet this deficiency, a General Staff college 
was organized at Langres on November 28, 1917, for the instruction 
of such officers as could be spared. An intensive course of study of 





three months was prescribed embracing the details of our staff organiza- 
tion, and administration, and our system of supply, and teaching the com- 
bined employment of all arms and services in combat. Officers were care- 
fully chosen for their suitability and, considering the short time available 
graduates from this school returned well equipped for staff duties and with 
a loyal spirit of common service much accentuated. The Staff College 
carried to completion four courses of three months each, graduating 537 
staff officers. 


TRAINING. 


20. Soon after our arrival in Europe careful study was made of 
the methods followed by our Allies in training combat troops. Both 
the French and British maintained continuously a great system of 
schools and training centers, which provided for both theoretical and 
practical instruction of inexperienced officers and noncommissioned of- 
ficers. These centers were required not only to train new troops, but 
to prepare officers and soldiers for advancement by giving them a short 
course in the duties of their new grades. These schools systems made 
it possible to spread rapidly a knowledge of the latest methods developed 
by experience and at the same time counteract false notions. 

21. A similar scheme was adopted in August, 1917, for our Armies 
in which the importance of teaching throughout our forces a sound 
fighting doctrine of our own was emphasized. It provided for troop 
training in all units up to include divisions. Corps centers of instruc- 
tion for noncommissioned officers and unit commanders of all arms 
were established. These centers also provided special training for the 
instructors needed at corps schools. Base training centers for replace- 
ment troops and special classes of soldiers, such as cooks and mechanics, 
were designated. The army and corps schools were retained under the 
direct supervision of the Training Section, General Staff. The schools 
mentioned graduated 21,330 noncommissioned officers and 13,916 
officers. 

Particular care was taken to search the ranks for the most promising 
soldiers, in order to develop leaders for the command of platoons and 
companies. There were graduated from these candidate schools in 
France 10,976 soldiers. It was planned to have 22,000 infantrymen 
under instruction by January 1, 1919, graduating 5,000 to 6,000 each 
month. In addition, there were to be graduated monthly 800 artillery- 
men, 400 engineers, and 200 signalmen, making a total of about 7,000 
soldiers each month. Prior to November 14, 1918, 12,732 soldiers 
were commissioned as officers. 

It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it represents 


a compromise between the demand for efficiency and the imperative 
and immediate necessity for trained replacement officers. 

22. Every advantage was taken of the experience of our Allies 
in training ofhcers. It was early recommended to the War Depart- 
ment that French and Bnitish officers be asked for to assist in the 
instruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organization 
_ and development of our own schools, a large number of our officers 
were sent to centers of instruction of the Allied armies. The training 
of our earlier divisions was begun in close association with the French 
divisions, under conditions set forth in the following paragraph on divi- 
sional training: 


Trench warfare naturally gives prominence to the defensive as 
opposed to the offensive. To guard against this, the basis of in- 
struction should be essentially the offensive both in spirit and in 
practice. The defensive is accepted only to prepare for future 
offensive. 


For training our Artillery units, special localities such as Valdahon, 
Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge, had to be sought, and the instruc- 
tion was usually carried on in conjunction with French artillery followed 
up later, as far as possible, with field practice in cooperation with our 
own Infantry. 

23. The long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon 
the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with 
training for open warfare. It was to avoid this result in our Army and 
to encourage the offensive spirit that the following was published in 


October, 1917: 


| * * * (a) The above methods to be employed must 
remain or become distinctly our own. 

(b) All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a 
vigorous offensive. This purpose will be emphasized in every 
phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought. 

(c) The general principles governing combat remain un- 
changed in their essence. This war has developed special features 
which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas 
enunciated in our Drill Regulations, Small Arms Firing Manual, 
Field Service Regulations, and other service manuals remain the 
guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard 
by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified 
in detail by instruction from these headquarters. 

(d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of 
the infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill 


as a marksman, both on the target range and in the field firing. An 
aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself, 
as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle. 

(e) A\ll officers and soldiers should realize that at no time 
in our history has discipline been so important; therefore, discipline 
of the highest order must be exacted at all times. The standards 
for the American Army will be those of West Point. The rigid 
attention, upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedi- 
ence to instructions required of the cadet will be required of every 
officer and soldier of our armies in France. * + 


Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the im- 
portance of target practice and musketry training, and recommending 
that instruction in open warfare be made the mission of troops in the 
United States, while the training in trench warfare so far as necessary 
be conducted in France. Succeeding divisions, whether serving tem- 
porarily with the British or French, were trained as thus indicated. The 
assistance of the French units was limited to demonstrations, and, in the 
beginning French instructors taught the use of French arms and assisted 
in the preparation of elementary trench warfare problems. 

Assuming that divisions would arrive with their basic training com- 
pleted in the United States, one month was allotted for the instruction 
of small units from battalions down, a second month of experience in 
quiet sectors by battalions, and a third month for field practice in open 
warfare tactics by division, including artillery. Unfortunately many 
divisions did not receive the requisite amount of systematic training before 
leaving the States and complete preparation of such units for battle was 
thus often seriously delayed. , 

24. The system of training profoundly influenced the combat efh- 
ciency of our troops by its determined insistence upon an offensive 
doctrine and upon training in warfare movement. — Instruction which had 
hitherto been haphazard, varying with the ideas and conceptions of 
inexperienced commanding officers and indifferent instructors, was brought 
under a system based on correct principles. Approved and systematic 
methods were maintained and enforced largely by the continual presence 
of members of the Training Section with the troops both during the 
training period and in campaign. 


“IN FELGEIGENCES 


25. Before our entry into the war, European experience had shown 
that military operations can be carried out successfully and without 
unnecessary loss only in the light of complete and reliable informa- 


ae ae 





tion of the enemy. Warfare with battle lines separated by short dis- 
tances only, made possible the early acquirement of information, such as 
that obtained through airplane photography, observation from balloons 
and planes, sensitive instruments for detecting gun positions and raids 
to secure prisoners and documents. All such information, together 


_ with that from Allied sources, including military, political, and econom- 


ical, was collected, classified, and rapidly distributed where needed. 


26. From careful studies of the systems and actual participation 
by our officers in methods in use at various Allied headquarters, an 
Intelligence Service was evolved in our forces which operated success- 
fully from its first organization in August, 1917. 

With us the simpler methods, such as observation from the air and 
ground and the exploitation of prisoners and documents, have proved 
more effective than the less direct means. Every unit from the battalion 
up had an intelligence department, but only in divisions and larger 
organizations did the intelligence agencies embrace all available means 
and sources, including radio interception stations and sound and flash- 
ranging detachments. 

27. The subjects studied by the Intelligence Section embraced 
the location of the enemy’s front line, his order of battle, the history 
and fighting value of his divisions, his manpower, his combat activities, 
circulation and movement, his defensive organizations, supply, con- 
struction and material, air service, radio service, strategy and tactics, 
and what he probably knew of our intentions. The political and 
economic conditions within the enemies’ countries were also of extreme 
importance. 

28. To disseminate conclusions, daily publications were necessary, 
such as a Secret Summary of Intelligence containing information of 
the broadest scope, which concerned only General Headquarters; and 
a Summary of Information, distributed down to include the divisions, 
giving information affecting the western front. A Press Review and a 
Summary of Air Intelligence were also published. 

Maps showing graphically the disposition and movement of enemy 
troops in our front were the best means for distributing information 
to our troops. At the base printing plant and at General Headquarters 
base maps were prepared while mobile printing plants, mounted on 
trucks, accompanied corps and army headquarters. Combat troops 
were thus supplied with excellent maps distributed, just before and 
during an attack, down to include company and platoon commanders. 


Between July | and November 11, 1918, over 5,000,000 maps 


were used. 


29. The secret service, espionage and counterespionage, was organ- 
ized in close cooperation with the French and British. ‘To prevent 
indiscretions in the letters of officers and soldiers, as well as in articles 
written for the press, the Censorship Division was created. The 
Base Censor examined individual letters when the writer so desired, 
censored all mail written in foreign languages, of which there were 
over 50 used, and frequently checked up letters of entire organizations. 

30. The policy of press censorship adopted aimed to accomplish 
three broad results: 


To prevent the enemy from obtaining important information of our 
forces. 

To give to the people of the United States the maximum information 
consistent with the limitations imposed by the first object. 

To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as they 
were known at the time. 

There were with our forces 36 regularly accredited correspondents, 
while visiting correspondents reached a total of 411. 


SUMMER OF 1917 TO SPRING OF 1918. 


31. In order to hinder the enemy’s conquest of Russia and, if 
possible, prevent a German attack on Italy, or in the near east, the 
Allies sought to maintain the offensive on the western front as far 
as their diminished strength and morale would permit. On June 7, 
1917, the British took Messines, while a succession of operations 
known as the Third Battle of Ypres began on July 31 and terminated 
with the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge November 6-10. The 
British attack at Cambrai is of special interest, since it was here that 
American troops (Eleventh Engineers) first participated in active 
fighting. 

The French successfully attacked on a limited front near Verdun, 
capturing Mort Homme on August 20 and advancing their lines to 
La Forge Brook. In another offensive, begun on October 23, they 
gained considerable ground on Chemin des Dames Ridge. These French 
attacks were characterized by most careful preparation to insure success 
in order to improve the morale of their troops. 

32. Notwithstanding these Allied attacks on the western front, 
the immense gains by the German armies in the east, culminating at 
Riga on September 3, precipitated the collapse of Russia. The follow- 
ing month, the Austrians with German assistance surprised the Italians 
and broke through the lines at Caporetto, driving the Italian armies 
back to the Piave River, inflicting a loss of 300,000 men, 600,000 


rifles, 3,000 guns, and enormous stores. ‘This serious crisis compelled 


the withdrawal of 10 French and British divisions from the western 
front to Italy. The German situation on all other theaters was so 
favorable that as early as November they began the movement of 
divisions toward the western front. If needed, her divisions could be 
withdrawn from the Italian front before the French and British dared 
recall their divisions. 

33. At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large American 
Army. Marshal Joffre during his visit to America had made special 
request that a combat division be sent at once to Europe as visual 
evidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war, and also 
asked for Engineer regiments and other special service units. 

The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain of its 
elements in Paris on July 4 caused great enthusiasm and for the 
time being French morale was stimulated. Still Allied apprehension 
was deep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The follow- 
ing extract is quoted from the cabled summary of an Allied conference 
held on July 26 with the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief and 
the British and French Chiefs of Staff: 


General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of 
purely defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and. withdrawing 
surplus troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening 
western front believed Allies could hold until American forces 
arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendency. 


The conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situation 
with a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With 
the approach of winter, depression among the Allies over the Russian 
collapse and the Italian crisis was intensified by the conviction that the 
Germans would undertake a decisive offensive in the spring. 

A review of the situation showed that with Russia out of the war 
the Central Powers would be able to release a large number of divisions 
for service elsewhere, and that during the spring and summer of 1918, 
without interfering with the status quo at Salonika, they could con- 
centrate on the western front a force much stronger than that of the 
Allies. In view of this, it was represented to the War Department 
in December as of the utmost importance that the Allied preparations 
be expedited. 

34. On December 31, 1917, there were 176,665 American 
troops in France and but one division had appeared on the front. 
Disappointment at the delay of the American effort soon began to 


develop. French and British authorities suggested the more rapid 
entry of our troops into the line and urged the amalgamation of our 
troops with their own, even insisting upon the curtailment of training 
to conform to the strict minimum of trench requirements they con- 
sidered necessary. 

My conclusion was that, although the morale of the German people 
and of the armies was better than it had been for two years, only 
an untoward combination of circumstances could give the enemy a 
decisive victory before American support as recommended could be 
made effective, provided the Allies secured unity of action. How- 
ever, a situation might arise which would necessitate the temporary use 
of all American troops in the units of our Allies for the defensive, but 
nothing in the situation justified the relinquishment of our firm purpose 
to form our own Army under our own flag. 

While the Germans were practicing for open warfare and con- 
centrating their most aggressive personnel in shock divisions, the train- 
ing of the Allies was still limited to trench warfare. As our troops 
were being trained for open warfare, there was every reason why 
we could not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even by 
divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer necessity. 
Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably commit Amer- 
ica’s fortunes to the hands of the Allies. Moreover it was obvious 
that the lack of homogeneity would render these mixed divisions diffi- 
cult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under stress of defeat, 
with the consequent mutual recrimination. Again, there was no doubt 
that the realization by the German people that independent American 
divisions, corps, or armies were in the field with determined purpose 
would be a severe blow to German morale and prestige. 

It was also certain that an early appearance of the larger Amer- 
ican units on the front would be most beneficial to the morale of the 
Allies themselves. Accordingly, the First Division, on January 19, 
1918, took over a sector north of Toul; the Twenty-sixth Division 
went to the Soissons front early in February; the Forty-second Division 
entered the line near Luneville, February 21, and the Second Division 
near Verdun, March 18. Meanwhile, the First Army Corps Head- 
quarters, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, commanding, was organized at 
Neufchateau on January 20, and the plan to create an independent 
American sector on the Lorraine front was taking shape. 

This was the situation when the great German offensive was launched 


on March 21, 1918. 








PART II. 
OPERATIONS. 
EXPEDITING SHIPMENT OF TROOPS. 


1. The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send 
to France by June 15, 1918, 21 divisions of the then strength of 
20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops, and 
those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over 200,000, 
making a total of some 650,000 men. Beginning with October, 6 
divisions were to be sent during that quarter, 7 during the first quarter 
of 1918, and 8 the second quarter. While these numbers fell short 
of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 
1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the 
main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to become 
available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage 
required to supply the Allies with steel, coal, and food. 

On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled 
to the War Department with the following recommendation: 


Paragraph 3. In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost 
importance to the Allied cause that we move swiftly. The mini- 
mum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the 
end of June is 4 Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops 
for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon 
Gen. Bliss and other American members of the conference. Gens. 
Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum 
that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we 
should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of 
available transportation would not seem to warrant it. 

Paragraph 4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient 
American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do 
so there must be a reduction in the tonnage allotted to other than 
Army needs. . It is estimated that the shipping needed will have 
to be rapidly increased up to 2,000,000 tons by May, in addition 
to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial 
purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are 
very weak and we must come to their relief this year, 1918. The 
year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on 
until 1919 unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is 
therefore strongly recommended that a complete readjustment of 
transportation be made and that the needs of the War Depart- 


ment as set forth above be regarded as immediate. Further details 
of these requirements will be sent later. 


and again on December 20, 1917: 


Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage 
in sight prepared in War College Division in September contem- 
plated that entire First Corps with its corps troops and some 
32,000 auxiliaries were to have been shipped by end of November, 
and that an additional program for December, January, and Feb- 
ruary contemplates that the shipment of the Second Corps with its 
corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by 
the end of February. Should such a program be carried out as 
per schedule and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, 
it would not succeed in placing even three complete corps, with 
proper proportion of Army troops and auxiliaries, in France by the 
end of May. ‘The actual facts are that shipments are not even 
keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December 
and the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions * 
and many corps troops. It can not be too emphatically declared 
that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps 
by June 30. In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore 
available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by 
most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a 
position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of 
fact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspond- 
ingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, 
and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with tonnage now 
available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage 
should be obtained at once as already recommended in my cables 


and by Gen. Bliss. 


3. During January, 1918, discussions were held with the British 
authorities that resulted in an agreement, which became known as the 
six-division plan and which provided for the transportation of six entire 
divisions in British tonnage, without interference with our own shipping 
program. High commanders, staff, Infantry, and auxiliary troops 
were to be given experience with British divisions, beginning with 
battalions, the Artillery to be trained under American direction, using 
French matériel. It was agreed that when sufficiently trained these 
battalions were to be re-formed into regiments and that when the Artillery 
was fully trained all of the units comprising each division were to be 


*The First, Forty-second, Second, and Twenty-sixth Divisions had arrived; but 
not the Replacement and the Depot Divisions, 


united for service under their own officers. It was planned that the 
period of training with the British should cover about 10 weeks. To 
supervise the administration and training of these divisions the Second 
Corps staff was organized February 20, 1918 

In the latter part of January joint note No. 12, presented by the 
Military Representatives with the Supreme War Council was approved 
by the Council. This note concluded that France would be safe 
during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely: 


(a) That the strength of the British and French troops in 
France are continuously kept up to their present total strength 
and that they receive the expected reinforcements of not less than 
two American divisions per month. 


THE GERMAN OFFENSIVES OF 1918 AND RELATED 
ALLIED AGREEMENTS. 


4. The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, 
overran all resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within 
eight days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield 


and had swept everything before him to a depth of some 56 kilometers.: 


For a few days the loss of the railroad center of Amiens appeared 
imminent. The offensive made such inroads upon French and Briiish 
reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless the new American 
troops should prove more immediately. available than even the most 
optimistic had dared to hope. On March 27 the Military Representa- 
tives with the Supreme War Council prepared their joint note No. 18. 
This note repeated the previously quoted statement from joint note No. 
12, and continued: 


The battle which is developing at the present moment in France, 
and which can extend to the other theaters of operations, may 
very quickly place the Allied Armies in a serious situation from 
the point of view of effectives, and the Military Representatives 
are from this moment of opinion that the above-detailed condi- 
tion (see (a) par. 3) can no longer be maintained, and they 
consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires 
new decisions. 

The Military Representatives are of opinion that it is highly 
desirable that the American Government should assist the Allied 
Armies as soon as possible by permitting in principle the tem- 
porary service of American units in Allied Army corps and di- 
visions. Such reinforcements must, however, be obtained from 
other units than those American divisions which are now operat- 


ing with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must 
eventually be returned to the American Army. 

The Military Representatives are of the opinion that from the 
present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise di- 
rected by the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and 
machine-gun units, organized as that Government may decide, be 
brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto 
made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly. 


The Secretary of War, who was in France at this time, Gen. Bliss, 
the American Military Representative with the Supreme War Council, 
and I at once conferred on the terms of this note, with the result that 
the Secretary recommended to the President that joint note No. 18 be 
approved in the following sense: 


The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest 
cooperation and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the 
Military Representatives with regard to the preferential trans- 
portation of American infantry and machine-gun units in the present 
emergency is approved. Such units, when transported, will be 
under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American 
Expeditionary Forces, and will be assigned for training and use by 
him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military 
forces of the United States under his command in such manner as 
to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always 
the determination of this Government to have its various military 
forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military sit- 
uation permits, into an independent American Army, acting in 
concert with the armies of Great Britain and France, and all 
arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service 
will be made with that end in view. 


While note No. 18 was general in its terms, the priority of ship- 
ments of infantry more especially pertained to those divisions that were 
to be trained in the British area, as that Government was to provide 
the additional shipping according to the six-division plan agreed upon 
even before the beginning of the March 21 offensive. 

On Apri! 2 the War Department cabled that preferential trans- 
portation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun units 
during the existing emergency. Preliminary arrangements were made 
for training and early employment with the French of such infantry 
units as might be sent over by our own transportation. As for the 
British agreement, the six-division plan was to be modified to give pri- 
ority to the infantry of those divisions. However, all the Allies were 








> 
pe 


now urging the indefinite continuation of priority for the shipment of 
infantry and its complete incorporation in their units, which fact was 
cabled to the War Department on April 3, with the specific recom- 
mendation that the total immediate priority of infantry be limited to four 
divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the necessity for future 
priority be determined later. 

5. The Secretary of War and I held a conference with British 
authorities on April 7, during which it developed that the British had 
erroneously assumed that the preferential shipment of infantry was to 
be continuous. It was agreed at this meeting that 60,000 infantry and 
machine-gun troops, with certain auxiliary units to be brought over by 
British tonnage during April, should go to the British area as part of 
the six-division plan, but that there should be a further agreement as 


‘to subsequent troops to be brought over by the British. Consequently, 


a readjustment of the priority schedule was undertaken on the basis of 
postponing ‘‘shipment of all noncombatant troops to the utmost possible 
to meet present situation, and at the same time not make it impossible 
to build up our own Army.” 

6. The battle line in the vicinity of Amiens had hardly stabilized 
when, on April 9, the Germans made another successful attack against 
the British lines on a front of some 40 kilometers in the vicinity of 
Armentieres and along the Lys River. As a result of its being included 
in a salient formed by the German advance, Passchendaele Ridge, the 
capture of which had cost so dearly in 1917, was evacuated by the 
Bnitish on April 17. 

The losses had been heavy and the British were unable to replace 
them entirely. They were, therefore, making extraordinary efforts to 
increase the shipping available for our troops. On April 21, I went to 
London to clear up certain questions concerning the rate of shipment 
and to reach the further agreement provided for in the April 7 con- 
ference. The result of this London agreement was cabled to Washing- 
ton April 24, ‘as follows: 


(a) That only the infantry, machine guns, engineers, and sig- 
nal troops of American divisions and the headquarters of divisions 
and brigades be sent over in British and American shipping dur- 
ing May for training and service with the British army in France 
up to six divisions and that any shipping in excess of that required 
for these troops be utilized to transport troops necessary to make 
these divisions complete. The training and service of these troops 
will be carried out in accordance with plans already agreed upon 
between Sir Douglas Haig and Gen. Pershing, with a view at an 
early date of building up American divisions. 


(b) That the American personnel of the artillery of these di- 
visions and such corps troops as may be required to build up 
American corps organizations follow immediately thereafter, and 
that American artillery personnel be trained with French materiel 
and join its proper divisions as soon as thoroughly trained. 

(c) If, when the program outlined in paragraphs (a) and (b) 
is completed, the military situation makes advisable the further ship- 
ment of infantry, etc., of American divisions, then all the British 
and American shipping available for transport of troops shall be 
used for that purpose under such arrangement as will insure im- 
mediate aid to the Allies, and at the same time provide at the 
earliest moment for bringing over American artillery and other 
necessary units to complete the organization of American divisions 
and corps. Provided that the ccmbatant troops mentioned in (a) 
and (b) be followed by such Service of the Rear and other troops 
as may be considered necessary by the American Commander-in- 
Chief. 

(d) That it is contemplated American divisions and corps when 
trained and organized shall be utilized under the American Com- 
mander-in-Chief in an American group. 

(ec) That the American Commander-in-Chief shall allot Amer- 
ican troops to the French or British for training or train them with 
American units at his discretion, with the understanding that troops 
already transported by British shipping or included in the six di- 
visions mentioned in paragraph (a) are to be trained with the 
British Army, details as to rations, equipment, and transport to be 
determined by special agreement. 


7. Ata meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Abbeville 
May | and 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans 
with the French and British was reopened. An urgent appeal came 
from both French and Italian representatives for American replacements 
or units to serve with their armies. After prolonged discussion regard- 
ing this question and that of priority generally the following agreement 
was reached, committing the Council to an independent American Army 
and providing for the immediate shipment of certain troops: 


It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to 
carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American Army 
should be formed as early as possible under its own commander 
and under its own flag. In order to meet the present emergency 
it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as 
rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, as 
far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American 


Army, preference will be given to infantry and machine-gun units 
for training and service with the French and British Armies; 
with the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units 
are to be withdrawn and united with its own artillery and aux- 
iliary troops into divisions and corps at the direction of the Amer- 
ican Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France. : 

Subparagraph A. It is also agreed that during the month of 
May preferences should be given to the transportation of infantry 
and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess ton- 
nage shall be devoted to bringing over such other troops as may 
be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief. 

Subparagraph B. It is further agreed that this program shall 
be continued during the month of June upon condition that the 
British Government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 
130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June, with the un- 
derstanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the 
British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June 
shall be allocated for training and service as the American Com- 
mander-in-Chief may determine. 

Subparagraph C. It is also further agreed that if the British 
Government shall transport an excess of 150,000 men in June that 
such excess shall be infantry and machine-gun units, and that early 
in June there shall be a new review of the situation to determine 
further action. : 


The gravity of the situation had brought the Allies to a full realiza- 
tion of the necessity of providing all possible tonnage for the transporta- 
tion of American troops. Although their views were accepted to the 
extent of giving a considerable priority to infantry and machine gunners, 
the priority agreed upon as to this class of troops was not as extensive 
as some of them deemed necessary, and the Abbeville conference was 
adjourned with the understanding that the question of further priority 
would be discussed at a conference to be held about the end of May. 

8. The next offensive of the enemy was made between the Oise 
and Berry-au-Bac against the French instead of against the British, as 
was generally expected, and it came as a complete surprise. The initial 
Aisne attack, covering a front of 35 kilometers, met with remarkable 
success, as the German armies advanced no less than 50 kilometers in 
four days. On reaching the Marne that river was used as a defensive 
flank and the German advance was directed toward Paris. During the 
first days of June something akin to a panic seized the city and it was 


estimated that 1,000,000 people left during the spring of 1918. 


The further conference which had been agreed upon at Abbeville 
was held at Versailles on June | and 2. The opinion of our Allies as 
to the existing situation and the urgency of their insistence upon further 
priority for infantry and machine gunners are shown by the following 
message prepared by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and 
Italy, and agreed to by Gen. Foch: 


The Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain, now 
meeting at Versailles, desire to send the following message to the 


President of the United States: 


‘““We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson 
for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in ex- 
cess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered 
to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. 
The crisis, however, still continues. Gen. Foch has presented to 
us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the 
numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where !62 Allied 
divisions now oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and 
that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing 
the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to ex- 
treme straits to keep them up) there is a great danger of the war be- 
ing lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied 
as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops. He, there- 
fore, urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible 
number of infantry and machine gunners, in which respect the 
shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should 
continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and 
July to avert the immediate danger from an Allied defeat in the 
present campaign owing to the Allied reserves being exhausted 
before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the 
future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory 
in the war unless America is able to provide such an Army as will 
enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He 
places the total American force required for this at no less than 
100 divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American 
levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a 
month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 
divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done. 

‘We are satisfied that Gen. Foch, who is conducting the present 
campaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judg- 
ment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not over- 
estimating the needs of the case, and we feel confident that the 
Government of the United States will do everything that can be 








_ == Ss Se 


| 





done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation and to 
proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to 
provide, as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies regards as essential to 
ultimate victory.” 

A separate telegram contains the arrangements which Gen. Foch, 
Gen. Pershing, and Lord Milner have agreed to recommend to 
the United States Government with regard to the dispatch of 
American troops for the months of June and July. 

(Signed) CLEMENCEAU, 
D. LLoyp GEORGE, 
ORLANDO. 


Such extensive priority had already been given to the transport of 
American infantry and machine gunners that the troops of those cate- 
gories which had received even partial training in the United States 
were practically exhausted. Moreover, the strain on our Services of 
Supply made it essential that early relief be afforded by increasing its 
personnel. At the same time, the corresponding services of our Allies 
had in certain departments been equally overtaxed and their responsible 
heads were urgent in their representations that their needs must be 
relieved by bringing over American specialists. The final agreement 
was cabled to the War Department on June 5, as follows: 


The following agreement has been concluded between Gen. 
Foch, Lord Milner, and myself with reference to the transporta- 
tion of American troops in the months of June and July: 


“The following recommendations are made on the assumption 
that at least 250,000 men can be transported in each of the 
months of June and July by the employment of combined British 
and American tonnage. We recommend: 

(a) For the month of June: (1) Absolute priority shall be 
given to the transportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz, six 
divisions without artillery, ammunition trains, or supply trains, 
amounting to 126,000 men and 44,000 replacements for combat 
troops); (2) 25,400 men for the service of the railways, of 
which 13,400 have been asked for by the French Minister of 
Transportation; (3) the balance to be troops of categories to be 
determined by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary 
Forces. 

‘“(b) For the month of July: (1) Absolute priority for the 
shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined 
above (four divisions minus artillery ‘et cetera’ amounting to 


84,000 men, plus 56,000 replacement); (2) the balance of the 
250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the Commander- 
in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces. 

““(c) It is agreed that if the available tonnage in either month 
allows of the transportation of a larger number of men than 250,- 
000, the excess tonnage will be employed in the transportation of 
combat troops as defined above. 

‘““(d) We recognize that the combatant troops to be dis- 
patched in July may have to include troops which have had in- 
sufficient training, but we consider the present emergency is such 
as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United 
States from sound principles of training, especially as a similar 
course is being followed by France and Great Britain. 

(Signed) ‘“‘Focnu, 
“MILNER, 
““PERSHING.” 


9. The various proposals during these conferences regarding pri- 
ority of shipment, often very insistent, raised questions that were not 
only most difficult but most delicate. On the one hand, there was a 
critical situation which must be met by immediate action, while, on the 
other hand, any priority accorded a particular arm necessarily post- 
poned the formation of a distinctive American fighting force and the 
means to supply it. Such a force was, in my opinion, absolutely 
necessary to win the war. A few of the Allied representatives became 
convinced that the American Services of Supply should not be neg- 
lected but should be developed in the common interest. The success 
of our divisions during May and June demonstrated fully that it was 
not necessary to draft Americans under foreign flags in order to utilize 
American manhood most effectively. 


ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 
10. When, on March 21, 1918, the German Army on the western 


front began its series of offensives, it was by far the most formidable 
force the world had ever seen. In fighting men and guns it had a great 
superiority, but this was of less importance than the advantage in 
morale, in experience, in training for mobile warfare, and in unity of 
command. Ever since the collapse of the Russian armies and the 
crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German armies were 
being assembled and trained for the great campaign which was to end 
the war before America’s effort could be brought to bear. Germany's 
best troops, her most successful generals, and all the experience gained 
in three years of war were mobilized for the supreme effort. 


The first blow fell on the right of the British Armies, including the 
junction of the British and French forces. Only the prompt coopera- 
tion of the French and British general headquarters stemmed the tide. 
The reason for this objective was obvious and strikingly illustrated the 
necessity for having someone with sufficient authority over all the Allied 
Armies to meet such an emergency. The lack of complete cooperation 
among the Allies on the western front had been appreciated and the 
question of preparation to meet a crisis had already received attention 
by the Supreme War Council. A plan had been adopted by which 
each of the Allies would furnish a certain number of divisions for a 
general reserve to be under the direction of the military representatives 
of the Supreme War Council of which Gen. Foch was then the senior 
member. But when the time came to meet the German offensive in 
March these reserves were not found available and the plan failed. 

This situation resulted in a conference for the immediate considera- 
tion of the question of having an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Afier 
much discussion during which my view favoring such action was clearly 
stated, an agreement was reached and Gen. Foch was selected. His 
appointment as such was made April 3 and was approved for the United 
States by the President on April 16. The terms of the agreement 
under which Gen. Foch exercised his authority were as follows: 


Beauvais, April 3, 1978. 
Gen. Foch is charged by the British, French, and American 


Governments with the coordination cf the action of the Allied 
Armies on the western front; to this end there is conferred on him 
all the powers necessary for its effective realization. ‘To the same 
end, the British, French, and American Governments confide in 
Gen. Foch the strategic direction of military operations. 

The Commander-in-Chief of the British, French, and American 
Armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction -of 
their armies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right to 
appeal to his Government, if in his opinion his Army is placed in 
danger by the instructions received from Gen. Foch. 


(Signed) G. CLEMENCEAU. 
PETAIN. 
F. Focu. 
LLoyp GEORGE. 
D. Haic, F. M. 
Henry WILSON, General, 3.4.18. 
TASKER H. Biss, General and Chief of Staff. 
JoHN J. PERSHING, General, U. S. A. 


EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS FROM 
MARCH TO SEPTEMBER, 1918. 


11. The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive 
caused me to make a hurried visit to Gen. Foch’s headquarters, at 
Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his 
disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our 
troops along the Allied front and a consequent delay in building up a 
distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation of the 
Allies demanded this divergence from our plans. 

On March 21, approximately 300,000 American troops had reached 
France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French 
or British divisions, were available—the First and Second then in line, 
and the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second just withdrawn from line after 
one month’s trench warfare training. The last two divisions at once 
began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions for the battle; the 
Twenty-sixth relieved the First Division, which was sent to northwest of 
Paris in reserve; the Forty-second relieved two French divisions from 
quiet sectors. In addition to these troops, one regiment of the Ninety- 
third Division was with the French in the Argonne, the Forty-first Depot 
Division was in the Services of Supply, and three divisons (Third, 
Thirty-second, and Fifth) were arriving. 

12. On April 25 the First Division relieved two French divisions 
on the front near Montdidier and on May 28 captured the important 
observation stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid dash. 
French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers aided in the attack, 
but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the comple- 
tion of the operation in order to meet the enemy’s new offensive launched 
May 27 toward Chateau-Thierry. The enemy reaction against our 
troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was deter- 
mined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American 
success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers were 
concentrated on our new position and counterattack succeeded counter- 
attack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at 
Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the 
numbers involved. 

13. Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first German 
offensive began, the Thirty-second, intended for replacements, had been 
temporarily employed in the Services of Supply to meet a shortage of 
personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be reassembled and 
by May 21 it was entering the line in the Vosges. At this time the 
Fifth Division, though still incomplete, was also ordered into the line in 
the same region. The Third Division was assembling in its training 








area and the Third Corps staff had just been organized to administer 
these three divisions. In addition to the eight divisions already men- 
tioned, the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh had arrived in the 
British area, and the Fourth, Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-third, 
Thirty-fifth, and Eighty-second were arriving there. Following the 
agreements as to British shipping, our troops came so rapidly that by 
the end of May we had a force of 600,000 in France. 

The Third German offensive on May 27, against the French on the 
Aisne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The Second 
Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the 
First Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, 
and, early on the morning of June |, was deployed across the Chateau- 
Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French 
line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same 
time the partially trained Third Division was placed at French disposal 
to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motorized machine-gun bat- 
talion succeeded in reaching Chateau-Thierry in time to assist in suc- 
cessfully defending that river crossing. 

The enemy having been halted, the Second Division commenced a 
series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture of 
Belleau Woods after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches 
was taken soon after, and on July | Vaux was captured. In these 
operations the Second Division met with most desperate resistance by 
Germany’s best troops. 

14. To meet the March offensive, the French had extended their 
front from the Oise to Amiens, about 60 kilometers, and during the 
German drive along the Lys had also sent reinforcements to assist the 
British. The French lines had been further lengthened about 45 
kilometers as a result of the Marne pocket made by the Aisne offensive. 
This increased frontage and the heavy fighting had reduced French 
reserves to an extremely low point. 

Our Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. George W. Read, had been 
organized for the command of the 10 divisions with the British, which 
were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. 
After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3, 5 American 
divisions were relieved from the British area to support the French. 
The Seventy-seventh and Eighty-second Divisions were moved south to 
release the Forty-second and Twenty-sixth for employment on a more 
active portion of the front; the Thirty-fifth Division entered the line in 
the Vosges, and the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Divisions were moved 
to the region of Meaux and Chateau-[/hierry as reserves. 

On June 9 the Germans attacked the Montdidier-Noyon front in 
an effort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines nearer to 


Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively 
little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the three 
preceding attacks by the enemy, this successful defense proved beneficial 
to the Allied morale, particularly as it was believed that the German 
losses were unusually heavy. 

15. On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the First, 
Second, Third, and Twenty-sixth Divisions were on the Chateau- 
Thierry front with the Fourth and Twenty-eighth in support, some 
small units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experience with 
our troops or with the French; the Forty-second Division was in sup- 
port of the French east of Rheims; and four colored regiments were 
with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine front we 
had five divisions in line with the French. Five were with the Bnitish 
Army, three having elements in the line. In our training areas four 
divisions were assembled and four were in the process of arrival. 

The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity 
for a counteroffensive that was obvious. If successful, such an opera: 
tion would afford immediate relief to the Allied defense, would remove 
the threat against Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy Railroad. But, 
more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the Allies 
and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to 
this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as 
emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. In every trial, 
whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved themselves 
equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23 and again on July 
10 at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be 
concentrated under American command, if possible, for use as a striking 
force against the Marne salient. Although the prevailing view among 
the Allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, 
and that at all events they could be used to better advantage under 
Allied command, the suggestion was accepted in principle, and my esti- 
mate of their offensive fighting qualities was soon put to the test. 

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15 
attack would conclude the war with a German peace. Although he 
made elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his 
intentions, and the front of attack was suspected at least one week 
ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was 
known and the enemy was checked with heavy losses. The Forty- 
second Division entered the line near Somme Py immediately, and five 
of its infantry battalions and all its artillery became engaged. South- 
west of Rheims and along the Marne to the east of Chateau- [hierry 
the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of 8 
kilometers beyond the river being effected against the French imme- 


diately to the right of our Third Division. The following quotation 
from the report of the commanding general Third Division gives the 
result of the fighting on his front: 


Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of 
the front-line positions, causing the infantry and machine-gun com- 
panies to suffer, in some cases a 50 per cent loss, no German sol- 
dier crossed the road from Fossoy to Crezancy, except as a prisoner 
of war, and by noon of the following day (July 16) there were 
no Germans in the foreground of the Third Division sector ex- 
cept the dead. 


On this occasion a single regiment of the Third Division wrote 
one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented 
the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the 
Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing 
in three directions, met the German attacks with counterattacks at crit- 
ical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into com- 
plete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners. 

16. The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and 
the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make 
their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the launching 
of the counterattack already planned. There were now over 1,200,000 
American troops in France, which provided a considerable force of re- 
serves. Every American division with any sort of training was made 
available for use in a counteroffensive. 

Gen. Petain’s initial plan for the counterattack involved the entire 
western face of the Marne salient. The First and Second American 
Divisions, with the First French Moroccan Division between them, 
were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly 
eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to 
the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18, without 
the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, and these three 
divisions at a single bound broke through the enemy’s infantry defenses 
and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German communica- 
tions leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne 
was immediately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to 
prevent disaster. 

The First Division, throughout 4 days of constant fighting, ad- 
vanced 11 kilometers, capturing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights above 
Soissons and taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from the 
7 German divisions employed against it. It was relieved by a British 
division. The Second Division advanced 8 kilometers in the first 26 
hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having cap- 


tured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It was relieved the night of 
the 19th by a French division. The result of this counteroffensive was 
of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and power dis- 
played on the field of Soissons by our First and Second Divisions the 
tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies. 

Other American divisions participated in the Marne counteroffensive. 
A little to the south of the Second Division, the Fourth was in line 
with the French and was engaged until July 22. The First American 
Corps, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett commanding, with the Twenty-sixth 
Division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement to- 
ward Soissons, capturing Torcy on the 18th and reaching the Chateau- 
Thierry-Soissons road on the 21st. At the same time the Third Division 
crossed the Marne and took the heights of Mont St. Pere and the 
villages of Charteves and Jaulgonne. 

In the First Corps, the Forty-second Division relieved the Twenty- 
sixth on July 25 and extended its front, on the 26th relieving the 
French division. From this time until August 2 it fought its way 
through the Forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing toward 
the Vesle until relieved by the Fourth Division on August 3. Early in 
this period elements of the Twenty-eighth Division participated in the 
advance. 

Farther to the east the Third Division forced the enemy back to 
Roncheres Wood, where it was relieved on July 30 by the Thirty- 
second Division from the Vosges front. The Thirty-second, after 
relieving the Third and some elements of the Twenty-eighth on the line 
of the Ourcq River, advanced abreast of the Forty-second toward the 
Vesle. On August 3 it passed under control of our Third Corps, 
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard commanding, which made its first ap- 
pearance in battle at this time, while the Fourth Division took up the 
task of the Forty-second Division and advanced with the Thirty-second 
to the Vesle River, where, on August 6, the operation for the reduction 
of the Marne salient terminated. 

In the hard fighting from July 18 to August 6 the Germans were 
not only halted in their advance but were driven back from the Marne 
to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The force of 
American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable the last 
offensive of the enemy to be crushed. 

17. The First and Third Corps now held a continuous front of 11 
kilometers along the Vesle. On August 12 the Seventy-seventh Di- 
vision relieved the Fourth Division on the First Corps front, and the 
following day the Twenty-eighth relieved the Thirty-second Division in 
the Third Corps, while from August 6 to August 10 the Sixth Infantry 
Brigade of the Third Division held a sector on the river line. The 








transfer of the First Corps to the Woevre was ordered at this time, and 
the control of its front was turned over to the Third Corps. 

On August 18 Gen. Petain began an offensive between Rheims and 
the Oise. Our Third Corps participated in this operation, crossing the 
Vesle on September 4 with the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh 
Divisions and overcoming stubborn opposition on the plateau south of 
the Aisne, which was reached by the Seventy-seventh on September 6. 
The Twenty-eighth was withdrawn from the line on September 7. Two 
days later the Third Corps was transferred to the region of Verdun, the 
Seventy-seventh Division remaining in line on the Aisne River until 
September 17. 

The Thirty-second Division, upon its relief from the battle on the 
Vesle, joined a French corps north of Soissons and attacked from 
August 29 to 31, capturing Juvigny after some particularly desperate 
fighting and reaching the Chauny-Soissons road. 

18. On the British front two regiments of the Thirty-third Di- 
vision participated in an attack on Hamel July 4, and again on August 
9 as an incident of the allied offensive against the Amiens salient. One 
of these regiments took Gressaire Wood and Chipilly Ridge, capturing 
700 prisoners and considerable matériel, 


ASSEMBLING THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY. 


19. In conference with Gen. Petain at Chantilly on May 19 it had 
been agreed that the American Army would scon take complete 
charge of the sector of the Woevre. The Twenty-sixth Division was 
already in line in the Woevre north of Toul and was to be followed 
by other American divisions as they became available, with the under- 
standing that the sector was to pass to our control when four divisions 
were in the line. But demands of the battle then going on farther 
west required the presence of our troops, and the agreement had no 
immediate result. Due to the presence of a number of our divisions 
northeast of Paris, the organization of an American corps sector in the 
Chateau-Thierry region was taken up with Gen. Petain, and on July 4 
the First Corps assumed tactical control of a sector in that region. 
This was an important step, but it was by no means satisfactory, as 
only one American division at the moment was operating under the con- 
trol of the First Corps, while he had at this time eight American di- 
visions in the front line serving in French corps. 

20. The counter-offensives against the Marne salient in July, and 
against the Amiens salient in August, had gained such an advantage 
that it was apparent that the emergency, which justified the dispersion 
of our divisions, had passed. The moment was propitious for as- 


sembling our divisions. Scattered as they were along the Allied 
front, their supply had become very difficult. From every point of 
view the immediate organization of an independent American force was 
indicated. The formation of the Army in the Chateau-Thierry region 
and its early transfer to the sector of the Woevre, which was to extend 
from Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to north of St. Mihiel, was there- 
fore decided upon by Marshal Foch and myself on August 9, and the 
details were arranged with Gen. Petain later on the same day. 


\ 


ST. MIHIEL OPERATION. 


21. At Bombon on July 24 there was a conference of all the Com- 
manders-in-Chief for the purpose of considering Allied operations. 
Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies under his 
command and these formed the basis of future cooperation of the Allies. 
It was emphatically determined that the Allied attitude should be to 
maintain the offensive. As the first operation of the American Army, 
the reduction of the salient of St. Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon 
as the necessary troops and material could be made available. On 
account of the swampy nature of the country it was especially impor- 
tant that the movement be undertaken and finished before the fall rains 
should begin, which was usually about the middle of September. 

Arrangements were concluded for successive relief of American di- 
visions and the organization of the First American Army under my 
personal command was announced on August 10, with La Ferte-sous- 
Jouarre as headquarters. This Army nominally assumed control of a 


portion of the Vesle front, although at the same time directions were 


given for its secret concentration in the St. Mihiel sector. 

22. The force of American soldiers in France at that moment was 
sufficient to carry out this offensive, but they were dispersed along the 
front from Switzerland to the Channel. The three Army Corps head- 
quarters to participate in the St. Mihiel attack were the First, Fourth, 
and Fifth. The First was on the Vesle, the Fourth at Toul, and the 
Fifth not yet completely organized. To assemble combat divisions and 
service troops and undertake a major operation, within the short period 
available and with staffs so recently organized, was an extremely difh- 
cult task. Our deficiencies in Artillery, Aviation, and special troops, 
caused by the shipment of an undue proportion of Infantry and Machine 
Guns during the summer, were largely met by the French. 

23. The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was important, as it 
would prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-Nancy 
Railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading north 
through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with an ad- 


vantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan 
Railroad system which was vital to the German armies west of Verdun, 
and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary for the produc- 
tion of German armament and munitions. 

The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the flanks 
of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed as the gen- 
eral line Marieulles (east of the Moselle)—heights south of Gorze- 
Mars la Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the. use on the west- 
ern face of 3 or 4 American divisions, supported by the attack of 6 
divisions of the Second French Army on their left, while 7 American 
divisions would attack on the southern face, and 3 French divisions 
would press the enemy at the tip of the salient. As the part to be 
taken by the Second French Army would be closely related to the 
attack of the First American Army, Gen. Petain placed all the French 
troops involved under my personal command. 

By August 30, the concentration of the scattered divisions, corps, 
and army troops, of the quantities of supplies and munitions required, 
and the necessary construction of light railways and roads, were well 
under way. 

24. In accordance with the previous general consideration of opera- 
tions at Bombon on July 24, an allied offensive extending practically 
along the entire active front was eventually to be carried out. After 
the reduction of the St. Mihiel sector the Americans were to cooperate 
in the concerted effort of the Allied armies. It was the sense of the 
conference of July 24, that the extent to which the different operations 
already planned might carry us could not be then foreseen, especially 
if the results expected were achieved before the season was far ad- 
vanced. It seemed reasonable at that time to look forward to a com- 
bined offensive for the autumn, which would give no respite to the 
enemy and would increase our advantage for the inauguration of suc- 
ceeding operations extending into 1919. 

On August 30, a further discussion with Marshal Foch was held at 
my headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. In view of the new successes 
of the French and British near Amiens and the continued favorable 
results toward the Chemin des Dames on the French front, it was now 
believed that the limited Allied offensive, which was to prepare for 
the campaign of 1919, might be carried further before the end of the 
year. At this meeting it was proposed by Marshal Foch that the gen- 
eral operations as far as the American Army was concerned should be 
carried out in detail by: 

(a) An attack between.the Meuse and the Argonne by the Second 
French Army, reinforced by from four to six American divisions. 

(b) A French-American attack, extending from the Argonne west 


to the Souain Road, to be executed on the right by an American Army 
astride the Aisne and on the left by the Fourth French Army. 

To carry out these attacks the 10 to 11 American divisions sug- 
gested for the St. Mihiel operation and the 4 to 6 for the Second 
French Army, would leave 8 to 10 divisions for an American Army 
on the Aisne. It was proposed that the St. Mihiel operation should 
be initiated cn September 10 and the other two on September 15. and 
20, respectively. 

25. The plan suggested for the American participation in these 
operations was not acceptable to me because it would require the im- 
mediate separation of the recently formed First American Army into 
several groups, mainly to assist French armies. This was directly 
centrary to the principle of forming a distinct American Army, for 
which my contention had been insistent. An enormous amount of 
preparation had already been made in construction of roads, railroads, 
regulating stations, and cther installations looking to the use and supply 
of our armies on a particular front. The inherent disinclination of our 
troops to serve under allied commanders would have grown and Amer- 
ican morale would have suffered. My position was stated quite clearly 
that the strategical employment of the First Army as a unit would be 
undertaken where desired, but its disruption to carry out these pro- 
posals would not be entertained. : 

A further conference at Marshal Foch’s headquarters was held on 
September 2, at which Gen. Petain was present. After discussion the 
question of employing the Amercan Army as a unit was conceded. 
The essentials of the strategical decision previously arrived at pro- 
vided that the advantageous situation of the Allies should be exploited 
to the utmost by vigorously continuing the general battle and extending 
it eastward to the Meuse. A\ll the Allied armies were to be employed 
in a converging action. The British armies, supported by the left of 
the French armies, were to pursue the attack in the direction of Cam- 
brai; the center of the French armies, west of Rheims, would continue 
the actions, already begun, to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne; and 
the American Army, supported by the right of the French armies, 
would direct its attack on Sedan and Mezieres. 

It should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully 
outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that the 
final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the 
French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be 
pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would 
force a cessation of operations. 

26. The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisne in- 
cluding the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector, was left to me. 


~~) <r oe 


Ce 








In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive 
spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse- 
Argonne-sector and our plans and installations had been prepared for 
an expansion of operations in that direction. So the Meuse-Argonne 
front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilometers of front, ex- 
tending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, west to include the 
Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed under my command, including 
all French divisions then in that zone. The First American Army was 
to proceed with the St. Mihiel operation, after which the operation be- 
tween the Meuse and the western edge of the Argonne Forest was to be 
prepared and launched not later than September 25. 

~ As a result of these decisions, the depth of the St. Mihiel operation 
was limited to the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Regnieville. The num- 
ber of divisions to be used was reduced and the time shortened. 
Eighteen to 19 divisions were to be in the front line. ‘There were 4 
French and 15 American divisions available, 6 of which would be in 
reserve, while the two flank divisions of the front line were not to ad- 
vance. Furthermore, 2 Army Corps headquarters, with their corps 
troops, practically all the Army Artillery and Aviation, and the First, 
Second, and Fourth Divisions, the first two destined to take a leading 
part in the St. Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn and started 
for the Meuse-Argonne by the fourth day of the battle. 

27. The salient had been held by the Germans since September, 
1914. It covered the most sensitive section of the enemy’s position on 
the Western Front; namely, the Mezieres-Sedan-Metz Railroad and 
the Briey-Iron Basin; it threatened the entire region between Verdun 
and Nancy, and interrupted the main rail line from Paris to the east. 
Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain 
itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged, 
heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse; the southern face fol- 
lowed the heights of the Meuse for 8 kilometers to the east and then 
crossed the plain of the Woevre, including within the German lines the 
detached heights of Loupmont and Montsec which dominated the plain 
and afforded the enemy unusual facilities for observation. The enemy 
had reinforced the positions by every artificial means during a period of 
four years. 

78. On the night of September 11, the troops of the First Army 
were deployed in position. On the southern face of the salient was the 
First Corps, Maj. Gen. Liggett, commanding, with the Eighty-second, 
Ninetieth, Fifth, and Second Divisions in line, extending from the Mo- 
selle westward. On its left was the Fourth Corps, Maj. Gen Joseph 
T. Dickman, commanding, with the Ejighty-ninth, Forty-second, and 
First Divisions, the left of this corps being opposite Montsec. These 


two Army Corps were to deliver the principal attack, the line pivoting 
on the center division of the First Corps. The First Division on the 
left of the Fourth Corps was charged with the double mission of cov- 
ering its own flank while advancing some 20 kilometers due north to- 
ward the heart of the salient, where it was to make contact with the 
troops of the Fifth Corps. On the western face of the salient lay the 
Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, commanding, with the 
Twenty-sixth Division, Fifteenth French Colonial Division, and_ the 
Fourth Division in line, from Mouilly west to Les Eparges and north to 
Watronville. Of these three divisions, the Twenty-sixth alone was to 
make a deep advance directed southeast toward Vigneulles. The 
French Division was to make a short progression to the edge of the 
heights in order to cover the left of the Twenty-sixth. The Fourth 
Division was not to advance. In the center, between our Fourth and 
Fifth Army Corps, was the Second French Colonial Corps, Maj. Gen. 
E. J. Blondlat, commanding, covering a front of 40 kilometers with 3 
small French divisions. These troops were to follow up the retirement 
of the enemy from the tip of the salient. 

The French independent air force was at my disposal which, to- 
gether with the British bombing squadrons and our own air forces, 
gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in 
one operation. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to inter- 
fere seriously with German rail movements. 

At dawn on September 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire 
of preparation, and accompanied by small tanks, the Infantry of the 
First and Fourth Corps advanced. The infantry of the Fifth Corps 
commenced its advance at 8 a. m. ‘The operation was carried out 
with entire precision. Just after daylight on September | 3, elements 
of the First and Twenty-sixth Divisions made a junction near Hatton- 
chatel and Vigneulles, 18 kilometers northeast of St. Mihiel. The 
rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy, 
and all objectives were reached by the afternoon of September 13. ‘The 
enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops from the 
tip of the salient on the eve of our attack, but had been unable to carry 
it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, and 
large stores of material and supplies. The energy and swiftness with 
which the operation was carried out enabled us to smother opposition 
to such an extent that we suffered less than 7,000 casualties during the 
actual period of the advance. 

During the next two days the right of our line west of the Moselle 
River was advanced beyond the objectives laid down in the original 
orders. This completed the operation for the time being and the line 
was stabilized to be held by the smallest practical force, 


29. The material results of the victory achieved were very impor- 
tant. An American Army was an established fact, and the enemy had 
felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing 
effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability 
to organize a large American force and drive it successfully through his 
defenses. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and 
raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire en- 
tanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open- 
warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be 
the correct doctrine. Our divisions concluded the attack with such 
small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they 
were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new 
theater of operations. The strength of the First Army in this battle 
totaled approximately 500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were 
French. 


MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION. 


30. The definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great 
allied convergent attack was agreed to in my conference with Marshal 
Foch and Gen. Petain on September 2. It was planned to use all 
available forces of the First Army, including such divisions and troops 
as we might be able to withdraw from the St. Mihiel front. The 
Army was to break through the enemy’s successive fortified zones to 
include the Kriemhilde-Stellung, or Hindenburg Line, on the front 
Brieulles-Romagne sous Montfaucon-Grandpre, and thereafter, by de- 
veloping pressure toward Mezieres, was to insure the fall of the Hin- 
denburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French 
Army, which was to attack to the west of the Argonne Forest. A 
penetration of some 12 to 15 kilometers was required to reach the 
Hindenburg Line on our front, and the enemy’s defenses were virtually 
continuous throughout that depth. 

The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in Sep- 
tember, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German 
attacks on Verdun in 1916 and the French counteroffensive in August, 
1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. The 
net result of the four years’ struggle on this ground was a German de- 
fensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter 
devastation, itself a serious obstacle to offensive operations. 

31. The strategical importance of this portion of the line was sec- 
ond to none on the western front. All supplies and evacuations of 
the German Armies in northern France were dependent upon two great 
railway systems—one in the north, passing through Liege, while the 
other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg, Thionville, and 


Metz, had as its vital section the line Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres. No 
other important lines were available to the enemy, as the mountainous 
masses of the Ardennes made the construction of east and west lines 
through that region impracticable. The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line 
was essential to the Germans for the rapid strategical movement of 
troops. Should this southern system be cut by the Allies before the 
enemy could withdraw his forces through the narrow neck between 
Mezieres and the Dutch frontier, the ruin of his armies in France and 
Belgium would be complete. 

From the Meuse-Argonne front the perpendicular distance to the 
Carignan-Mezieres railroad was 50 kilometers. This region formed 
the pivot of German operations in northern France, and the vital neces- 
sity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted in the con- 
vergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive German de- 
fensive positions. It will be seen, for example, that the distance 
between “‘no man’s land” and the third German withdrawal position 
in the vicinity of the Meuse River was approximately 18 kilometers; 
the distance between the corresponding points near the tip of the 
great salient of the western front was about 65 kilometers, and “in 
the vicinity of Cambrai was over 30 kilometers. The effect of a 
penetration of 18 kilometers by the American Army would be 
equivalent to an advance of 65 kilometers farther west; furthermore, 
such an advance on our front was far more dangerous to the enemy 
than an advance elsewhere. The vital importance of this portion 
of his position was fully appreciated by the enemy, who had suffered 
tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it by the reduction 
of Verdun. As a consequence it had been elaborately fortified, and 
consisted of practically a continuous series of positions 20 kilometers 
or more in depth. 

In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided 
by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the domi- 
nating heights not only protected his left but gave him positions from 
which powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire on the western 
bank. Batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne forest 
covered his right flank, and could cross their fire with that of the 
guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway between the Meuse and 
the forest the heights of Montfaucon offered perfect observation and 
formed a strong natural position which had been heavily fortified. 
The east and west ridges abutting on the Meuse and Aire River valleys 
afforded the enemy excellent machine-gun positions for the desperate 
defense which the importance of the position would require him to 
make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded and rugged heights 
constituted natural features favorable to defensive fighting. 








32. When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneous 
preparation for two major operations, an interval of 14 days separated 
the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period of the move- 
ment of the immense number of troops and the amount of supplies 
involved in the Meuse-Argonne battle, over the few roads available, 
and confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was one of the most 
delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concentration included 
15 divisions of which 7 were involved in the pending St. Mihiel drive, 
3 were in sector in the Vosges, 3 in the neighborhood of Soissons, | 
in a training area, and | near Bar-le-Duc. Practically all the Artillery, 
Aviation, and other auxiliaries to be employed in the new operations 
were committed to the St. Mihiel attack and therefore could not be 
moved until its success was assured. The concentration of all units 
not to be used at St. Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on 
September | 3, the second day of St. Mihiel, reserve divisions and Army 
Artillery units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the 
Argonne front. 

That part of the American sector from Fresnes-en-Woevre, south- 
east of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while 
nominally under my control, did not actively become a part of my com- 
mand until September 22, on which date my headquarters were estab- 
lished at Souilly, southwest of Verdun. Of French troops, in addition to 
the Second French Colonial Corps, composed of 3 divisions, there 
was also the Seventeeenth French Corps of 3 divisions holding the 
front north and east of Verdun. 

33. At the moment of the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle, 
the enemy had 10 divisions in line and 10 in reserve on the front 
between Fresnes-en-Woevre and the Argonne Forest, inclusive. He 
had undoubtedly expected a continuation of our advance toward Metz. 
Successful ruses were carried out between the Meuse River and 
Luneville to deceive him as to our intentions, and French troops were 
maintained as a screen along our front until the night before the battle, 
so that the actual attack was a tactical surprise. 

34. The operations in the Meuse-Argonne battle really form a 
continuous whole, but they extended over such a long period of con- 
tinuous fighting that they will be considered in three phases, the 
first from September 26 to October 3, the second from October 4 to 
31, and the third from November | to 11. 

35. On the night of September 25, the 9 divisions to lead in the 
attack were deployed between the Meuse River and the western edge 
of the Argonne Forest. On the right was the Third Corps, Maj. 
Gen. Bullard commanding, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth 
Divisions. in line; next came the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. Cameron 


commanding, with the Seventy-Ninth, Thirty-seventh, and Ninety- 
first Divisions; on the left was the First Corps, Maj. Gen. Liggett 
commanding, with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eight, and Seventy-seventh 
Divisions. ach corps had | division in reserve and the Army held 
3 divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks, 
142 manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by 
Americans, were concentrated to support the attack of the infantry. 
We thus had a superiority in guns and aviation, and the enemy had 
no tanks. 

The axis of the attack was the line Montfaucon-Romagne-Buzancy, 
the purpose being to make the deepest penetration in the center, which, 
with the Fourth French Army advancing west of the Argonne, would 
force the enemy to evacuate that forest without our having to deliver 
a heavy attack in that difficult region. 

36. Following three hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, 
the Infantry advanced at 5:30 a. m. on September 26, accompanied 
by tanks. During the first two days of the attack, before the enemy 
was able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress 
through the network of defenses. . Montfaucon was held tenaciously 
by the enemy and was not captured until noon of the second day. 

By the evening of the 28th a maximum advance of 1|1 kilometers 
had been achieved and we had captured Baulny, Epinonville, Sept- 
sarges, and Dannevoux. The right had made a splendid advance 
into the woods south of Brieulles-sur-Meuse, but the extreme left 
was meeting strong resistance in the Argonne. The attack continued 
without interruption, meeting six new divisions which the enemy threw 
into the first line before September 29. He developed a powerful 
machine gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made 
frequent counter-attacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front 
of the Twenty-eight and Thirty-fifth Divisions. These divisions had 
taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny, and Charpentry, and the line was 
whithin 2 kilometers of Apremont. We were no longer engaged in 
a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily com- 
mitted, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, 
hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy. 

37. By nightfall of the 29th the First Army line was approxi- 
mately, Bois de la Cote Lemont—Nantillois—Apremont—southwest 
across the Argonne. Many divisions, especially those in the center 
that were subjected to cross-fire of artillery, had suffered heavily. 
The severe fighting, the nature of the terrain over which they at- 
tacked, and the fog and darkness sorely tried even our best divisions. 
On the night of the 29th the Thirty-seventh and Seventy-ninth Divi- 
sions were relieved by the Thirty-second and Third Divisions, respec- 


tively, and on the following night the First Division relieved the Thirty- 
fifth Division. 

38. The critical problem during the first few days of the battle 
was the restoration of communications over “no man’s land,” ‘There 
were but four roads available across this deep zone, and the violent 
artillery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually destroyed 
them. The spongy soil and the lack of material increased the difh- 
culty. But the splendid work of our engineers and pioneers soon made 
possible the movement of the troops, artillery, and supplies most needed. 
By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisional artillery, except a few 
batteries of heavy guns, had effected a passage and was supporting 
the infantry action. 


MEUSE-ARGONNE, SECOND PHASE. 


39. At 5:30 a. m. on October 4 the general attack was renewed. 
The enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the 
Argonne had increased from 10 in first line to 16, and included some 
of his best divisions. The fighting was desperate, and only small 
advances were realized, except by the First Division on the right of 
the First Corps. By evening of October 5 the line was approximately 
Bois de la Cote Lemont-Bois du Fays-Gesnes-Hill 240-Fleville- 
Chehery, southwest through the Argonne. 

It was especially desirable to drive the enemy from his command- 
ing positions on the heights east of the Meuse, but it was even more 
important that we should force him to use his troops there and weaken 
his tenacious hold on positions in our immediate front. The further 
stabilization of the new St. Mihiel line permitted the withdrawal of 
certain divisions for the extension of the Meuse-Argonne operation to 
the east bank of the Meuse River. 

40. On the 7th the First Corps, with the Ejighty-second Division 
added, launched a streng attack northwest toward Cornay, to draw 
attention from the movement east of the Meuse and at the same time 
outflank the German position in the Argonne. The following day 
the Seventeenth French Corps, Maj. Gen. Claudel commanding, initiated 
its attack east of the Meuse against the exact point on which the 
German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from northern France. 
The troops encountered elaborate fortifications and stubborn resistance, 
but by nightfall had realized an advance of 6 kilometers to a line 
well within the Bois de Consenvoye, and including the villages of Beau- 
mont and Haumont. Continuous fighting was maintained along our 
entire battle front, with especial success on the extreme left, where the 
capture of the greater part of the Argonne Forest was completed. The 


enemy contested every foot of ground on our front in order to make 
more rapid retirements farther west and withdraw his forces from 
northern France before the interruption of his railroad communications 
through Sedan. 

4|.> We were confronted at this time by an insufficiency of replace- 
ments to build up exhausted divisions. Early in October combat units 


‘ required some 90,000 replacements, and not more than 45,000 would 


be available before November | to fill the existing and prospective 
vacancies. We still had two divisions with the British and two with 
the French. A review of the situation, American and Allied, especially 
as to our own resources in men for the next two months, convinced me 
that the attack of the First Army and of the Allied Armies further 
west should be pushed to the limit. But if the First Army was to 
continue its aggressive tactics our divisions then with the French must 
be recalled, and replacements must be obtained by breaking up newly 
arrived divisions. 

In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French with 
Marshal Foch and Gen. Petain, on October 10, the former expressed 
his appreciation of the fact that the First Army was striking the pivot 
of the German withdrawal, and also held the view that the Allied 


attack should continue. Gen. Petain agreed that the American divi- 


sions with the French were essential to us if we were to maintain our 
battle against the German pivot. The French were, however, strain- 
ing every nerve to keep up their attacks and, before those divisions with 
the French had been released, it became necessary for us to send the 
Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first Divisions from the First Army to assist 
the Sixth French Army in Flanders. 

42. At this time the First Army was holding a front of more 
than 120 kilometers; its strength exceeded 1,000,000 men; it was 
engaged in the most desperate battle of our history, and the burden 
of command was too heavy for a single commander and staff. _There- 
fore, on October 12, that portion of our front extending from Port-sur- 
Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en- Woevre, southeast of Verdun, 


was transferred to the newly constituted Second Army with Lieut. Gen. 


Robert L. Bullard in command, under whom it began preparations for 
the extension of operations to the east in the direction of Briey and Metz. 
On October 16 the command of the First Army was transferred to 
Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett, and my advance headquarters was estab- 
lished at Ligny-en-Barrois, from which the command of the group of 
American Armies was exercised. 

43. Local attacks of the First Army were continued in order par- 
ticularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general assault. 
The First and Fifth Divisions were relieved by the Forty-second and 








Eightieth Divisions, which were now fresh. An attack along the whole 
front was made on October 14. The resistance encountered was 
stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Marie was captured and 
the Hindenburg Line was broken. Cunel and Romagne-sous-Mont- 
faucon were taken and the line advanced 2 kilometers north of Sommer- 
ance. A maximum advance of 17 kilometers had been made since 
September 26 and the enemy had been forced to throw into the fight 
a total of 15 reserve divisions. 

During the remainder of the month important local operations were 
carried out, which involved desperate fighting. The First Corps, Maj. 
Gen. Dickman commanding, advanced through Grandpre; the Fifth 
Corps, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall commanding, captured the 
Bois de Bantheville; the Third Corps, Maj. Gen. John L. Hines com- 
manding, completed the occupation of Cunel Heights; and the Seven- 
teenth French Corps drove the enemy from the main ridge south of La 
Grande Montagne. Particularly heavy fighting occurred east of the 
Meuse on October 18, and in the further penetration of the Kriemhilde- 
Stellung on October 23 the Twenty-sixth Division entering the battle 
at this time relieved the Eighteenth French Division. 

44. Summarizing the material results which had been attained 

by the First Army by the end of October, we had met an increasing 
number of Germany’s best divisicns, rising from 20 in line and reserve 
on September 26, to 31 on October 31; the enemy's elaborately pre- 
pared positions, including the Hindenburg line, in our front had been 
broken; the almost impassable Argonne Forest was in our hands; an 
advance of 21 kilometers had been effected; 18,600 prisoners, 370 
cannon, 1,000 machine guns, and a mass of material captured; and 
the great railway artery through Carignan to Sedan was now seriously 
threatened. ; 
- The demands of incessant battle which had been maintained day by 
day for more than a month had compelled our divisions to fight to 
the limit of their capacity. Combat troops were held in line and 
pushed to the attack until deemed incapable of further effort because of 
casualties or exhaustion; artillery once engaged was seldom withdrawn 
and many batteries fought until practically all the animals were casual- 
ties and the guns were towed out of line by motor trucks. The Amer- 
ican soldier had shown unrivaled fortitude in this continuous fighting 
during the most inclement weather and under many disadvantages of 
position. Through experience, the Army had developed into a powerful 
and smooth-running machine, and there was a supreme confidence in 
our ability to carry the task successfully. 

While the high pressure of these dogged attacks was a great strain 
on our troops, it was calamitous to the enemy. His divisions had 


been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale 
had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the 
breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight, 
it became practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy was 
forced to meet the constantly recurring crises by breaking up tactical 
organizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separated 
portions of the field. 

Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, from the 
front line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificent 
efforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the enorm- 
ous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmountable 
were overcome daily in expediting the movements of replacements, 
ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick and wounded to the 
rear. It was this spirit of determination animating every American soldier 
that made it impossible for the enemy to maintain the struggle until 


19193 


MEUSE-ARGONNE, THIRD PHASE. 


45. The detailed plans for the operations of the Allied Armies on 
the western front changed from time to time during the course of this 
great battle, but the mission of the First American Army to cut the 
great Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres Railroad remained unchanged. Marshal 
Foch coordinated the operations along the entire front, continuing per- 
sistently and unceasingly the attacks by all Allied Armies; the Bel- 
gian Army, with a French Army and two American divisions, ad- 
vancing eastward; the British Armies and two American divisions, 
with the First French Army on their right, toward the region north 
of Givet; the First American Army and Fourth French Army, toward 
Sedan and Mezieres. 

46. On the 21st my instructions were. issued to the First Army to 
prepare thoroughly for a general attack on October 28, that would be 
decisive if possible. In order that the attack of the First Army and 
that of the Fourth French Army on its left should be simultaneous, 
our attack was delayed until November |. The immediate purpose 
of the First Army was to take Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt, 
to turn the forest north of Grandpre, and to establish contact with 
the Fourth French Army near Boult-aux-Bois. The Army was directed 
to carry the heights of Barricourt by nightfall: of the first day and 
then to exploit this success by advancing its left to Boult-aux-Bois in 
preparation for the drive toward Sedan. By strenuous effort all available 
artillery had been moved well forward to the heights previously occu- 
pied by the enemy, from which it could fully cover and support the 
initial advance of the Infantry. 


On this occasion and for the first time the Army prepared for its 
attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and 
were not under the necessity of taking over a new front, with its 
manifold installations and services. Our own personnel handled the 
communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service; our divi- 
sions were either on the line or close in rear; the French artillery, 
aviation, and technical troops which had previously made up our 
deficiencies had been largely replaced by our own organizations; and 
our army, corps, and divisional staffs were by actual experience second 
to none. 

47. On the morning of November |, three Army corps were in 
line between the Meuse River and the Bois de Bourgogne. On the 
right the Third Corps, had the Fifth and Ninetieth Divisions; the 
Fifth Corps occupied the center of the line, with the Eighty-ninth 
and Second Divisions, and was to be the wedge of the attack on the 
first day; and on, the left the First Corps deployed the Ejightieth, 
Seventy-seventh, and Seventy-eighth Divisions. 

Preceded by two hours of violent artillery preparation, the Infantry 
advanced, closely followed by “‘accompanying guns.” The Artillery 
acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well coordinated 
and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged 
by the rapid onslaught of the Infantry. By nightfall the Fifth Corps, 
in the center, had realized an advance of almost 9 kilometers, to the 
Bois de la Folie, and had completed the capture of the heights of 
Barricourt, while the Third Corps, on the right, had captured Aincre- 
ville and Andevanne. Our troops had broken through the enemy’s 
last defense, captured his artillery positions, and had precipitated a 
retreat of the German forces about to be isolated in the forest north 
of Grandpre. On the 2d and 3d we advanced rapidly against heavy 
fighting on the fronts of the right and center corps; to the left the troops 
of the First Corps hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, 
while the Artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. Our 
heavy artillery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the 
Caripnan-Sedan Railread and the junction at Longuyon and Conflans. 
By the evening of the 4th, our troops had reached La Neuville, opposite 
Stenay, and had swept through the great Foret de Dieulet, reach- 
ing the outskirts of Beaumont, while on the left we were 8 kilometers 
north of Boult-aux-Bois. 

The following day the advance continued toward Sedan with in- 
creasing swiftness. The Third Corps, turning eastward, crossed the 
Meuse in a brilliant operation by the Fifth Division, driving the enemy 
from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a general withdrawal 


from the strong positions he had so long held on the hills north of 
Verdun. 

By the 7th the right of the Third Corps had exploited its river 
crossing to a distance of 10 kilometers east of the Meuse, completely 
ejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and driving him out into 
the swampy plain of the Woevre; the Fifth and First Corps had reached 
the line of the Meuse River along their respective fronts and the 
left of the latter corps held the heights dominating Sedan, the strategical 
goal of the Meuse-Argonne operation, 41 kilometers from our point of 
departure on November 1. We had cut the enemy’s main line of 
communications. Recognizing that nothing but a cessation of hostilities 
could save his armies from complete disaster, he appealed for an 
immediate armistice on November 6. 

48. Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further 
employment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse 
and the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, 
while the Second Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey 
Iron Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved 
in this enterprise were issued on November 5. 

Between the 7th and 10th of November the Third Corps continued 
its advance eastward to Remoiville, while the Seventeenth French 
Corps, on its right, with the Seventy-ninth, Twenty-sixth, and Eighty- 
first American Divisions, and 2 French divisions, drove the enemy from 
his final foothold on the heights east of the Meuse. At 9 p. m. on 
November 9 appropriate orders were sent to the First and Second 
Armies in accordance with the following telegram from Marshal Foch 
to the Commander of each of the Allied armies: 


‘The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, retreats along 
the entire front. It is important to coordinate and expedite our 
movements. I appeal to the energy and the initiative of the Com- 
manders-in-Chief and of their armies to make decisive the results 
obtained.” 


In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army pressed 
the enemy along its entire front. On the night of the 10th-I1th and 
the morning of the 11th the Fifth Corps, in the First Army, forced 
a crossing of the Meuse east of Beaumont and gained the command- 
ing heights within the reentrant of the river, thus completing our control 
of the Meuse River line. At 6 a. m. on the I1th notification was 
received from Marshal Foch’s headquarters that the Armistice had been 
signed and that hostilities would cease at 11 a. m. Preparatory 








measures had already been taken to insure the prompt transmission to 
the troops of the announcement of an Armistice. However, the ad- 
vance east of Beaumont on the morning of the I 1th had been so rapid 
and communication across the river was so difficult that there was some 
fighting on isolated portions of that front after || a. m. 

49. Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 
4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun 
to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different 
German divisions, representing 25 per cent of the enemy’s entire divi- 
sional strength on the western front. Of these enemy divisions 20 had 
been drawn from the French front and | from the British front. Of 
the 22 American divisions |2 had, at different times during this period, 
been engaged on fronts other than our own. The First Army suffered 
a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 
prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machine guns, and large quantities of 
material. 

The disposition which the enemy made to meet the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack and 
during the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribed to 
this section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced to 
take in its defense. From the moment the American offensive began 
until the Armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his 
divisions to our front was continuous. 


OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY. 


50. Under the instructions issued by me on November 5, for opera- 
tions by the Second Army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin, 
the advance was undertaken along the entire front of the army and 
continued during the last three days of hostilities. In the face of 
the stiff resistance offered by the enemy, and with the limited number 
of troops at the disposal of the Second Army, the gains realized re- 
flected great credit on the divisions concerned. On November 6 Marshal 
Foch requested that 6 American divisions be held in readiness to assist 
in an attack which the French were preparing to launch in the direction 
of Chateau-Salins. The plan was agreed to, but with the provision 


that our troops should be employed under the direction of the com- 


manding general Second Army. 

This combined attack was to be launched on November 14, and 
was to consist of 20 French divisions under Gen. Mangin and the 6 
American divisions under Gen. Bullard. Of the divisions designated 
for this operation the Third, Fourth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-sixth 


were in Army reserve and were starting their march eastward on the 
morning of November 11, while the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth 
were being withdrawn from line on the Second Army front. 


AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON OTHER FRONTS. 


51. During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, American 
divisions were participating in important attacks on other portions of the 
front. The Second Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Read, commanding, 
with the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions on the British front, 
was assigned the task in cooperation with the Australian Corps, of 
breaking the Hindenburg line at Le Cateau, where the St. Quentin 
Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. In this attack, carried 
out September 29 and October 1, the Thirtieth Division speedily 
broke through the main line of defense and captured all of its ob- 
jectives, while the Twenty-seventh progressed until some of its elements 
reached Gouy. In this and later actions from October 6 to 19, our 
Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced about 24 
kilometers. : 

52. On October 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions assisted 
the Fourth French Army in its advance between Rheims and the 
Argonne. The Second Division completed its advance on this front 
by the assault of the wooded heights of Mont Blanc, the key pojnt 
of the German position, which was captured with consummate dash 
and skill. The division here repulsed violent counterattacks, and then 
carried our lines ‘into the village of St. Etienne, thus forcing the Ger- 
mans to fall back before Rheims and yield positions which they had held 
since September, 1914. On October 10 the Thirty-sixth Division 
relieved the Second, exploiting the latter’s success, and in two days 
advanced, with the French, a distance of 21 kilometers, the enemy 
retiring behind the Aisne River. 

53. In the middle of October, while we were heavily engaged in 
the Meuse-Argonne, Marshal Foch requested that 2 American divi- 
sions be sent immediately to assist the Sixth French Army in Belgium, 
where slow progress was being made. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety- 
first Divisions, the latter being accompanied by the Artillery of the 
Twenty-eighth Division, were hurriedly dispatched to the Belgian front. 
On October 30, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, these divi- 
sions entered the line and attacked. By November 3 the Thirty- 
seventh Division had completed its mission by rapidly driving the 
enemy across the Escaut River and had firmly established itself on 
the east bank, while the Ninety-first Division, in a spirited advance, 


captured Spitaals Bosschen, reached the Scheldt, and entered Aude- 
narde. 


AMERICAN TROOPS IN ITALY. 


54. The Italian Government early made request for American 
troops, but the critical situation on the western front made it neces- 
sary to concentrate our efforts there. When the Secretary of War 
was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send American 
troops to Italy to show America’s interest in the Italian situation and 
to strengthen Italian morale. Similiarly a request was made by the 
Italian Prime Minister at the Abbeville conference. It was finally 
decided to send one regiment to Italy with the necessary hospital and 
auxiliary services, and the Three hundred and thirty-second Infantry 
was selected, reaching the Italian front in July, 1918. These troops 
participated in action against the Austrians in the fall of 1918 at the 
crossing of the Piave River and in the final pursuit of the Austrian 
Army. 


AMERICAN TROOPS IN RUSSIA. 


55. It was the opinion of the Supreme War Council that Allied 
troops should be sent to cooperate with the Russians, either at Mur- 
mansk or Archangel, against the Bolshevist forces, and the British 
Government, through its ambassador at Washington, urged American 
participation in this undertaking. On July 23, 1918, the War De- 
partment directed the dispatch of three battalions of Infantry and three 
companies of Engineers to join the Allied expedition. In compliance 
with these instructions the Three hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, 
the First Battalion, Three hundred and tenth Engineers, Three hun- 
dred and thirty-seventh Field Hospital Company, and Three hundred 
and thirty-seventh Ambulance Company were sent through England, 
whence they sailed on August 26. 

The mission of these troops was limited to guarding the ports and 
as much of the surrounding country as might develop threatening 
conditions. The Allied force operated under British command, through 
whose orders the small American contingent was spread over a front 
of about 450 miles. From September, 1918, to May, 1919, a series 
of minor engagements with the Bolshevist forces occurred, in which 82 
Americans were killed and 7 died of wounds. 

In April, 1919, two companies of American railroad troops were 
added to our contingent. The withdrawal of the American force 
commenced in the latter part of May, 1919, and on August 25 there 
was left only a small detachment of Graves Registration troops. 


THE ADVANCE INTO GERMANY. 


56. In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, the Allies 
were to occupy all German territory west of the Rhine, with bridge- 
heads of 30 kilometer radius at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence. The 
zone assigned the American command was the bridgehead of Coblenz 
and the district of Treves. This territory was to be occupied by an 
American Army, with its reserves held between the Moselle-Meuse 
Rivers and the Luxemburg frontier. 

The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on November 16, con- 
templated that 2 French infantry divisions and | French cavalry division 
would be added to the American forces that occupied the Coblenz 
bridgehead, and that | American Division would be added to the 
French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. Ass this arrange- 
ment presented possibilities of misunderstanding due to difference of 
views regarding the government of occupied territory, it was represented 
to the Marshal that each nation should be given a well-defined territory 
of occupation, employing within such territory only the troops of the 
commander responsible for the particular zone. On December 9 
Marshal Foch accepted the principle of preserving the entity of com- 
mand and troops, but reduced the American bridghead by adding a 
portion of the eastern half to the French command at Mayence. 

57. Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the 
First or Second Army as the Army of Occupation. Plans had been 
made before the Armistice to organize a Third Army and, on November 
14, this army, with Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman as commander, was 
designated as the Army of Occupation. The Third and Fourth Army 
Corps staffs and troops, less artillery, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Thirty-second, and Forty-second Divisions, and the Sixty-sixth Field 
Artillery Brigade were assigned to the Third Army. This force was 
later increased by the addition of the Seventh Corps, Maj. Gen. 
William M. Wright commanding, with the Fifth, Ejighty-ninth, and 
Ninetieth Divisions. 

The advance toward German territory began on November 17 at 
5 a. m., six days after signing the Armistice. All of the Allied 
forces from the North Sea to the Swiss border moved forward simultane- 
ously in the wake of the retreating German armies. Upon arrival at 
the frontier, a halt was made until December 1, when the leading 
elements of all Allied armies crossed the line into Germany. The 
Third Army Headquarters were established at Coblenz and an Ad- 
vance General Headquarters located at Treves. Steps were immediately 
taken to organize the bridgehead for defense, and dispositions were 
made to meet a possible renewal of hostilities. 





Che advance to the Rhine required long arduous marches, through 
cold and inclement weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest, 
refit, and refresh themselves after their participation in the final battle. 
The Army of Occupation bore itself splendidly and exhibited a fine 
state of discipline both during the advance and throughout the period 
of occupation. 

58. The zone of march of our troops into Germany and the line 
of communications of the Third Army after reaching the Rhine lay 
through Luxemburg. After the passage of the Third Army, the 
occupation of Luxemburg, for the purpose of guarding our line of com- 
munications, was intrusted to the Fifth and Thirty-third Divisions of 
the Second Army. The city of Luxemburg, garrisoned by French 
troops and designated as the headquarters of the Allied Commander-in- 
Chief, was excluded from our control. 

Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policy 
of noninterference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy was announced. 
Therefore, when the French commander in the city of Luxemburg 
was given charge of all troops in the Duchy, in so far as concerned 
the ‘‘administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg,” my instruc- 
tions were that our troops would not be subject to his control. Later, 
at my request, and in order to avoid possible friction, Marshal Foch 
placed the entire Duchy in the American Zone. 


RETURN OF TROOPS TO THE UNITED STATES. 


59. On the day the Armistice was signed, the problem of the 
return of our troops to the United States was taken up with the War 
Department and, on November 15, a policy recommended of sending 
home certain auxiliaries so that we could begin to utilize all available 
shipping .without delay. On December 21 the War Department an- 
nounced by cable that it had been decided to begin immediately the 
return of our forces and continue as rapidly as transportation would 
permit. To carry this out, a schedule for the constant flow of troops 
to the ports was established, having in mind our international obligations 
pending the signing of the treaty of peace. 

60. While more intimately related to the functions of the Services 
of Supply than to Operations, it is logical to introduce here a brief re- 
cital of the organizations created for the return of our troops to America. 
Prior to the Armistice but 15,000 men had been returned home. Al- 
though the existing organization was built for the efficient and rapid 
handling of the incoming forces, the embarkation of this small number 
presented no difficulties. 
reversed the problem of the Services of Supply at the ports and the 


But the Armistice suddenly and completely - 


handling of troops. It became necessary immediately to reorganize 
the machinery of the ports, to construct large embarkation camps, and 
to create an extensive service for embarking the homeward-bound 
troops. 

Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux became the principal embarkation 
ports, Marseilles and Le Havre being added later to utilize Italian 
and French liners. The construction of the embarkation camps during 
unseasonable winter weather was the most trying problem. These, with 
the billeting facilities available, gave accommodation for 55,000 at Brest, 
44,000 at St. Nazaire, and 130,000 at Bordeaux. Unfortunately, 
the largest ships had to be handled at Brest, where the least shelter 
was available. 

To maintain a suitable reservoir of men for Brest and St. Nazaire, 
an Embarkation Center was organized around Le Mans, which event- 
ually accommodated 230,000 men. Here the troops and their records 
were prepared for the return voyage and immediate demobilization. 
As the troops arrived at the base ports, the embarkation service was 
charged with feeding, reclothing, and equipping the hundreds of thou- 
sands who passed through, which required: the maintenance of a form 
of hotel service on a scale not hitherto attempted. 

61. On November 16 all combat troops, except 30 divisions and 
a minimum of corps and army troops, were released for return to the 
United States. It was early evident that only limited use would be 
made of the American divisions, and that the retention of 30 divisions 
was not necessary. Marshal Foch considered it indispensable to main- 
tain under arms a total, including Italians, of 120 to 140 divisions, 
and he proposed that we maintain 30 divisions in France until February 
1, 25 of which should be held in the Zone of the Armies, and that on 
March | we should have 20 divisions in the Zone of the Armies and 5 
ready to embark. The plan for March | was satisfactory, but the 
restrictions as to the divisions that should be in France on February 
1 could not be accepted, as it would seriously interfere with the flow 
of troops homeward. 

In a communication dated December 24 the Marshal set forth the 
minimum forces to be furnished by the several Allies, requesting the 
American Army to furnish 22 to 25 divisions of Infantry. In the 
same note he estimated the force to be maintained after the signing of 
the preliminaries of peace at about 32 divisions, of which the American 
Army was to furnish 6. 

In reply it was pointed out that our problem of repatriation of troops 
and their demobilization was quite different from that of France or 
Great Britain. On account of our long line of communications in 
France and the time consumed by the ocean voyage and travel in the 


United States, even with the maximum employment of our then available 
transportation, at least a year must elapse before we could complete 
our demobilization. Therefore, it was proposed by me that the num- 
ber of American combat divisions to be maintained in the Zone of the 
Armies should be reduced on April | to 15 divistons and on May | tol 0 
divisions, and that in the unexpected event that the preliminaries of 
peace should not be signed by May | we would continue to maintain 
10 divisions in the Zone of the Armies until the date of signature. 

The Allied Commander-in-Chief later revised his estimate, and, on 
January 24, stated to the Supreme War Council that the German 
demobilization would permit the reduction of the Allied forces to 100 
divisions, of which the Americans were requested to furnish 15. In 
reply, it was again pointed out that our problem was entirely one of 
transportation, and that such a promise was unnecessary inasmuch as 
it would probably be the summer of 1919 before we could reduce 
our forces below the number asked. We were, therefore, able to keep 
our available ships filled, and by May 19 all combat divisions, except 
5 still in the Army of Occupation, were under orders to proceed to 
ports of embarkation. This provided sufficient troops to utilize all 
troop transports to include July 15. 

62. The President had informed me that it would be necessary for 
us to have at least one regiment in occupied Germany, and left the 


details to be discussed by me with Marshal Foch. My cable of July | 


summarizes the agreement reached: » 


“By direction of President, I have discussed with Murshal 
Foch question of forces to be left on the Rhine. Following 
“agreed upon: The Fourth and Fifth Divisions will be sent to 
base ports immediately, the Second Division will commence mov- 
ing to base ports on July 15, and the Third Division on August 
15. Date of relief of First Division will be decided later. 
Agreement contemplates that after compliance by Germany with 
military conditions to be completed within first three months after 
German ratification of treaty, American force will be reduced to 
one regiment of Infantry and certain auxiliaries. Request Presi- 
dent be informed of agreement.” 


As a result of a later conference with Marshal Foch, the Third 
Division was released on August 3 and the First Division on Au- 
gust 15. I am, Mr. Secretary, 

Very Respectfully, 
John J. Pershing, 
General, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces. 











AMERICA’S AMAZING ACHIEVEMENT 





The following summary of America’s participation in the World 
War was compiled from data prepared by Colonel Leonard P. Ayres, 


Chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff. Before becoming 


a member of the General Staff, Colonel Ayres was director of the 
Departments of Education and Statistics of the Russell Sage Founda- 
lion. 


FOUR MILLION MEN. 


1. * The number of men serving in the armed forces of the Nation 
during the war was 4,800,000, of whom 4,000,000 served in the 
Army. 

2. In the War with Germany the United States raised twice as 
many men as did the Northern States in the Civil War, but only half 
as many in proportion to the population. 

The British sent more men to France in their first year of war 
than we did in our first year, but it took England three years to reach 
a strength of 2,000,000 men in France, and the United States accom- 
plished it in one-half of that time. 

4. Of every 100 men who served, 10 were National Guardsmen, 
13 were Regulars, and 77 were in the National Army (or would have 
been if the services had not been consolidated). 

5 Of the 54,000,000 males in the population, 26,000,000 were 
registered in the draft or were already in service. 

6. In the physical examinations the States of the Middle West 
made the best showing. Country boys did better than city boys; whites 
better than colored; and native born better than foreign born. 

7. In this war twice as many men were recruited as in the Civil 
War and at one-twentieth of the recruiting cost. 

8. There were 200,000 Army officers. Of every six officers, one 
had previous military training with troops, three were graduates of 
officers’ training camps, and two came directly from civil life. 


SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 


1. The average American soldier who fought in France had six 
months of training here, two months overseas before entering the line, 
and one month in a quiet sector before going into battle. 

2. Most soldiers received their training in infantry divisions which 


are our typical combat units and consist of about 1,000 officers and 
27,000 men. 

3. Forty-two divisions were sent to France. 

4. More than two-thirds of our line officers were graduates of the 
officers’ training camps. 

5. France and England sent to the United States nearly 800 
specially skilled officers and noncommissioned officers who rendered 
most important aid as instructors in our training camps. 


FOOD, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. 


1. The problems of feeding and clothing the Army were difficult 
because of the immense quantities involved rather than because of the 
difficulty of manufacturing the articles needed. 

Requirements for some kinds of clothing for the Army were 
more than twice as great as the prewar total American production of 
ihe same articles. 

3. To secure the articles needed for the Army the Government had 
to commandeer all the wool and some other staple articles in the 
United States and control production through all its stages. 

4. The distribution of supplies in the expeditionary forces required 
the creation of an organization called the Services of Supply, to which 
one-fourth of all the troops who went overseas were assigned. 

5. American Engineers built in France 83 new ship berths, 1,000 
miles of standard-gauge track, and 538 miles of narrow-gauge track. 

6. The Signal Corps strung in France 100,000 miles of telephone 
and telegraph wire. 

7, Prior to the armistice 40,000 trucks were shipped to the forces 
in France. 

8. Construction projects in the United States cost twice as much 
as the Panama Canal, and construction overseas was on nearly as large 
a scale. 

9, The Army in France always had enough food and clothing. 


SPRINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS AND BROWNINGS. 
1. When war was declared the Army had on hand nearly 600,000 


Springfield rifles. Their manufacture was continued, and the American 
Enfield rifle designed and put into production. 


2. The total production of Springfield and Enfield rifles up to 
the signing of the armistice was over 2,500,000. 

3. The use of machine guns on a large scale is a development of the 
European war. In the American Army the allowance in 1912 was 
four machine guns per regiment. In 1919 the new Army plans provide 
for an equipment of 336 guns per regiment, or eighty-four times as 
many. 

4. The entire number of American machine guns produced to the 
end of 1918 was 227,000. 

5. During the war the Browning automatic rifle and the Browning 
machine gun were developed, put into quantity production, and used in 
large numbers in the final battles in France. 

6. The Browning machine guns are believed to be more effective 
than the corresponding weapon used in any other army. 

7. American production of rifle ammunition amounted to approxi- 


mately 3,500,000,000, of which 1,500,000,000 were shipped over- 


seas. 


TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 


1. When war was declared the United States had sufficient light 
artillery to equip an army of 500,000 men, and shortly found itself 
confronted with the problem of preparing to equip 5,000,000 men. 

2. To meet the situation it was decided in June, 1917, to allot our 
guns to training purposes and_ to equip our forces in France with 
artillery conforming to the French and British standard calibers. 

It was arranged that we should purchase from the French and 
British the artillery needed for our first divisions and ship them in 
return equivalent amounts of steel, copper, and other raw materials so 
that they could either manufacture guns for us in their own factories 
01 give us guns out of their stocks and replace them by new ones made 
from our materials. 

4. Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of complete artillery 
units produced in American plants was more than 3,000, or equal to 
all those purchased from the French and British during the war. 

5. The number of rounds of complete artillery ammunition pro- 
duced in American plants was in excess of 20,000,000, as compared 
with 9,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British. 

6. In the first 20 months after the declaration of war by each 
country the British did better than we did in the production of light 
artillery, and we excelled them in producing heavy artillery and both 
light and heavy ammunition. 

7. So far as the Allies were concerned, the European war was in 
large measure fought with American powder and high explosives. 


8. At the end of the war American production of smokeless pow- 
der was 45 per cent greater than the French and British production 
combined. 

9. At the end of the war the American production of high explo- 
sives was 40 per cent greater than Great Britain’s and nearly double 
that of France. | 

10. During the war America produced 10,000 tons of gas, much 
of which was sold to the French and British. 

11. Out of every hundred days that our combat divisions were in 
line in France they were supported by their own artillery for 75 days, 
by British artillery for 5 days, and by French for 1'4 days, Of the 
remaining 181/7 days that they were in line without artillery, 18 days 
were in quiet sectors, and only one-half of | one day in each hundred 
was in active sectors. 

12. In round numbers, we had in France 3,500 pieces of artillery, 
of which nearly 500 were made in America, and we used on the firing 
line 2,250 pieces, of which over 100 were made in America. 


AIRPLANES, MOTORS AND BALLOONS. 


1. On the declaration of war the United States had 55 training 
airplanes, of which 51 were classified as obsolete and the other 4 as 
obsolescent. 

2. When we entered the war the Allies made the designs of their 
planes available to us and before the end of hostilities furnished us 
from their own manufacture 3,800 service planes. 

3. Aviation training schools in the United States graduated 8,602 
men from elementary courses and 4,028 from advanced courses. More 
than 5,000 pilots and observers were sent overseas. 

4. The total personnel of the Air Service, officers, students, and 
enlisted men, increased from 1,200 at the outbreak of the war to nearly 
200,000 at its close. 

5. There were produced in the United States to November 30, 
1918, more than 8,000 training planes and more than 16,000 training 
engines. 

The De Haviland-4 observation and day bombing plane was 
the only plane the United States put into quantity production. Before 
the signing of the armistice 3,227 had been completed and 1,885 
shipped overseas. The plane was successfully used at the front for 
three months. 

7. The production of the 12-cylinder Liberty engine was America’s 
chief contribution to aviation. Before the armistice 13,574 had been 
completed, 4,435 shipped to the expeditionary forces, and 1,025 de- 
livered to the Allies. 


; 





8. The first flyers in action wearing the American uniform were 
members of the Lafayette Escadrille, who were transferred to the 
American service in December, 1917. 

9. The American air force at the front grew from 3 squadrons 
in April to 45 in November, 1918. On November | 1 the 45 squad- 
rons had an equipment of 740 planes. 

10. Of 2,698 planes sent to the zone of the advance for American 
aviators 667, or nearly one-fourth, were of American manufacture. 

11. American air squadrons played important roles in the battles 
of Chateau-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. They 
brought down in combat 755 enemy planes,: while their own losses 
of planes numbered only 357. 


TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 


1. Two out of every three American soldiers who reached France 
took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,084,000, 
and of these 1,390,000 saw active service at the front. 

2. Of the 42 divisions that reached France 29 took part in active 
combat service. Seven of them were Regular Army divisions, | | 
were organized from the Naticnal Guard, and 11 were made up of 
National Army troops. 

3. American divisions were in battle for 200 days and engaged 
in 13 major operations. 

4. From the middle of August until the end of the war the Ameri- 
can divisions held during the greater part of the time a front longer 
than that held by the Bnitish. 

5. In October the American divisions held 101 miles of line. or 
23 per cent of the entire western front. 

6. On the Ist of April the Germans had a superiority of 324,000 
in rifle strength. Due to American arrivals the allied strength exceeded 
that of the Germans in June and was more than 600,000 above it in 
November. 

7. In the Battle of St. Mihiel 550,000 Americans were engaged, 
as compared with about 100,000 on the Northern side in the Battle 
of Gettysburg. The artillery fired more than 1,000,000 shells in four 
hours, which is the most intense concentration of artillery fire recorded 
in history. 

8. The Meuse-Argonne Battle lasted for 47 days, during which 
1,200,000 American troops were engaged. 


A MILLION DOLLARS AN HOUR. 


1. The war cost the United States considerably more than 
$1,000,000 an hour for over two years, 


2. The direct cost was about $22,0000,000,000, or nearly enough 
to pay the entire cost of running the United States Government from 
1791 up to the outbreak of the European war. 

3. Our expenditures in this was was sufficient to have carried on 
the Revolutionary War continuously for more than |,000 years at the 
rate of expenditure which that war actually involved. 

4. In addition to this huge expenditure nearly $10,000,000,000 
have been loaned by the United States to the Allies. 

5. The Army expenditures have been over $14,000,000,000, or 
nearly two-thirds of our total war costs. 

6. During the first three months our war expenditures were at the 
rate of $2,000,000 per day. During the next, year they averaged 
more than $22,000,000 a day. For the final ten months of the period, 
from April, 1916, to April, 1919, the daily average was over 
$44,000,000. 

7. Although the Army expenditures are less than two-thirds of 
our total war costs, they are nearly equal to the value of all the gold 
produced in the whole world from the discovery of America up to the 
outbreak of the Eurcpean war. 

8. The pay of the Army during the war cost more than the com- 
bined salaries of all the public-schooi principals and teachers in the 
United States for the five years from 1912 to 1916. 

9. The total war costs of all nations were about $186,000,000,- 
000, of which the Allies and the United States spent two thirds and 
the enemy one-third. 

10. The three naticns spending the greatest amounts were Ger- 
many, Great Britain, and France, in that order. After them come 
the United States and Austria-Hungary, with substantially equal ex- 
penditures. 

11. The United States spent about one-eighth of the entire cost of 
the war, and something less than one-fifth of the expenditures of the 
allied side. 

Agi FE; CASUALTY LIST: 


TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES TO JANUARY 19, 1920. 


Killed in action—including 382 at sea............-..... 34,774 
Dicdso te. OUnd See re RE er ec ees i ui eee 13,961 
Diedsotabiscasceeertoe. mceite eters, = Ss ed eae ee re 23,734 
Died from Accident and Other Causes...............-- S157 


Wounded in Action (over 85 per cent returned to duty)... .215,424 
Missing in Action—not including prisoners released and tre: 
LINCO Saat eee met oes, Ok. ais, es 3 


CTiotal arom) atcapaeet IRE Ls. mtic shes tv. ood ates 293,053 


Acknowledgment 


For invaluable aid and co-operation in the compilation of this portfolio 
grateful acknowledgment is made to— 


Mr. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War Mr. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy 


Major General Charles T. Menoher, Director of the Air Service Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, Director, Military Intel- 


ligence Division, General Staff 
Brigadier General Fox Conner, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F. 


Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. Spaulding, Chief, Historical Branch, War 


Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hickam, Air Service Plans Division, General Staff 

Major Rowan P. Lemly, /nf., U. S. A. Lieutenant Colonel Noble B. Judah, G-2, 42d Div. 

Mr. Ralph A. Hayes, Secretary to the Secretary of War Major Edward J. Steichen, Chief, Photographic Section, Air Service 
Major Kendall Banning, General Staff Mr. William Cochran ~ 

Lieutenant John McDonnell, Air Service Captain Fred Place, Air Service 


The Authors 


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